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PHILOSOPHY AND JEWISH MYSTICISM*

By Gerhard Gershom Scholem

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Mystical religion seeks to transform the God that it encounters in the peculiar religious consciousness of its own social environment from an object of dogmatical knowledge into a novel and living experience. Jewish mysticism in its various forms represents an attempt to interpret the religious values of Judaism in terms of the idea of the living God, who manifests Himself in the acts of creation, revelation, and redemption. Pushed to its extreme, the mystical contemplation of this idea gives birth to the conception of a sphere, a whole realm of divinity, that underlies the world of our sense data and is present and active in all that exists. This is the meaning of what the Kabbalists call *Sefiroth;* and this conception requires explanation.

The attributes of the living God undergo a peculiar transformation when compared with the meaning given to them by the philosophers of Judaism. Among these Maimonides felt bound to ask: How is it possible to say of God that He is good? Does that not imply a limitation of the infinite Being? The words, "God is good," he argued, can only mean that He is not bad; that is, He is the opposite of all that is negative. He is the negation of privation. A quite different reply is given by the Kabbalist, for whom the distinction, even the conflict, between the known and the unknown God takes on a significance denied to it by the philosophers of Judaism. The mystic strives to assure himself of the living presence of God, the God of the Bible, the God who is good, wise, just, and merciful, and the embodiment of all other positive attributes. But at the same time he is unwilling to renounce the idea of the hidden God who remains eternally unknowable in the depths of His own self, or, to use the bold expression of the Kabbalists, "in the depth of his nothingness." This hidden God may be without special attributes. The living God, of whom Revelation speaks, and with whom all religion is concerned, must have attributes which rep-

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resent to the mystic the scale of moral values to be realized in life. God is good, God is severe, God is merciful and just, etc. The mystic does not recoil even before the consequence that in a higher sense there is a root of evil even in God. The goodness or mercy or benevolence of God, in other words, are not simply the negation of evil but a whole sphere of divine light in which God manifests Himself under this particular aspect to the contemplation of the Kabbalist. The spheres, which are often described with the aid of mythical metaphors and provide the key for a kind of mystical topography of the divine realm, are themselves nothing but stages in the revelation of God's creative power. Every attribute represents a given stage, including the attribute of severity and judgment which mystical speculation has connected with the source of evil in God. The mystic who sets out to grasp the meaning of God's absolute unity is thus faced at the outset with an infinite complexity of heavenly spheres and stages as described in the Kabbalist texts. From the contemplation of these he proceeds to the conception of God as the union and the root of all these contradictions. Generally speaking, the mystics do not seem to conceive of God as absolute being or absolute becoming but as the union of both, much as the hidden God, of whom nothing is known to us, and the living God of religious experience and revelation are one and the same. Kabbalism, in other words, is not dualistic, although historically a close connection exists between the Kabbalist way of thinking and the Gnostic position that the hidden God and the Creator are opposing principles. On the contrary, all the speculative energy of orthodox Kabbalists is bent to the task of escaping from dualistic consequences; otherwise they could not have maintained themselves within the Jewish community.

It is possible to say that the mystical interpretation of the attributes and the unity of God in the doctrine of the *Sefiroth* constituted a problem common to all Jewish mystics, though the solutions given to it by and in the various schools differ. In the same way, all Jewish mystics, from Philo of Alexandria to the latest Hassid, are at one in giving to the Torah a mystical interpretation. To them the Torah is a living organism animated by a secret life, which streams and pulsates below the surface of its literal meaning. Each of the innumerable strata of this hidden region corresponds to a new and profound meaning of the Torah. The Torah, in other words, does not consist merely of chapters,

phrases, and words; it is rather to be regarded as the living incarnation of the divine wisdom, which is eternally sending out new rays of light. It is not merely the historical law of the Chosen People, although it is that, too; it is rather the cosmic law of the universe as God's wisdom conceived it. Each configuration of letters in it, whether or not it makes sense in human speech, symbolizes a certain given aspect of God's power that is active in the universe. And just as the thoughts of God, in contrast to those of man, are of infinite profundity, so also no single interpretation of the Torah in human language is capable of taking in the whole of its meaning. It cannot be denied that this method of interpretation proved almost barren for the objective understanding of Holy Writ, but it is equally undeniable that, viewed in this new light, the Sacred Books exerted a powerful influence on the individual, who discovered in their written texts the secret of his life and of his God. After all, it is the usual fate of sacred writings to become more or less divorced from the intentions of their authors. What may be called their after-life, those aspects that are discovered by later generations, frequently becomes of greater importance than their original meaning. Besides, who knows what their original meaning was?

Like all their confrères, whether Christian or Muslim, the Jewish mystics cannot, of course, escape from the fact that the relation between mystical contemplation and the fundamental facts of human life and intellect is highly paradoxical. But in the Kabbala these paradoxes of the mystical mind frequently assume a peculiar form. Take for example the paradoxes of mystic speech, one of the fundamental problems of mystical thought throughout the ages. How is it possible to give lingual expression to mystical knowledge, which by its very nature is related to a sphere where speech and expression are excluded? How is it possible to paraphrase adequately in mere words the most intimate act of all, the contact of the individual with the divine? And yet the urge of the mystics for self-expression is well known. They continuously and bitterly complain of the utter inadequacy of words to express their true feelings, but, for all that, they glory in them; they indulge in rhetoric and never weary of trying to express the inexpressible in words. All writers on mysticism have laid stress on this point. Jewish mysticism is no exception, yet it is distinguished by two unusual characteristics which may in some way be interrelated: first, the striking restraint of the Kabbalists in referring to the supreme ex-

perience; and secondly, their metaphysically positive attitude towards language as God's own instrument.

When the writings of Jewish mystics are compared with the mystical literature of other religions a considerable difference is noticeable, a difference which has to some extent made difficult, or even prevented, an understanding of the deeper meaning of Kabbalism. Nothing could be further from the truth than the assumption that the religious experience of the Kabbalists knows nothing of that which forms the essence of mystical experience everywhere and at all times. The ecstatic experience, the encounter with absolute Being in the depths of one's own soul, or however one prefers to describe the aim of mystical nostalgia, has been shared by the heirs of rabbinical Judaism as one of the original and fundamental impulses of man. But they had at the same time an overwhelmingly strong disinclination to treat in express terms these strictly mystical experiences. Not only is the form different in which these experiences are expressed, but the will to express them and to impart the knowledge of them is lacking, or is counteracted, by other factors. The autobiographies of great mystics, who have tried to give an account of their inner experiences in a direct and personal manner, are the glory of mystical literature. Many of these confessions, for all their many contradictions, besides providing some of the most important material for the understanding of mysticism, are also veritable pearls of literature. The Kabbalists, however, are no friends of mystical autobiography. They aim to describe the realm of divinity and the other subjects of their contemplation in an objective way, by burning, as it were, their ships behind them. They glory in objective description and are deeply averse to letting their own personalities intrude into the picture. The wealth of expression at their disposal is not inferior to that of their autobiographical confrères. It is as though they were hampered by a sense of shame. Documents of an intimate and personal nature are not entirely lacking, but it is characteristic that they are to be found almost wholly in manuscripts which the Kabbalists themselves would hardly have allowed to be printed. On the whole, I am inclined to believe that this dislike of a too personal indulgence in self-expression may have been caused by the fact, among others, that the Jews retained a particularly vivid sense of the incongruity of mystical experience with an idea of God that stressed the aspects of creator, king, and law-giver.

My second point is that Kabbalism is distinguished by an unusually positive attitude towards language. Kabbalists, who differ in almost everything else, are agreed in regarding language as something more precious than an inadequate instrument of contact among human beings. To them Hebrew, the sacred language, is not simply an instrument for expressing certain thoughts, born out of a certain convention and having a purely conventional character, as it was according to the theory of language dominant in the Middle Ages. Language in its purest form, that is, Hebrew, according to the Kabbalists, reflects the fundamental spiritual nature of the world; in other words, it has mystical value. Speech reaches God because it comes from God. Man's common language, which has prima facie only an intellectual function, reflects the creative language of God. All creation—and this is an important principle of most Kabbalists—is, from the point of view of God, nothing but an expression of His hidden self that begins and ends by giving itself a name, the sacred name of God, the perpetual act of creation. All that lives is an expression of God's language; and what can revelation reveal in the last resort if not the name of God? What I mean to emphasize is this peculiar interpretation of the faculty of speech, which sees in it, and in its mystical analysis, a key to the deepest secrets of the Creator and creation.

J. Bernhart, one of the explorers of the world of mysticism, was justified in saying: "Has anyone done more to create historical movement than those who seek and proclaim the immovable?" This question brings us to the problem of the historical role of mysticism within the framework of Jewish tradition. Kabbala, it must be remembered, is not the name of a certain dogma or system, but the general term applied to a whole religious movement. This movement has been going on from Talmudic times to the present day; its development, though by no means uniform, has been uninterrupted and often dramatic. It leads from R. Akiba, of whom the Talmud says that he left the Paradise of mystical speculation safe and sane as he had entered it (something which cannot, indeed, be said of every Kabbalist) to the late Rabbi Kuk, the religious leader of the Jewish community in Palestine and a splendid type of Jewish mystic. Within this movement there is a considerable variety of religious experience, to use William James' expression. There have been many different currents of thought and various systems and forms of speculation. There is little resemblance

between the earliest mystical texts in our possession, dating from Talmudic and post-Talmudic days, and the writings of the ancient Spanish Kabbalists; or those of the school which later flourished in Safad, the holy town of Kabbalism in the sixteenth century; or, finally, the Hassidic literature of the modern age. And yet the question must be asked whether there is not something more than a purely historical connection uniting these *disjecta membra*, something to provide us a hint as to what makes this mystical movement in Judaism differ from non-Jewish mysticism. Such a common denominator can, perhaps, be discovered in certain unchanging fundamental ideas concerning God, creation, and the part played by man in the universe. Two of these ideas I have mentioned above, namely, the attributes of God and the symbolic meaning of the Torah. But it may also be that it is to be found in the attitude of the Jewish mystic towards those dominant spiritual forces which have conditioned and shaped the intellectual life of Jewry during the last two thousand years: the Halacha, the Agada, and the philosophy of Judaism. To a summary discussion of the relations of Jewish mysticism to the Halacha and the Agada on the one hand and to the philosophy of Judaism on the other, I now turn.

It is generally believed that the attitude of mysticism towards history is one of aloofness, or even of contempt. The historical aspects of religion have meaning for the mystic chiefly as symbols of acts which he conceives as being divorced from time, or constantly repeated in the soul of man. Thus, according to the mystic, the exodus from Egypt, the fundamental event of our history, cannot have come to pass once only and in one place; it must correspond to an event which takes place in ourselves, an exodus from an inner Egypt in which we all are enslaved. Only thus conceived does the exodus cease to be a subject of learning and acquire the dignity of immediate religious experience. In the same way, it will be remembered, the doctrine of "Christ in us" acquired so great an importance among the mystics of Christianity that the historical Jesus Christ was often relegated to the background. If, however, the Absolute which the mystic seeks is not to be found in the varying occurrences of history, he may conclude that it must either antedate the course of mundane history or else reveal itself in the last age. In other words, knowledge both of the primary facts of creation

and of its end, of eschatological salvation and bliss, can acquire a mystical significance.

"The mystic," says Charles E. Bennet in his penetrating essay, *A Philosophical Study of Mysticism*, "as it were forestalls the processes of history by anticipating in his own life the enjoyment of the last age." This eschatological nature of mystical knowledge is apparent in the writings of many Jewish mystics, from the anonymous authors of the early *Hekhaloth* treatises to R. Nahman of Brazlav. The consensus of Kabbalist opinion regards the mystical way to God as a reversion of the process by which we have emanated from God. To know the stages of the creative process is also to know the stages of one's own return to the root of all existence. In this sense the interpretation of Maasse Bereshith, the esoteric doctrine of creation, has always been one of the main preoccupations of Kabbalism. It is here that Kabbalism comes nearest to Neo-platonic thought, of which Dodds has said with truth, "procession and reversion together constitute a single movement, the diastole and systole, which is the life of the universe." Exactly that is also the belief of the Kabbalist.

But the cosmogonic and the eschatological trends of Kabbalist speculation, which we have tried to define, are in the last resort ways of escaping from history rather than instruments for understanding it; that is to say, they do not help us to gauge the intrinsic meaning of history. There is, however, a more striking instance of the link between the concepts of Jewish mysticism and those of history. It is a remarkable fact that the very term "Kabbala," under which it has become best known, is derived from an historical concept. Kabbala means literally tradition, in itself an excellent example of the paradoxical nature of mysticism to which I have referred before. The very doctrine which centers about the immediate personal contact with the divine, that is to say a highly personalized and intimate form of knowledge, is conceived as traditional wisdom. The fact is, however, that the idea of Jewish mysticism from the start combined the conception of a knowledge which by its very nature, is difficult to impart and therefore secret, with that of a knowledge which is the secret tradition of chosen spirits or adepts. Jewish mysticism, therefore, is a secret doctrine in a double sense, a characteristic which cannot be said to apply to all forms of mysticism. It is a secret doctrine because it treats of the most deeply hidden and fundamental matters of human life; but it is a secret also

because it is confined to a small élite of the chosen who impart the knowledge to their disciples. It is true that this picture never wholly corresponded to life. Against the doctrine of the chosen few, who alone may partake in the mystery, must be set the fact that, at least during certain periods of history, the Kabbalists themselves have tried to bring under their influence much wider circles, even the whole nation. There is an analogy between this development and that of the mystery religions of the Hellenistic period of antiquity, when secret doctrines of an essentially mystical nature were diffused among ever growing numbers of persons.

It must be kept in mind that, in the sense in which it is understood by the Kabbalist himself, mystical knowledge is not his private property which has been revealed to him, and to him only, in his personal experience. On the contrary, the purer and more nearly perfect it is, the nearer it is to the original stock of knowledge common to mankind. To use the expression of the Kabbalist, the knowledge of things human and divine that Adam, the father of mankind, possessed is therefore also possessed by the mystic. For this reason the Kabbala advanced what was at once a claim and an hypothesis, namely, that its function was to hand down to its own disciples the secret of God's revelation to Adam. Little though this claim is grounded in fact—and I am inclined to believe that even many Kabbalists did not regard it seriously—the fact that such a claim was made appears to me highly characteristic of Jewish mysticism. Reverence for the traditional has always been deeply rooted in Judaism, and even the mystics, who actually broke away from tradition, retained a reverent attitude towards it; it led them directly to their theory of the coincidence of true intuition and true tradition.

Another approach will take us deeper into the problem. I have already said that the mystical sphere is the meeting-place of two worlds or stages in the development of human consciousness: one primitive and one advanced, the world of mythos and that of revelation. This fact cannot be left out of account in dealing with the Kabbala. Whoever tries to get a better understanding of its ideas, without attempting anything in the nature of an apology, cannot fail to notice that it contains, side by side with a deep and sensitive understanding of the essence of religious feeling, a mode of thought characteristic of primitive mythological thinking. The peculiar affinity of Kabbalist thought

to the world of mythos cannot well be doubted, and should certainly not be obscured or lightly dismissed, because the notion of a mythical domain within Judaism seems strange and paradoxical to us who are accustomed to thinking of Jewish monotheism as the classical example of a religion which has severed all links with mythos. It is, indeed, surprising that in the very heart of Judaism ideas and notions sprang up purporting to interpret its meaning better than any others, and yet representing a relapse into, or, if you like, a revival of, the mythical consciousness. This is particularly true of the Zohar and the Lurjanic Kabbala, those forms of Jewish mysticism that have exerted by far the greatest influence in Jewish history, and have stood out for centuries in the popular mind as bearers of the final and deepest truth in Jewish thought.

It is useless to get indignant over these facts as Graetz did; they should rather set us thinking. Their importance for the history of the Jewish people, particularly during the past four centuries, has been far too great to permit them to be ridiculed and treated as mere deviations. Perhaps, after all, there is something wrong with the popular conception of monotheism as being opposed to mythos; perhaps monotheism contains room for the development of mythical lore on a deeper plane. I do not believe that all those devoted and pious spirits to be found in large numbers among Ashkenasic and Sephardic Jewry, ceased to be Jews also in the religious sense after the exodus from Spain, merely because their forms of belief appear to contradict certain modern theories of Judaism. And I therefore ask myself: What is the secret of the tremendous success of the Kabbala among our people? Why did it succeed in becoming a decisive factor of our history, in shaping the lives of a large proportion of Jewry over a period of centuries, while its contemporary, rational Jewish philosophy, was unsuccessful in achieving the spiritual hegemony for which it strove? This is a pressing question. I cannot accept the explanation that the facts I have described are solely due to external historical circumstances, that persecution and decline weakened the spirit of the people, and made them seek refuge in the darkness of mysticism because they could not bear the light of reason. The matter appears to me to be more complicated, and I should like briefly to submit my answer to the question. The secret of the success of the Kabbala lies in the fact that its relation to the spiritual heritage of rabbinical Judaism differs from that of rationalist philoso-

phy in that it is more deeply and more positively connected with the main forces active in Judaism.

Undoubtedly both the mystics and the philosophers completely transform the structure of ancient Judaism; both have lost the simplicity of the classical documents of rabbinical literature. Classical Judaism expressed itself; it did not reflect upon itself. By contrast, the mystics and the philosophers of a later stage of religious development make of Judaism itself a problem. Instead of simply speaking their minds, they tend to produce an ideology of Judaism, an ideology, moreover, that comes to the rescue of tradition by giving it a new interpretation. It is not as though the rise of Jewish philosophy and of Jewish mysticism took place in widely separated ages, or as though the Kabbala, as Graetz saw it, was a reaction against a wave of rationalism. Rather the two movements are interrelated and interdependent. Neither were they, from the start, manifestly opposed to each other, a fact which is often overlooked. On the contrary, the rationalism of some of the "enlighteners" frequently betrays a mystical tendency; and, conversely, the mystic who has not yet learned to speak in his own language often uses and misuses the vocabulary of philosophy. Only very gradually did the Kabbalists, rather than the philosophers, begin to perceive the implications of their own ideas, and the conflict between a purely philosophical interpretation of the world and an attitude progressing from rational thought to irrational contemplation, and thence to the mystical interpretation of the universe. What many mystics felt towards philosophy was succinctly expressed by R. Moses of Burgos at the end of the thirteenth century. If he heard the philosophers praised, he used to say in some anger: "You ought to know that these philosophers whose wisdom you are praising end where we begin." Actually this means two things. On the one hand, it means that the Kabbalists are largely concerned with the investigation of a sphere of religious reality that lies quite outside the orbit of mediaeval Jewish philosophy; their purpose is to discover a new stratum of religious consciousness. On the other hand, though R. Moses may not have intended to say this, they stand on the shoulders of the philosophers, and it is easier for them to see farther than their rivals. To repeat, the Kabbala certainly did not arise as a reaction against philosophical enlightenment, but it is true that, once there, the Kabbala functioned in opposition to it. At the same time, an intellec-

tual dispute went on between the Kabbala and the forces of the philosophical movement which left deep marks on the structure of the former. The Kabbalists employed the ideas and conceptions of orthodox theology, but the magic wand of mysticism opened up hidden sources of new life in the heart of many scholastic ideas and abstractions. Philosophers may lift their eyebrows at what must appear to them a misunderstanding of the meaning of philosophical ideas. But it is precisely such misunderstanding that often becomes productive of original thought in the mystical sphere.

Let me take as an illustration of what I have said the idea of "creation out of nothing." In the dogmatical disputations of Jewish philosophy the question whether or not Judaism implies belief in this concept, and if so, in precisely what sense, has played an important part. I shall not go into the difficulties with which the orthodox theologians found themselves faced whenever they tried to preserve the full meaning of this idea of creation out of nothing. In its simplest sense, it affirms the creation of the world by God out of something that is neither God Himself nor any kind of existence, but simply the nonexistent. The mystics, too, speak of creation out of nothing; in fact, it is one of their favorite formulae. But in their case the orthodox term conceals a meaning that differs considerably from the original one. This "nothing" from which everything has sprung is by no means a mere negation; only to us does it have no attributes because it is beyond the reach of intellectual knowledge. In truth, however, this "nothing"—to quote one of the Kabbalists—is infinitely more real than all other reality. Only when the soul has stripped itself of all limitation, and, in mystical language, has descended into the depths of nothing does it encounter the divine. For this "nothing" comprises a wealth of mystical reality although it cannot be defined. "*Un Dieu défini serait un Dieu fini.*" In a word, it signifies the divine itself in its most impenetrable guise. And, in fact, creation out of nothing means to many mystics just creation out of God. Creation out of nothing thus becomes the symbol of emanation, that is to say, of an idea which, in the history of philosophy and theology, stands farthest removed from it.

Let us return to our original problem. As we have seen, the renaissance of Judaism on a new plane is the common concern of both the mystics and the philosophers. For all that there remains a considerable

difference, a good example of which is afforded by the conception of *Sitre Torah,* or "Secrets of the Law." The philosophers, no less than the mystics, talk of discovereing these secrets, using esoteric phraseology so profusely that their style is hardly distinguishable from that of the real esoterics and Kabbalists. But what are these secrets according to the philosopher? They are the truths of philosophy, the truths of the metaphysics or ethics of Aristotle, or Alfarabi, or Ibn Sina; truths, in other words, which are capable of being discovered outside the sphere of religion and which were projected into the old books by way of allegorical or typological interpretation. The documents of religion are, therefore, not conceived of as expressing a separate and distinct world of religious truth and reality, but rather as giving a simplified description of the relations which exist among the ideas of philosophy. The story of Abraham and Sara, of Lot and his wife, of the twelve tribes, etc., are simply descriptions of the relation between matter and form, spirit and matter, or the faculties of the mind. Even where the allegory was not pushed to such absurd extremes, the tendency was to regard the Torah as a mere vehicle of philosophical truth, if indeed a particularly exalted or a perfect one. In other words, the philosopher can proceed with his proper task only after having successfully converted the concrete reality of Judaism into a bundle of abstractions. A separate phenomenon is to him no object of philosophical contemplation. By contrast, the mystic refrains from destroying the living texture of religious narrative by allegorizing it, although allegory plays an important part in the writings of a great many Kabbalists. The mystic's essential mode of thinking is what I should like to call symbolical in the strictest sense. Abraham is the historical Abraham; an act which is prescribed by religion, a Mizwah, is not merely a way of remembering some lofty moral idea or other. It has, on the contrary, preserved its particular meaning. But, both in the person of Abraham and in the Mizwah, a deeper and hidden sphere of reality becomes transparent. In the mystical symbol which the Kabbalist discovers everywhere in his own life, the infinite shines through the finite and makes it more, not less, real. This gives an idea of the profound difference between, on the one hand, the allegorical interpretation of religion practiced by the philosophers and, on the other, its symbolical understanding by the mystics.

The difference becomes clear if we consider the attitude of philoso-

phy and Kabbala respectively to the two outstanding creative manifestations of classical Jewry: Halakha and Agada. It is a remarkable fact that the philosophers failed to establish a satisfactory and intimate relation to either. They seemed unable to make the spirit of Halacha and Agada, though fundamental in the Jewish soul, productive of new meaning and vitality.

Let us begin with Halakha, the world of sacred law and, therefore, the most important factor in the real life of ancient Jewry. Dr. Altmann, in his important essay, *Was ist jüdische Theologie?* (1933), is quite justified in regarding as one of the decisive weaknesses of classical Jewish philosophy the fact that it ignored the problem presented by the Halakha. The whole world of religious law remained outside the orbit of philosophical inquiry; consequently, of course, it was not subjected to philosophical criticism. It is not as if the philosopher denied or defied this world. He, too, lived in it and bowed to it, but it never became part and parcel of his work as a philosopher. It furnished no material for his thoughts. This undeniable fact is particularly conspicuous in the case of thinkers like Maimonides and Saadya, in whom the converging streams met. Their entire failure to establish a true synthesis of the two elements has already been pointed out by Samuel David Luzzatto. Maimonides, for instance, prefaces the Mishneh Torah, his great codification of the Halakha, with a philosophical chapter that has no relation whatever to the Halakha itself. The synthesis of the two worlds remains sterile, and the genius that moulded them into a semblance of union cannot hide their intrinsic disparity. For a purely historical understanding of religion Maimonides' analysis of the origin of the religious commandments (*Guide of the Perplexed*, Part III) is of great importance; but it would be bold to maintain that his ideology of the Mizwoth tended to appeal immediately to the religious feelings of the faithful or to increase their enthusiasm for their actual practice. If the prohibition against seething a kid in his mother's milk, and many similar irrational commandments, are explainable by polemics against long forgotten pagan rites, if the offering of sacrifice is a concession to the primitive mind, if other Mizwoth carry with them antiquated moral and philosophical ideas, how can one expect the community to remain faithful to practices the occasions of which have long since disappeared, and the aims of which can be attained directly through philosophical reasoning? To the philosopher the Halakha had

either no significance at all, or one that was calculated to diminish rather than to enhance its prestige in his eyes.

The attitude of the Kabbalists was entirely different; for them the Halakha never became a province of thought in which they felt themselves strangers. From the beginning, and with growing determination, they sought to master the world of the Halakha as a whole and in every detail. From the beginning, an ideology of the Halakha has been one of their aims. But their interpretation of religious commandments does not represent them as allegories of more or less profound ideas, or as pedagogical measures, but rather as the enactment of a secret rite (or mystery in the sense in which the term was used by the ancients). Whether or not one is appalled by this idea of the Halakha as a sacrament, a mystery rite, by this revival of myths right in the heart of Judaism, the fact remains that it was this transformation that raised the Halakha to a position of incomparable importance for the mystic, and strengthened its hold over the people. Every Mizwah became an event of cosmic importance, an act having bearing upon the dynamics of the universe. The religious Jew became a protagonist in the drama of the world; or at least he manipulated the strings behind the scene. Or, to use a less extravagant metaphor, if the whole universe is an enormous complicated machine, man is the machinist who keeps the wheels going by applying a few drops of oil here and there at the right time. The moral substance of man's action supplies this "oil," and his existence therefore becomes extremely significant, since it unfolds on a background of cosmic infiniteness. The danger of theosophical schematicism or, as S. H. Hirsch put it, of "magical mechanism," is, of course, inherent in such an interpretation of the Torah, and has more than once raised its head during the development of the Kabbalist movement. There is a danger in imagining magical mechanism to be operative in every sacramental action of an accompanying decline of spontaneity of action. But this conflict is inherent in any and every fulfilment of a religious command, since the prescribed duty is also conceived as self-willed and spontaneous. The antinomy is, in fact, inescapable, and can be overcome only by strong and unbroken religious feeling. When that begins to flag, the contradiction between command and free-will increases proportionately, and eventually gathers sufficient force to become destructive.

This interpretation of every religious act as a mystery, even when its

meaning was clear for all to see, or was expressly mentioned in the written or oral law, forged a strong link between Kabbala and Halakha which appears to me to have been, in large part, responsible for the influence of Kabbalist thought over successive generations.

A good deal of similarity to what I have said about the Halakha is apparent in the relation of philosophers and mystics, respectively, to the Agada. Here, too, right from the beginning their ways part. The Agada is an excellent mirror of spontaneous religious life and feeling during the rabbinical period of Judaism. In particular, it represents a method of giving original and concrete expression to the deepest motive powers of the religious Jew; and this quality helps to make it an excellent and genuine approach to the essentials of our religion. However, it was just this quality that never ceased to baffle the philosophers of Judaism. Their treatment of the Agada is embarrassed and fumbling. They almost certainly regarded it as a stumbling-block rather than as a precious heritage, let alone a mystery key. And thus it is not surprising that their allegorical interpretation of its meaning reflects an attitude which is not that of the Agada. Only too frequently their allegorizations are simply veiled criticism.

Here again the Kabbalists conceive their task differently although it also involves a transformation of the meaning of the subject. It would be too much to say that they leave the meaning of the Agada intact. They differ from the philosophers in that for them the Agada is not just a dead letter. They live in its historical continuity, and they are able, therefore, to enhance it, though in the spirit of mysticism. No Kabbalist was ever embarrassed by an old Agada; particularly those Agadoth that were anathema to "enlightened" Jews were enthusiastically hailed by the Kabbalists as symbols of their own interpretation of the universe. The anthropomorphical Agadoth belong to this class as well as certain epigrams, such as R. Abbahu's saying that, before making this world, God made many others and destroyed them because He did not like them. The philosophers, who had passed through the school of Aristotle, never felt at home in the world of Midrash. But the more extravagant and paradoxical these Agadoth appeared to them, the more the Kabbalist was convinced that they were among the keys to the mystical realm. Agadist influence can be traced in the Kabbalist vocabulary, and favorite figures of speech almost to the same extent as philosophy and Gnosticism, Scripture being, of

course, the most prevalent of all. The Agada can, in a way, be regarded as a popular mythos of the Jewish world.

The point I have made, that mysticism represents to a certain extent a revival of mythical lore, suggests finally a very serious point which I should like at least to mention. The Jewish mystic lives and acts in perpetual rebellion against a world with which he is outwardly at peace. Conversely, this fact is responsible for the profound ambiguity of his outlook, and it also explains the apparent self-contradiction inherent in a great many Kabbalist symbols and images. The great symbols of the Kabbala certainly come from creative and genuinely Jewish religious feeling, but at the same time they are invariably tinged with the world of mythos. Without this mythical element the ancient Jewish mystics could not have compressed into language the substance of their inner experience. It was Gnosticism, one of the final great manifestations of mythos in religious thought conceived in the struggle against Judaism as the conqueror of mythos, that lent figure of speech to the Jewish mystic. The importance of this paradox can hardly be exaggerated. It must be kept in mind that the whole meaning and purpose of those ancient myths and metaphors that the editors of the Book Bahir (and therefore the whole Kabbala) inherited from the Gnostics was simply the subversion of a law that had at one time disturbed and broken the order of the mythical world. Hence through wide and scattered provinces of Kabbalism the revenge of mythos upon its conqueror is clear for all to see, and together with it we find an abundance of contradictory symbols. It is characteristic of Kabbalistic theology in its systematized forms that it attempts to construct and to describe, in terms of thought that exclude the element of mythos, a world in which something of mythicism has again come to life. However, it is this contradiction more than anything else that explains the extraordinary success of Kabbalism in Jewish history. Mystics and philosophers are, as it were, both aristocrats of thought; yet Kabbalism succeeded in establishing a connection between its own world and certain elemental impulses operative in every human mind. It did not turn its back on the primitive side of life, that all-important region where mortals are afraid of both life and death, and derive scant wisdom from rational philosophy. Philosophy ignored these fears out of which man wove myths, and for turning its back on the primitive side of man it paid the high price of losing touch with him altogether. For

it is cold comfort to those who are plagued by genuine fear and sorrow to be told that their troubles are but workings of their own imaginations.

The main touchstone for this difference between the philosophers and the Kabbalists is their attitude towards the existence of evil in the world. On the whole, the philosophers of Judaism treat it as something meaningless in itself; to the Kabbalists, on the contrary, it is one of the most pressing problems possible, and one that keeps them continuously occupied with attempts to solve it. They have a strong sense of the reality of evil and the dark horror that surrounds everything living. They do not, like the philosophers, seek to evade its existence by the aid of a convenient formula; they try rather to penerate into its depths. And by doing so, they unwittingly establish a connection between their own strivings and the vital interests of popular belief—you may call it superstition—and all those concrete manifestations of Jewish life in which these fears found expression. It is a paradoxical fact that none other than the Kabbalists, through the interpretations of various religious acts and customs, has made clear what they signified to the average believer, if not what they really meant from the beginning. Jewish folklore is a living proof of this contention, as Lauterbach has shown in some particularly famous instances.

It would be idle to deny that Kabbalistic thought lost much of its magnificence where it was forced to descend from the pinnacles of philosophic speculation to the plane of ordinary thinking and acting. The dangers that mythos and magic present to the religious consciousness, including that of the mystic, are clearly shown in the development of Kabbalism. If one turns to the writings of great Kabbalists, one seldom fails to be torn between alternate admiration and disgust. There is a case for being quite clear about this in a time like ours, when the fashion of uncritical and superficial condemnation of even the most valuable elements of mysticism threatens to be replaced by an equally uncritical and obscurantist glorification of the Kabbala. I have said before that Jewish philosophy had to pay a high price for its escape from the pressing problems of real life. But Kabbalism, too, has had to pay for its success. Philosophy came dangerously near to losing the living God; Kabbalism, which set out to preserve Him, to blaze a new and glorious trail to Him, encountered mythos on its way and was tempted to lose itself in the labyrinth.

In conclusion, if I were asked what value I attach to Jewish mysticism, I should summarize as follows. Classical Jewish theology, both mediaeval and modern, in representatives like Saadya, Maimonides, and Hermann Cohen, has taken upon itself the task of formulating an antithesis to pantheism and mythicism, that is, to prove them wrong. In this endeavor it has shown itself tireless. What is really required, however, is an understanding of these phenomena that does not lead away from monotheism, and, once their significance is grasped, a clear definition of that elusive something in them that may be of value. To have posed this problem is the historic achievement of Kabbalism. The various answers it supplied to the question may be as inadequate as you like; I certainly am the last to deny that its representatives sometimes lost their way and ran over the edge of the precipice. The fact remains that they faced a problem of the greatest importance for Jewish theology which others were more concerned to ignore. The particular forms of symbolical thought in which the fundamental attitude of the Kabbala found its expression may mean little or nothing to us. But the attempt to discover the hidden life under the external shapes of reality, and to make visible that abyss in which the symbolical nature of all that exists reveals itself, this attempt is as important for us today as it was for the ancient mystics. For as long as nature and man are conceived as creations (and that is the indispensable condition of highly developed religious life), the quest for the hidden life of the transcendent element in such creation will always be one of the most important preoccupations of the human mind.

CO-OPERATION AND CONVERSION AMONG THE GREAT RELIGIONS

By John Clark Archer

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For all the religions which now claim or hope for men's allegiance, professing to be indispensable to human welfare, three questions have become vital: what is the real character of this or that religion? what is the effective power of each in its own situation? what are its prospects? The followers—or shall we say the leaders?—of any faith have more concern than ever with such questions. Humanity does not, and ought not to, stand still, whether in the art of living or in the life of faith. Humanity never has stood still, nor yet religion. And the future must be planned for, in so far as it may lie in man's own keeping. But men do not move forward through energy spontaneously generated at the moment, whatever the enthusiasm of the moment. Back of them, projected into them, is the experience of the race—of their own kind. They may do little more in their day than modify and enrich the technique of living, or of religion, wrought of old experiments, and little beyond elaborating the principles which their predecessors have enunciated. This way they find their answers to these questions.

We have said *become* vital, because in our day unusual uncertainty disturbs each religion from within, beyond any distress caused by so-called secular hostilities without. It is important for each faith to know itself beyond undue uncertainty. Perhaps it had once thought it knew—and in this way persuaded men to follow it. And then it found men of other faiths with other certainties, or, at least, convictions. Religions have stood face to face that have come from the ends of the earth, and from acquaintance bred of intercourse peculiar problems have emerged, especially for any faith which has assumed that its field is the whole world. Any such religion must be reappraised in practice, whatever is or has been its theory; and its character, power and prospects tested with reference to the total world-situation. Even a religion without an assumption of a world following must reckon today on the whole field—and be appraised by the whole. Perhaps it may hold a place somewhere in the final reckoning. It will hold a

place if it has embodied and expressed an "indispensable." It may thus outlive a change of *name*. No startling departures of lasting consequence may any more be expected from the principles and the technique followed by men of insight and devotion in the major areas of historical religion. The materials for the future of religion are already in existence. A living faith can only endure through its power of renewal in accordance with experience, through its repetition and elaboration of essentials. No religion of the day has had an altogether separate existence. Indeed, in an exact sense, it had no separate beginning. And there will be no *new* religion in the future.

There are seven great religions of our present world. The youngest, Islam, is over thirteen centuries old. Perhaps Hinduism, at least three thousand years of age, may be called the oldest. There are also Judaism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Christianity and Shinto. An eighth, "Primitivism," might justifiably be added, did it not already persist within these seven—it will never develop further in its own right. Four others, the religions of the Parsi, the Jain, the Taoist and the Sikh, may be expected to vanish ultimately beyond their lost horizons, probably yielding to the seven's saving reserves of unexpended power. Each of the seven seems to have a substance and a spirit of its own, assuring it of perpetuity. At least its character and contribution will be reckoned in the final whole. Each now occupies a place, whether geographical, racial, psychological, or otherwise, each ground, however, being subject to developmental change. Each has what we might call the power and the prestige of a certain pattern. Within limitations, yet to be spoken of, each of the seven great religions may be said to have the capacity of renewal in accordance with its pattern. Such seems to be a proper deduction from the evidence each has given in the past of immeasurable vitality, especially when in conflict—or in competition merely—with other faiths. It seems wellnigh impossible to foresee the final outcome in terms of the supremacy of any one religion. Surely no religion as it is now in its own peculiar situation can rightly expect, *as it is*, to gain the victory. Yet each has competitive resources of no mean worth, whatever use, offensive or defensive, be made of them.

Whatever acquaintance among religions—we mean among the followers, of course, for we are not dealing with abstractions entirely—has been fostered by recent world activities has blurred to some degree

the lines of demarcation which have outlined these religions. Lest this result be little more than superficial in its indication of the common wealth of faith, it is expedient for the faithful of all households to seek a better, a more critical understanding, and meanwhile to live in mutual, sympathetic aid on behalf of the world's welfare. In such association the distinctive values may be detected, and only by such association will the larger, ultimate values for mankind as a whole be realized. This is the method of practical comparison of religions. This will establish more than the superficial common wealth of all.

By reason of the world situation the comparison of religions has gradually undergone some serious revision. The method is plainer now than formerly, by which to make comparisons—by which to *answer* our three vital questions (see above). The conclusions which the facts now seem to warrant must inevitably affect every great household of the faithful, engendering, at least, a heartier co-operation for the common good. Upon closer examination of the history of religions it has been discovered, for example, that conversion, in the sense of a change from one religion to another—among the great religions, that it—has usually been a negligible factor in the spread of any faith. Such converts have usually been made in virtually unoccupied territory. Probably all seven of the great religions are today stronger in numbers of adherents than ever before. No one has increased at the net cost of any other, that is, at the cost of any "orthodoxy," or by marring any other pattern. And we have come to know more accurately the varying evaluation put by the several faiths upon conversion—a factor which must still be reckoned with.

Confucianism has been content with cultural penetration and expansion, with no organized endeavor seeking acceptance of a religious creed or an explicit moral code. It went in this character to Japan, with Japanese themselves the purveyors, or else sharing in the passage. It has continued as leaven in its Chinese home, most influential in its teaching of a practical morality. It has been for many centuries one of China's "three religions" (with the Taoist and the Buddhist), delimited by no fixed boundaries, although each has had something of its own peculiar role in the common situation.

Nor has Hinduism had a doctrine of conversion, especially with reference to non-Hindu *individuals*. Groups or tribes have now and then become Hinduized (brahmanized, perhaps) and admitted to the

complex socio-religious Hindu order by some final use of ritual, but Hinduism has been usually a matter of one's birth. And being born a Hindu, a man's status and his destiny are determined by the processes of karma and transmigration, rather than by any moral transformation (conversion in another sense). Indian Buddhism did a great deal of converting, so it seems, but not in any formal manner. There was no Hindu organization from which to withdraw. The Buddhist did not even change his caste, except that the doctrine of the equality of castes under the Law was preached and practiced. Gautama was himself in one sense a converted Hindu and many of his later followers were ex-brahmans. An Order was established, with its discipline of life, but for monks of various grades primarily. It was not a comprehensive Church. It finally dissolved and disappeared in India. And the faith itself was saved in greatly altered form, if not in essence, through extension into other lands—Ceylon, Burmah, congenial southeastern Asia, China and Japan, not to mention Korea, Tibet and inner Asia. In China and Japan, especially, it flourished as another phase of native culture, its monasteries alone (and its pagodas?) symbolizing its uniqueness.

How pure Shinto might ever have made converts is hard to indicate. Probably, by some political committal, if at all. It has no creed, save its mythology, no [written] code of morals, no ecclesiasticism, no doctrine of salvation. Conversion would be penetration and absorption, rather than enrolment. Shinto is a sort of totalitarian naturalism, or universal spirit. It could absorb new members by some such gradual process as that by which tribesmen of India have been brahmanized. Its "creative spirit," as some apologists define it, might thus extend itself. Likewise, independent of Confucian intellectualism, Indian philosophy, and western (as it once was) materialism, it may preserve itself.

Whatever the origin of the Hebrews, the conversion of non-Jews to Judaism has been inconspicuous. Judaism has followed the fortunes of a "chosen people," who, despite unparalleled vicissitudes as a body —sometimes as a nation—have for long disregarded national boundaries, as they have spread about the earth, a notable example of popular self-perpetuation. Orthodox Jews, of the Judah-Benjamin tradition, are still committed to ancient ideals of repentance and faith—conversion, but that of an inner turning.

Christianity and Islam are known to have been intent on converts from without. They have been missionary in a definite sense, beyond any merely cultural expansion. Islam built its House, both temporal and spiritual, which all non-Moslems, with the exception—in theory, at least—of the only "book-people" which Mohammed knew, the Jews, Sabians and Christians, were supposed to enter. The alternative was death. By the promulgation of the faith, expressing itself in various ways through internal development, and by adaptation through certain liberal principles, Islam built its vast empire. But even where its gains in membership have been largest, in India, that is, its success lay more among the "unchurched" than among the orthodox. If Hinduism was at any time directly affected—and, of course, it was—it took, in turn, a cultural revenge on Islam. Christianity throughout its longer career has been even more uncompromising than Islam. All non-christians were expected to turn "Christian." Nor might they, after conversion, remain, like adherents of Shinto and Confucianism, something else, besides. Both creed and organization have emphasized Christianity's historic intolerance of anything non-christian. The Christian view of world religion is essentially unique. Although the expansion of Christianity has occurred mainly through pagan areas, itself much affected by types of pagan culture, it has taken comparatively little toll of any other great religion. In later competition with Islam its gains have been insignificant. Christians also are compelled at last to reconsider the real character of their faith, its effectiveness and its prospects, in comparison with other faiths.

The comparison of religions has progressed through several major stages, and faces today what may prove to be its greatest opportunity, productive of its highest value. As a method of inquiry it applies, first of all, to the world of religions as they are. It no longer compares, as it sometimes did, "one's own good theory with another's bad practice." It rather compares theory with theory and practice with practice. And more: it reckons with varieties of environment, with times and seasons, not content to compare religions altogether as they are in the world today. It considers different levels here and there in world society, differences which have imposed upon religions diverse tasks, engendering somewhat varied characters. It handles scriptures with great care, assuming that they are mostly theoretical. At least, scriptures themselves must be evaluated sooner or later through religions' *living*

epistles—meaning devotees. And interpretations of any scripture vary! Comparative method bears in mind important stages in the development of doctrine. Doctrines have received varying emphases, and have proved of alterable value. Devotees have often selected their religious assets according to their immediate needs. If men find themselves between two worlds, with a Sahara or a Hellespont to cross, they rally and sort their equipment for a successful venture. Religious terminology experiences altered meanings and usages. Terms foreign to any one religion connote specific associations. There are tones in some tongues which other tongues can not reproduce. Translations have often misrepresented the true content and meaning of the original—sometimes for purposes of propaganda, we may suspect. Words are products of a peculiar soil. Doctrines of a great religion, such as Buddhism or Christianity, have been preached in many tongues. Some things were said in India, some in Palestine, some in Japan. "Thus saith the Scripture," or "Thus spoke the apostles" may be variously interpreted. It were unfair, for example, to say that one religion, by virtue of its possession of a doctrine or a word can meet a special situation better than another religion which has no equivalents in phraseology—such a situation, for instance, as race conflict, or industrialization. What a religion might do under new conditions may be conjectural, at least.

Nor can it be conclusively asserted that a religion which showed effectiveness in one nation is bound on that account to be effective in another, and that at a different level of development. How a religion serves—or has served—its immediate environment is a fair test. If truly analogous or commensurable situations can be discovered among the various religions, a cross-section estimate at such a level would be valid. If, in a diagram, the religions stood in parallel columns of different lengths, according to age and development, the lines would be much broken which linked up analogous stages. These zigzag lines connecting real identities and similarities would indicate many just grounds of comparison, both theoretical and practical, with reference to such items, for example, as revelation, God, goodness, human brotherhood, conversion, the hereafter. Various settings, historical and geographical, would come into view, perhaps into perspective. And these items might be evaluated in the total world-situation, as well as intrinsically. We might thus better understand what is the real character

of Religion whence the many forms at various times in all the lands. Then we should compare not merely one religion with another, but any one with what we know to be Religion. The effectiveness and prospects of any one religion might thus be better estimated.

Conversion—transfers from one religion to another—would properly wait upon some such just comparison. Indoctrination, also, especially in a foreign area, would wait upon comparison. Where conversion was once, in any case, a primary consideration, indoctrination was of immediate importance. We have seen at least this, that indoctrination has not solved the problems of expansion for any of the great religions. What of contending sects? We have seen, in fact, that doctrinal variation has been incidental to expansion. With newer emphasis upon comparison a religion could go into all the world to make disciplies on inclusive, rather than on propagandist, terms. Whatever conversion might eventuate would represent men's voluntary turning, would be predicated upon their freedom of choice, intelligent evaluation of available data, and sincere devotion. There would be no bitter controversies, no persecutions, no religious wars. Superior values would determine wise men's allegiances, all in the best religious manner; for values would be wrought out by association and co-operation, providing a natural and inevitable development toward the final faith of all good men. Islam and Christianity, perhaps the bitterest of rivals sometimes, might work together on such a basis. Indeed, Christianity, Islam and Judaism might become another "three religions" (cf. the Chinese "three"), with the saviorhood of Jesus reconciled within the total situation in some way analogous to the savior Buddha's offices. Whatever lies ahead for any religion must be won through co-operation rather than through conflict. The success of Christianity, for example, in the western world, often in *opposition* to Judaism and Islam, is not of itself a proper measure of its strength as an aggressive faith amidst peoples of the higher cultures, as in India and China. Any Christian success among, say, Jews, Moslems, Hindus, and Buddhists will come only through clearly demonstrated and irresistibly compelling moral and religious values, both theoretical and actual.

Co-operation assumes the independence of the elements co-operating, and the eventual acceptance by all participants of the highest values which emerge. As religious forces look into the future, each religion can afford to be, and should be, bent upon a demonstration of its best

resources. It should be missionary with an open mind. It *must* be missionary, or else concede defeat. It should exercise its will to live, knowing that renewal and development can come only by its *own* will, not another's. If it have not such will, it can at least co-operate toward the future common good, yielding its own values to that end. There can be no hiding of a talent in a napkin. It will be given to him that hath, to those that multiply their talents. This does not call for compromise, but for adjustment, such as *in fact* has been common in the life of all religions—we are not here discussing merely abstract theory! Nor does it call for sheer eclecticism. The method in actual practice would be more dynamic. Would it alter doctrine? Yes. Would it modify religious orders? Yes. Would it place religious personalities in a new perspective? Yes. What of it? Would it alter truth? Hardly, unless truth be creatively attained at last, after this or that appearance here and there, now and then. Would it pave the way for truth? Yes, and for beauty, and for goodness—and for whatever values God holds in store for mankind working together.

There are, then, seven great religions, "seven ships upon the sea," arks of safety of a certain tried seaworthiness. Each had, perhaps yet has, a port of registry, and has been sailing under orders, with special goods and men and insignia aboard. Each has touched at foreign ports, some very frequently, exchanging goods, passengers, and even members of the crew. They have passed each other on the high seas, their common element. But each has charted its own courses, serving particular regions, times and peoples. Whatever benefits might come of much-to-be-desired meetings on the high seas, each vessel continues to serve its own objectives. Out of *such* service, meanwhile, extended as occasion offers, will come the greater service to mankind at large.

If there is any hope of mutual understanding, finally, among earth's peoples, there should be some expectation of co-operation among them. If harmony ever be, in general, a world experience, there must be harmony in religion. The latter may indeed be pre-requisite. Whatever the adventitious accompaniments of religion here and there from time to time—accommodations, as it were, to the mind and spirit of the rank and file of worshipers—and whatever be the unique assets of any great religion, Religion itself in all of its dimensions must at last be comprehended by the faithful. To this end religions may be missionary in the newer sense of this expression, messengers may properly be sent

out by all to reiterate, emphasize and confirm, by a process of inspired selection, tidings increasingly acceptable to *all* men. This is not the way of any one religion in the guise of the "universal." There is no present universal, unless it be the "primitive." There neither is, nor will be, uniformity. It is the way of what is valid amidst the cheerful, acceptable, inevitable difficulties of change and growth in the total life of man. If and when decisive majorities of men arrive through experience at a community of values, these values may then serve to indicate the path ahead, may truly be the measure of whatever is of universal validity possible in man's quest of certainties and ultimates in a changing world. It is as yet beyond human vision to identify abstract finality. It doth not yet appear what we shall be, but the preaching of a God "of envy and strife" cannot nourish an increasingly effective faith. If each of the great religions be true to itself, it cannot then be false to any other. If it discover that other faiths are not against it, it may conceive that they are for it. If a religion realizes that within its own tradition it has a certain measure of renewal and extension, it should also be aware that other faiths have this capacity, and should be allowed fair opportunity. Here are the seeds of comparison, co-operation and the final faith. It cannot be that "adaptation to new uses" is destructive of "essential truth."

SCIENTIST INTO SEER: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM PRESENTED BY SWEDENBORG*

By Marguerite Beck Block

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Every now and then the world is startled by the phenomenon of an eminent scientist becoming "mystical." A Newton turns to Daniel. A famous physicist takes up psychical research and becomes an avowed believer in personal survival. A great biologist announces that he has seen diseases pronounced incurable by the doctors cured by prayer. And Nobel prize winners admit that there is a mysterious Something in the universe that may properly be called God. This is all very distressing to the die-hard mechanists, but they are seldom at a loss for an explanation. The physicist's mind has been unhinged by the loss of a dear one, and the biologist's judgment unconsciously biased by the religion of his youth. The Nobel prize winners must be suffering from a "loss of nerve" in middle age. But to the student of psychology these rationalizings of the mechanists are not very convincing. It seems more worth while to try to find out what really happens to turn such a man from science to mysticism.

Of all such cases, the most interesting, because the most extreme, is that of Emanuel Swedenborg, the 250th anniversary of whose birth is being commemorated this year. The bare and startling facts are these: a great scientist, "the last of the universal scholars," who had won renown in a variety of fields—mining, metallurgy, engineering, mathematics, geology, astronomy, chemistry, cosmology, physiology, and anatomy—at the age of fifty-seven in the best of health, suddenly retired from his scientific work, and four years later astonished the world by the publication of an extraordinary work, the *Arcana Coelestia*—dubbed by Kant "eight quarto folios of pure nonsense," but accepted by thousands as divine revelation. And in the next twenty-five years of his life this remarkable man published a total of eighty-three titles propounding a new, and brilliantly original system of Christian theology.

Surely this is dramatic enough, but even more astonishing is his

* Acknowledgment is due Dr. Charles G. Taylor for invaluable criticism and advice.

claim that during those twenty-five years he lived a dual life, partly on earth attending to his literary, political, and business affairs, and partly in another world, conversing with the dead, and investigating the secrets of this vast, mysterious universe. The natural question to ask is what had happened to produce this cataclysmic change—and perhaps the natural answer would be that much learning hath made him mad! But, in reality, the problem is not quite so simple. It must be unraveled through a detailed analysis of Swedenborg's mind.

Our case history requires, to begin with, a brief biographical sketch. Swedenborg was born in Stockholm in 1688, the third child of Jesper Svedberg, royal Chaplain to Charles XI, later Bishop of Skara. His mother was the daughter of Albrecht Behm, Assessor in the Royal College of Mines. On both sides of the family were ample financial means, derived from the mining industry, and education and culture. Among his relations were prosperous business men, government officials, physicians, professors, and clergy, including a number of bishops. When Swedenborg was four his father was appointed Professor of Theology at Uppsala, and it was in the old university town that he spent his formative years. At this time the Cartesian controversy was rife at Uppsala, the invasion of the new philosophy of science being stoutly resisted by the Theological Faculty. Under the influence of his brilliant young humanist brother-in-law, Eric Benzelius, founder of the first Academy of Science in Sweden, Emanuel determined to devote his life to science, instead of following his father's footsteps into the Church.

After his graduation he went abroad for five years of scientific studies in England, Holland, and France under the best men of the day. On his return home he worked for a while under the great engineer, Christopher Polhem, whose daughter figured in a romance which ended in bitter disappointment for the young man. He began the publication of Sweden's first scientific journal, and eventually secured from Charles XII an appointment to the College of Mines, a position which he held for thirty years. During these years he carried on his exacting professional duties, traveled much abroad to study the mining methods of other countries, and published a great number of scientific works. His *Opera Philosophica et Mineralia,* in three monumental volumes, brought him high renown. But soon after its publication he took up a new field of research, anatomy and physiology, working in the prin-

cipal clinics of Europe. The results of these labors were published in the *Oeconomia Regni Animalis,* and its sequel, *Regnum Animale*—which brings us to the fateful year 1744.

We know that it was a fateful year because of a strange little volume—a notebook in Swedenborg's handwriting—which came into the possession of the Royal Library at Stockholm in 1858. It turned out to be a *Journal of Dreams* covering the period from March to October, 1744. Its publication by G. E. Klemming,[1] the Royal Librarian, produced quite a furor. Naturally it was seized upon by medical men with avidity, and it has not escaped the attention of the Freudians, who interpret it according to their own doctrines.[2] Perhaps it can best be described in Jung's terms,[3] but we shall attempt to present the problem in the least technical form possible.

Viewed from the outside, Swedenborg's life at this time presents no abnormal features. We see a middle-aged gentleman of high social standing, with an international reputation as a scientist. As a member of the House of Nobles he took an active part in political life, with a special interest in fiscal policies and government patronage of industry, and was held in high esteem by his colleagues. So much for the credit side. On the debit side we find a serious lack of emotional satisfactions, particularly a lack of family ties. He had never married, and the members of his family for whom he really cared were either dead, or living in other parts of Sweden. He must have been a very lonely man. Of his love-life we know very little. Apparently he had never risked another rebuff after the disastrous affair with Emerentia Polhem, preferring to remain unmarried. According to the testimony of his con-

1. *Svedenborgs Drömmar—1744* (Uppsala, 1859).

2. Eduard Hitschmann, "Swedenborgs Paranoia," *Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse,* 1912. III, p. 32; A von Winterstein, "Swedenborgs religiöse Krise und sein Traumtagebuch." *Imago,* 1936, XX, pp. 292-338.

According to von Winterstein, Swedenborg's psychosis was due to an unresolved Oedipus Complex of the inverted, or negative type—or in other words, a repressed and unconscious homosexual attachment to his father. In the course of the crisis he substitutes God for his father, thereby making the love relationship morally acceptable, and gives up his scientific work as a self-punishment for having allowed worldly vanity to lead him away from his father's profession. He then turns to religion, the path laid down for him by the father fixation.

3. Jung refers to Swedenborg as an example of what he calls *enantiodromia,* i.e., "the emergence of the unconscious opposite, which occurs whenever an extreme, one-sided tendency dominates the conscious life; for this involves the gradual development of an equally strong, unconscious counterposition." *Psychological Types* (New York, 1933), p. 542. Jung, like the others, diagnoses Swedenborg as schizophrenic, i.e., "split personality."

temporaries, he lived a correct and moral life, though there is some evidence that at one time he possessed a mistress—a normal enough state of affairs for the eighteenth century. And yet, we know from his own pen that all his life "love of the sex" had been his "chief passion." The picture is therefore one of a strong instinctual drive severely repressed.

Another aspect of the emotional life, the religious, had also suffered from repression. As a child he had been abnormally pious. To quote his own words:

> From my fourth to my tenth year I was constantly engaged in thoughts about God, salvation, and the spirtual diseases of men, and several times I revealed things at which my father and mother wondered, saying that angels must be speaking through me.[4]

Also in childhood he began to practice a kind of breath-control, which he calls "internal respiration." During morning and evening prayers he purposely held his breath until it became barely perceptible. By means of this, he tells us, he was able to converse with angels.[5] But as he grew up, an ever-increasing passion for science had submerged the religious and mystical aspects of his nature, and worldly interests had taken their place. He was never at any time irreligious, but it is fair to say that his religion was philosophical, rather than emotional, and that his psychic and religious tendencies were distinctly in abeyance.

In his professional life, too, there was a certain amount of frustration, for although he had achieved enough success to satisfy any ordinary ambition, Swedenborg's was not an ordinary ambition. We find in him many traces of hurt pride and wounded vanity. The great tomes into which he had poured his life blood had received recognition in certain limited circles, but they had not set the world on fire. In his own country he was eclipsed by the rising star of a younger man, Carl Linnaeus. While he was abroad in 1739 a new Academy of Science was founded, with Linnaeus for president. His latest work, the *Oeconomia*, had been greeted somewhat coldly by the scientific reviewers, who simply failed to understand what he was driving at. And, indeed, this is not surprising, for the scientific venture in which he had been engaged for the past eight years was an unusual one.

4. R. L. Tafel, *Documents Concerning the Life and Character of Emanuel Swedenborg*, Vol. II, p. 279.

5. *Spiritual Diary* (London, 1883), nos. 3317, 3320, 3464.

In 1736 he had obtained a leave of absence on half-pay for three or four years in order to continue his scientific studies. But now it was not the mineral, but the animal kingdom on which he intended to work—that is, the human body as the kingdom of the soul. His project was nothing less than the discovery by scientific method of the nature of the soul, and the demonstration of its immortality. He intended to fight the materialistic science of the Enlightenment with its own weapons, and apparently had no doubts of his ultimate success. After four years of intensive study with leading anatomists he began the publication of the results of his researches. It is somewhat surprising to find in Part II of the *Oeconomia* the following frank confession of failure:

> I could not but think with mankind in general, that all our knowledge of it [the human soul] was to be attempted either by a bare reasoning philosophy, or more immediately by the anatomy of the human body. But upon making the attempt, I found myself as far from my object as ever; for no sooner did I seem to have mastered the subject, than I found it again eluding my grasp, though it never absolutely disappeared from view. Thus my hopes were not destroyed, but deferred. . . . For I have resolved, cost what it may, to trace out the nature of the human soul (nos. 208, 214).[6]

He conceived the soul to be a subtle fluid,

> in the third degree above the blood, which it enters as the first, supreme, inmost, remotest, and most perfect substance and force of its body, as the sole and proper animal force, and as the determining principle of all things (no. 222).

So far, so good—but in his attempt to identify this "spirituous fluid" with the immortal soul of theology he struck a snag, and began to doubt the infallibility of the human reason.

> I confess however that while I am lingering on this threshold that conducts me almost beyond the bounds of nature, or while I am daring to speak of the unition of God with the souls of his creatures, I feel a certain holy trembling stealing over me, and warning me to pause; for the mind thinks it sees what it does not see, and sees where no intuition can penetrate; nor can it tell whether what it thinks enters in the *a priori* or *a posteriori* direction; if by the latter, life appears to be inherent; if by the former, it appears to be not inherent, or not essentially united to us. And what increases this awe is a love of the truth which, that it may hold in

6. *The Economy of the Animal Kingdom* (New York, New Church Press, no date).

my mind the supreme place, is the end of all my endeavours, and which, whenever I deviate from it, converts itself into a representation of justice and condign punishment (no. 259).

Meanwhile, to prevent us from falling from doubt (to which . . . the mind is so prone), into actual denial, certain theologians, following the philosophers, have chosen to regard the soul as in fact intrinsically immortal, so as to surmount the possibility of its destruction by any created thing . . . (no. 349).

Had I not found myself supported by the authority of the most Christian fathers, I should not have dared to pronounce the opinion that the spirituous fluid is the soul that will live after the death of the body. But these fathers held it for certain that we shall hereafter be angelic essences (no. 356).

Here we find our scientist, his proud wings trailing in the dust, humbly confessing the failure of his investigations, and calling upon Ambrose, Basil, Origen, and Justin Martyr as authority for the thesis he has failed to prove! But, nothing daunted, he had persisted in the quest. He had not heeded that warning to pause, of which he speaks, and now, three years later, we find him in Amsterdam completing another work, the *Regnum Animale.* But already he had begun to have strange experiences—"preternatural sleep," and unusual dreams. The preceding year the Lord had appeared to him (whether in a dream or a vision, he does not say), and had sent him "to do His work." This commission Swedenborg interpreted as divine approval of his scientific investigations. But doubt, even despair, of ultimate success was becoming apparent. The venture he still believed in, but something was wrong with the method. And something was wrong with him!

This, then, is the picture presented at the outbreak recorded in the *Journal of Dreams:* a man of unusual physical and intellectual vitality; a man of strong instinctual and emotional drives; a man of strange, latent psychic powers, facing in loneliness, in disappointment, and probably considerable fatigue from years of overwork, that middle point in life which is a sort of Judgment Day for us all. How terrific a winnowing of the grain from the chaff now took place in the depths of his soul the dreams alone can tell us.

Perused just as it stands, out of the context of his daily life during this period, the *Journal of Dreams* presents a picture of so deeply disturbed a psyche, of so many clinical symptoms of abnormality—such as visual and auditory automatisms, "swoonings, sweatings and trem-

blings", and dreams of such terrifying vividness and horror, that it is little wonder that it has been considered adequate proof of a severe psychosis. In the works of the medical men and psychologists[7] concerning him we find all the usual terms—paranoia, schizophrenia, paraphrenia, and catatonic dementia praecox—used to describe him. They would have us think of him as a man distraught, a fit patient for a psychopathic ward. But a careful study of his life during the crisis period reveals a quite contrary picture. There is no evidence at all of the state of confusion, and violent emotional disturbance which characterizes a true "catatonic" condition. In fact, he lived his daily life calmly and efficiently, and for many years even his closest friends had no suspicion that he was undergoing unusual experiences. To quote Dr. Alfred Acton, who has made a detailed study of the chronology of Swedenborg's life:

> In the daytime he wrote these dreams in his Journal and reflected on their meaning; but in the daytime he was also busily engaged in adding the finishing touches to his Animal Kingdom, consulting anatomical authorities, meeting learned men, and seeing his work through the press. During the period covered by his Journal, he wrote and published that masterpiece of reasoning, the Epilogue to the second volume dealing with the senses in their relation to the mind. He also wrote The Five Senses, and the Introduction to his work On the Brain, in which he lays down the laws of analytical thought.[8]

It is remarkable that it is these very works which contain some of the anatomical discoveries which have been pronounced by modern scientists to be a hundred years in advance of the science of his day (such as the localization of the motor centers of the cortex, and others equally amazing). As a matter of fact, many a patient in the course of psychoanalysis undergoes disturbances quite as severe as that of Swedenborg, and like him, manages to pursue his normal activities more or less efficiently. In this connection it must be remembered that Swedenborg was no ordinary man—he was, in fact, a genius—and one, moreover, of great physical and mental stamina.

The Journal begins with a few notations dated 1743 (probably the

7. Among others: Emil A. G. Kleen, *Swedenborg, en levnadsskildring*, 2 vols. (Stockholm, 1917, 1920); Karl Jaspers, *Strindberg und Van Gogh. Versuch einer pathographischen Analyse unter vergleichender Heranzichung von Swedenborg und Hölderlin* (Bern, 1922); Rolf Lagerborg, *Fallet Swedenborg, i belysning av nyare undersökningar* (Helsingfors, 1924).

8. *Introduction to the Word Explained* (Bryn Athyn, Pa., 1927), pp. 36-37.

latter part of that year), which, though very sketchy, do show the main outlines of the psychological situation.

About the one who lay in boiling water.

About the one who fell with a chain into an abyss.

About the king who gave something very precious in a peasant's hut. [It is possible that this was the commission from the Lord of which he speaks.]

I wondered at myself that there remained nothing of (the desire) to work for my own glory.

—that I was not inclined towards the sex, as I had been all my days.

How I have been in wakeful ecstasies almost the whole time.

How I opposed myself to the spirit . . . indeed, I sometimes fell into impatience . . . and wished to make insistent demands, when there was not the easy progress I wanted.

How I had resisted the power of the Holy Spirit, and what then happened; how I beheld hideous spectres, without life, horribly intertwined.

I seemed to be lying on a mountain beneath which there was an abyss . . . I was . . . trying to get up, holding on to a projection, without foothold.

How a woman was by my side. . . . She said that she was pure, but that I had a bad odor. She was, I believe, my guardian angel (pp. 13-14).[9]

That the conflict is a religious one seems obvious. The two sides of his nature had, at last, come into open warfare, and he was actually, as we say, "in hot water." He had received a divine commission which he did not yet understand, but which, unconsciously, he already felt to be a threat to his worldly ambitions, for he "resisted the spirit"—with unpleasant consequences! He was surprised to find his normal desires in abeyance, but a serious danger, the abyss, threatened him. His guardian angel found him grossly impure—here a strong sense of guilt is apparent. He seems to be rather peevish about the lack of progress in his great project of finding the soul, and inclined to demand divine assistance. And in the "wakeful ecstasies" we find a return, at long last, of the mystical tendencies of his childhood.

But the significant thing is that an eighteenth century scientist should have taken these manifestations seriously, and attempted to solve the problem presented by them *psychologically*. He did not attribute them to overwork, or an upset digestion, but accepted them as a sort of code message from his inmost depths. He realized that some deeply significant change was taking place in him, and brought

9. I have used the English translation by C. Th. Odhner. *Emmanuel Swedenborg's Journal of Dreams* (Bryn Athyn, Pa., 1918), with minor corrections made from the Swedish edition edited by Knut Barr (Stockholm, 1924).

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all his keen intellect and intuition to bear upon the situation. He recorded his dreams with meticulous precision, and perfect frankness (to such an extent, in fact, that parts of them can be printed only in Latin). At times he wondered if they might not be "mere phantasy," but soon developed a system of interpretation. Naturally there was much that he did not understand, but the amazing fact is that he understood so much. His own interpretation of the symbols would not be accepted *in toto* by any of the analytic schools—and yet, they are remarkably perceptive. He understood that the persons in the dreams represent various aspects of his own personality, and also that a dream can have several different meanings, in reference to different phases of the problem. It must be granted that Swedenborg, both in the theories advanced in his writings, and in his own technique of dream analysis, was a genuine forerunner of the modern school of analytical psychology.

In March of 1744 he began to record the dreams in detail, and the first one is important:

> I was standing by a machine which was moved by a wheel; its spokes involved me more and more and carried me up so that I could not escape. . . . (It signifies) either that I need to be kept further in the dilemma, or else, that it concerned the lungs in the womb, on which subject I wrote immediately afterwards; (or) both (p. 14).

It is characteristic of Swedenborg that he interpreted his dreams as having a bearing upon the scientific work he was engaged in, as well as upon his emotional problems, for his work and his emotional life were almost synonymous. Having renounced marriage in youth, he had devoted himself passionately to Science—her faithful servant and lover. He identifies the women in his dreams as the sciences, or as his scientific works, and his attitude toward them is playfully romantic.

> All the objects of the sciences have represented themselves to me by means of women. . . . Verities or virgins of this kind . . . esteem themselves so precious and dear to those who cultivate them, that they are indignant if one offers a price . . . they wish rather to offer themselves to their lovers freely. I who am their servitor do not dare to disobey them, lest I be deprived of the service (pp. 78, 102).

Not only had Swedenborg made science his love—he had made it his faith, as well—and here lies the crux of the dilemma. He had always regarded his scientific work as useful to his country, and to humanity in general, and in his self-appointed mission as apostle to the

Gentiles of the Enlightenment he had expected to make it serve God as well; this being his intent in carrying science into the spiritual realm. It was his way of justifying to himself his choice of science, instead of the church, as a vocation. But now that this hope had failed his conscience began to trouble him. The life of reason had proved useless in his quest of the soul—perhaps actually inimical. Hitherto he had played with mechanistic conceptions of the universe without injury to his conventional religious faith, but now, caught in his own rationalistic machinery, he found himself "involved more and more." The weapon with which he had sought to vanquish the Enlightenment had proved a boomerang. It is now easy to understand the meaning of the dreams. The abyss which threatened him was nothing less than the loss of faith in the Word of God itself—and hence, to a Lutheran, damnation. The following series of dreams seems to confirm this interpretation:

> The temptation still continued. . . . It was an anxiety as if I were damned and in hell, yet always the hope which the Holy Spirit granted . . . remained strong throughout (p. 22).
>
> While I was reading concerning the miracles of God wrought through Moses, it seemed to me as if something of my own understanding mixed itself into it, so that I was not able to have the strong faith that I ought to have. I believed and yet did not believe. I was thinking that on this account the angels and God revealed themselves to shepherds, and not to the philosopher who allows his understanding to take part in the play, as is always the way when, for instance, a person asks why God made use of the wind when he collected the locusts; why he hardened Pharoah's heart . . . (p. 25).
>
> It was remarkable that I was able to have at one and the same time two thoughts quite distinct from one another—the one for myself . . . and at the side of this the thoughts of the temptation. . . . They held me captive so that I did not know whither to flee . . . (p. 31).
>
> The whole day I was in double thoughts, which tried to destroy what was spiritual as it were by contemptuous abuse, so that I found that the temptation was very strong. But by the grace of the Spirit I was able to fix my thoughts on a tree, then on the cross of Christ, and on Christ crucified; as often as I did this, the other thoughts fell down flat, as of themselves (p. 49).
>
> I had frightful dreams; dreamt that the executioner roasted the heads which he had struck off, and . . . put the roasted heads one after another into an empty oven, which nevertheless was never filled. It was said that this was his food. . . . Afterwards I dreamed that the Evil One carried me into various deep places and bound me (p. 54).

Swedenborg interprets this to mean that the Evil One feeds on the heads of those who seek to confirm their faith by their reason.

So disturbed was he in mind that he fasted and prayed, partook of the Lord's Supper, and even beat himself, in the hopes of conquering these torturing doubts. He began to see himself as the "greatest of sinners," "impure from head to foot," full of vanity, self-love, pride of intellect, love of pleasure, wealth and high position, fondness for food, and "desire for the sex." His repentance was touchingly sincere, and with a childlike humility he prayed for forgiveness and grace. He heard in a dream a chorus singing an old hymn, a childhood favorite, "Jesus är min vän then bäste," and it seemed to him "that green buds had opened." This was on Easter Day—and the following night he received his second "manifestation of the Lord."

> About twelve, one, or two o'clock in the night there came over me a very powerful tremor from the head to the feet, accompanied by a booming sound as if many winds had clashed against one another. It was indescribable, and shook me and prostrated me on my face. In the moment that I was prostrated I became wide awake, and I saw that I had been thrown down. I wondered what it meant . . . and I said: "Oh, Thou Almighty Jesus Christ, who of Thy great mercy deignest to come to so great a sinner, make me worthy of this grace!" I kept my hands folded and I prayed, and then there came forth a hand which strongly pressed my hands. I then continued my prayer, saying, "Thou hast promised to receive in grace all sinners; Thou canst not otherwise then keep Thy word!" In the same moment I was sitting at His bosom, and beheld Him face to face. It was a countenance of a holy mien, and such that it cannot be expressed, and also smiling, so that I believe that His countenance was such also when He lived (on earth) He spoke to me and asked if I had a bill of health. I answered, "Lord, Thou knowest better than I." He said, "Well, then do (what thou hast promised)" (pp. 26-27).

Apparently Swedenborg still believes this commission to be related to his scientific work, though the idea of a religious vocation is beginning to shape itself. How strong a resistance he has against it appears in the following, dreamed that same night, after the remarkable mystical experience:

> I then saw my father. . . . He called me to himself and took hold of my arms, which were in short sleeves, but with lace ruffles for cuffs; he took both cuffs and tied them with my ribbons. My wearing cuffs signifies that I am not of the Clergy, but that I am and ought to remain in civil service. He then asked me what I thought about this question, viz., that a certain king had granted leave to about thirty persons who belonged to the spiritual

order to get married and thus change their estate. . . . I found myself able to answer, according to my conscience, that no one ought to be permitted to change his estate, no matter what it may be, to which he has devoted himself. He said that he was also of the same opinion, but I added that if the king had resolved upon it then the matter was settled (p. 28).

The importance of the father as the symbol of authority (and for Swedenborg, also the symbol of the religious vocation) appears in this dream. In the extremity of his conflict he now receives from his dead father the approval of his choice of a career—an approval probably never granted by the bishop in life. But all to no avail, for "the king had resolved upon it, and the matter was settled"! From now on the nature of the new vocation becomes clearer and clearer.

I seemed to be at dinner in company with a number of persons at the house of a clergyman. I paid about a louis d'or for the meal, and thus more than I ought, but when I was on my way from the place I had with me two vessels of silver which I had taken from the table. This troubled me and I tried to return them, and it seemed to me that I had a plan to do so . . . that is, for the honor of God to give them back to the universal Church in some manner, which it seems to me will also be done (p. 30).

The silver vessels seem to represent treasure which he has come by dishonestly, and which must be returned somehow to the Church—that is, by choosing science as a career he had stolen from the Church what rightfully belonged to it—again the feeling of guilt in regard to his vocation. The method of restitution now appears.

All this, as it seems to me, signifies that I ought to employ my remaining time on what is higher, and not write about worldly things . . . but about that which concerns the very centre of everything, and that which concerns Christ. May God enlighten me further in regard to my duty, for I am still in some darkness as to whither I ought to turn (p. 66).

During this period Swedenborg was experiencing from time to time, along with the doubts and temptations, such intense ecstasies, of the normal mystical type, that he could not but be convinced of the genuineness of his "call."

I was in heaven and heard a speech which no human tongue can utter with the life that is there or the glory and inmost delight that flow from it (p. 24).

I had also in my mind and in my body as it were a sensation of an indescribable delight, so that if it had been more intense, the body would have been as it were dissolved from the delight alone (p. 25).

But the earthly desires, which at the beginning of the crisis had seemed to depart, now returned in full force, and carnal temptations appear in many of the dreams:

Afterwards it seemed to me that I had with me Eliezer, my deceased brother, who was being attacked by a wild boar that held him fast and bit him. I tried to drag the animal down with a hook, but could not. Afterwards I went up, and saw that he was lying between two boars which were eating his head. . . . This, as I believe, signifies that on the previous day I had indulged my appetite and had partaken too freely of the necessaries of life, which is also a work of the flesh and not of the spirit; for such is the life of swine, and is forbidden by Paul; it is called feastings.

On the following day I was more on my guard, but I came into a rather strong temptation. That now and henceforth I must forcibly govern my appetite, this brought me into a strange condition, and as it were into a state of chagrin; but I was quickly delivered from it after I had prayed and sung a hymn (p. 67).

On the twentieth I had intended to go to the Lord's Supper in the Swedish Church, because recently I had fallen into many pernicious thoughts, so that I observed that the body is continually rebellious (p. 71).

Nevertheless I could not keep control of myself so as not to desire the sex, although not with the intention of proceeding to effect; yet in the dream it did not seem altogether contrary to the dispensation of God (p. 72).

At the end of April the *Regnum Animale* came off the press, and on May thirteenth Swedenborg sailed for England, apparently for the purpose of discussing his new work, *The Five Senses,* with some of the English authorities. He took lodgings in London with "a pious shoemaker" whom he had met on the boat, and attended the chapel of the Moravian Brethren with him—so humble had our Swedish aristocrat become! In fact, he seems at this time to have been strangely attracted to this emotional form of Pietism. By July third he had completed *The Five Senses,* a remarkable feat—two hundred folio pages of careful scientific work in less than a month and a half! When it was finished he wrote:

It was with a special tenderness that I as it were said farewell to her, kissing her, when another appeared at a little distance . . . the second part, which is the brain (pp. 77-78).

He continued his scientific work throughout the summer, but under ever increasing tension, indicated by such dreams as these:

I saw a great beast with wings which at times looked like a human

being, but with a great gaping mouth; he did not venture to touch me. I cut at him with a sword, but had no skill or strength in the arms to strike him. . . . I had been thinking during the day about the woman and the dragon in the Apocalypse, and I wished that I might be an instrument to slay the dragon; this, however is not within my power, but it is in the power of God alone (pp. 82-83).

I seemed to be walking across a field which was very rough. . . . There came against me a large black ox, and it seemed he was going to gore me with his horns (p. 88).

The terrible danger in which I had been in the night between the 29th and the 30th was afterwards represented to me in sleep; that I was upon a cake of ice which after a while could scarcely bear me; further on I came to a fearful great abyss; a person on the other side could not come to help me, and therefore I turned back (p. 90).

It was shortly after this dream of the man on the cake of ice that Swedenborg abandoned his scientific work. The thin ice of the rational intellect was melting beneath him, and he felt himself being swept nearer to the great abyss. To save his soul from perdition a safer refuge must be found—and indeed, a refuge *was* found. The next dream reads:

I beheld the gable-end of the most beautiful palace that anyone could see, and the midst of it was shining like the sun. I was told that it had been resolved in the society that I was to become a member, as it were an immortal, which no one had been before, unless he had died and lived [again] (pp. 88-89).

A strangely prophetic dream, this, for the following year, he was, as he calls it, "intromitted into the spiritual world," and thus became a living member of the society of the dead!

He now turned from science to philosophy for the subject matter of his next book, *De Cultu et Amore Dei*—a sort of Platonic creation-myth, which has received high praise from Swedish literary critics. Atterbom says that it is written "with a poetic inspiration such that, if divided among a dozen poets it would suffice to fix them in the firmament of song as stars of the first magnitude,"[10] and Martin Lamm calls it "a jubilant lovesong to the divinity who created the universe, and with his light illumines it."[11] And not only is the little book a work of exquisite poetic imagination, but it also contains some of Swedenborg's most remarkable foreshadowings of later scientific discoveries, such

10. P. D. Atterbom, *Svenska siare och skalder* (Örebro, 1854), p. 45.
11. Martin Lamm, *Upplysningstidens romantik* (Stockholm, 1918), Vol. 1, p. 119.

as the origin of the planets from the solar matter, and a theory of organic evolution of the animal from the vegetable kingdoms. The book figures in several of his dreams:

> Something was told me about my book; it was said that it would be a divine Book on the worship and love of God; I believe there was also something about spirits (p. 91).
>
> This night was the most delightful of all, because I had a vision of the Kingdom of Innocence. Beneath me I beheld the most beautiful garden that can be imagined, a garden where, little by little, white roses appeared placed upon every tree. Afterwards I came into a long chamber where beautiful white vessels were standing, containing milk and bread; it was so appetizing that nothing more appetizing can be imagined. I was in company with a woman, of whom I have no particular recollection. As I returned there came to me a beautiful and innocent little child, who told me that the woman had left without saying farewell. . . . The child meant innocence itself; I was quite touched by it, and wished that I were in such a kingdom, where all is innocence. I lamented that I had to leave it upon awakening. As to the woman who left without saying farewell, I do not know what is meant thereby (pp. 93-94).

But *we* know! She was that Science who had been his mistress for more than thirty years, and who now steals away out of his life, without a word of farewell—unrecognized and unmourned, leaving him alone in his dearly bought Kingdom of Innocence! "Except ye become as little children . . ."

The last act of this extraordinary soul-drama takes place the following spring. It is described by Swedenborg in a letter to the Swedish Academician, Carl Robsahm:

> I was in London and was eating my midday meal, somewhat late, in an inn where . . . I had a private room. . . . I was hungry and ate with a good appetite. Towards the end of the meal I noticed a sort of dimness before my eyes; it grew darker, and I saw the floor covered with the most horrible crawling animals, such as snakes, frogs, and such like creatures. I was astounded, for I was in full possession of my senses and had clear thoughts. At last the darkness . . . suddenly dispersed and I saw a man sitting in the corner of the room. As I was then quite alone, I became very much frightened at his speech, for he said, Eat not so much. All again became black before my eyes, but immediately it cleared away and I found myself alone in the room. Such an unexpected horror hastened my return home. I showed no sign of concern before the landlord, but I considered well what had happened and could not look upon it as a matter of chance, or as produced by a physical cause. I went home, but at night the same man revealed himself to me again. I was not frightened then. He said that

he was the Lord God, the Creator and Redeemer of the world; and that He had chosen me to declare to men the spiritual contents of Scripture; and that He Himself would declare to me what I should write on this subject. Then, on that same night the world of spirits, hell and heaven were opened to me with full conviction. There I recognized many acquaintances of every condition of life, and from that day I gave up all practice of worldly letters, and devoted my labor to things spiritual.[12]

And what are we to make of this extraordinary story? There have been three different explanations: (1) that of his followers, who accept it at its face value as divine revelation; (2) that of his admirers (such as Emerson), who, while not accepting the revelation theory, have, nevertheless, regarded him as a true and great mystic;[13] (3) and that of his enemies of the State Church, who had good reason to wish to discredit his theology, and declared him insane. This third attitude was adopted by the earlier medical students of the problem. But of late years a new approach has been made through modern psychology, which offers more hope of finally solving the problem. The trouble, however, with all these diagnoses is that they are based mainly upon the *Journal of Dreams,* and show insufficient knowledge, both of Swedenborg's literary works, and of essential biographical data. Considerable light has been thrown recently on the subject of the relation of the religious crisis to insanity by Dr. Anton T. Boisen, in his book, *The Exploration of the Inner World,*[14] which has a direct bearing upon the case of Swedenborg.

Dr. Boisen lists Swedenborg, along with Ezekiel, Jeremiah, St. Paul, John Bunyan, and George Fox, among those whom he calls "successful explorers" of the inner world. In the course of his long experience in a hospital for the insane, he has found a close resemblance between a certain type of schizophrenia and the religious conversion in its extreme form. Both experiences contain the same psychological content: (1) a sense of the mysterious; (2) a sense of peril; (3) a sense of personal responsibility; (4) an erotic involvement. The crisis begins with some unusual experience of an hallucinatory nature, which

12. Tafel, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 34-36.

13. The ablest defender of this theory is Professor Martin Lamm, of Stockholm, who, in his *Swedenborg: en studie öfver hans utveckling till mystiker och ande-skådare* (Stockholm, 1915; German edition, Leipzig, 1922; French edition, Paris, 1936), repudiates the insanity charge, and maintains that Swedenborg's crisis experience was a normal phase in the development of a mystic.

14. (Chicago, 1936), reviewed in *The Review of Religion*, March, 1938.

the subject interprets as supernatural (such as Swedenborg's first "manifestation of the Lord"), and which carries with it a deeply mysterious sense of fate. The second step, a sense of peril, involves (as in Swedenborg) a feeling of helplessness in temptation, and fear of damnation. The third phase, the sense of responsibility, comes after repentance and complete surrender, and takes the form of some sort of divine commission. In Swedenborg's case it required more than a year to reach this culmination. The fourth element, the erotic involvement, is obvious enough in Swedenborg, as we have seen, to lend itself to a perfect Freudian interpretation. The only thing lacking to make Swedenborg fit Dr. Boisen's formula is the confused, or catatonic, state of violent disturbance. This, however, does not vitiate the argument, for in a person of lesser fibre the same experience would have produced a more violent reaction. Swedenborg's rare combination of the scientific with the religious attitude toward his crisis saved him.

Dr. Boisen's thesis is this: the crisis experience, in both the religious genius and the hospital patient, no matter how violent the symptoms, is not a disease in itself, but rather, analogous to a fever in the body, an attempt on the part of nature to overcome a diseased condition. The actual disease is functional, not organic, and consists of an intolerable conflict between the desires and the moral standards accepted in youth. This results in a sense of personal failure, of moral isolation, in psychological terms, a "guilt complex." The disturbances, to quote Dr. Boisen,

> represent the deliquescence of the old sets and attitudes which makes possible new formations. They are essentially purposive (p. 54).
>
> I hold that there is no line of demarcation between valid religious experience and the abnormal conditions and phenomena which to the alienist are evidences of insanity. The distinguishing thing, as I see it, is not the presence or absence of the abnormal and the erroneous and the morbid, but the directions or tendency of the change which may be taking place. . . . Saul of Tarsus, George Fox, and others I might name, are classed as religious geniuses, and not as insane men, because the experiences through which they passed had a definite unifying function. That after all is the only test (p. 119).

There are several different possible outcomes of such a conflict: (1) the drifting into complete and hopeless disintegration known as hebephrenic schizophrenia; (2) the formation of a system of delu-

sional misrepresentation, known as paranoia, which preserves a certain amount of integration, but upon a fictional basis (the persecution mania, or an assumption of an exalted role, such as identification with Napoleon or God); (3) successful emergence from the crisis, either a return to normality, or a complete reintegration of the personality on a new and higher spiritual level. The last, of course, is the reaction type to which the religious genius belongs. It is in the second group, however, the paranoid type, that Swedenborg is placed by the medical fraternity, and it is this diagnosis which requires investigation.

As we have seen, the *Journal of Dreams* is insufficient evidence on which to base an insanity charge. The facts of his daily life during this period preclude the possibility of any true "catatonic disturbance." The crisis was analogous, rather, to the psychoanalytical experience in which the patient becomes conscious of the deeply repressed elements of his personality, understands and accepts them, assimilates them into his conscious life, and is reintegrated upon a higher level of consciousness. This is exactly what Swedenborg did for himself, sustained and strengthened in his ordeal by a deep sense of divine assistance. The crisis was for him, actually a way of salvation. As Dr. Boisen says of George Fox:

> By virtue of simple honesty, and earnestness of purpose, he found his way through the wilderness (p. 66).

But the insanity charge is not so easily disposed of. Swedenborg might have returned to normal after the crisis, and pursued his scientific career to the end of his days—but he did not. The true crux of the problem lies, therefore, not in the crisis itself, but in what happened *after* it. The basis of the paranoid interpretation is, first and foremost, Swedenborg's repeated statements that all the rest of his life, he enjoyed "intromission into the spiritual world," not in his dreams, nor even in a trance state, but in full possession of his faculties, and complete consciousness of his physical environment. He sat as his desk, pen in hand writing, and at the same time wandered at will in another world, conversing with the shades of Aristotle and St. Paul and Martin Luther, investigating the various heavens and hells, and interviewing souls from other planets. He carefully distinguishes these experiences from objective manifestations (hallucinations), with which he was quite familiar, and placed them in an inner realm of being imperceptible to the external senses. Is it necessary to find in this a proof

of insanity, or is there not another possible explanation? In this connection it might be well to remember Swedenborg's often reiterated statement that this "spiritual world" is not a place, but a state of mind. He says: "The spiritual world is where man is, and is by no means remote from him,"[15] and "Man's mind is his spiritual world."[16] It seems a more valid proceeding to understand it as a *psychological*, rather than an eschatalogical reality. This conception naturally suggests Jung's "collective unconscious," in which are found the primordial images of our racial experience.[17] A deep regression into this super-personal realm of the psyche would account for Swedenborg's angels and devils, and all his glowing imagery, in terms of a waking dream. Given a strongly poetic temperament with an especial gift of visualization, plus a childhood religion rich in such symbolism, and a faculty for deep introversion, there is little reason to wonder at the variety and vividness of his phantasy life.

But perhaps we ought to wonder that a man of science should have regarded these experiences as divine revelation, and described them in terms of actual, metaphysical reality. It is just here that a knowledge of the historical background of his life may be helpful, for although a man of the Enlightenment, Swedenborg was, first and last, a Swede, and the Swedish people are, as a nation, a remarkable combination of practicality and mysticism. A well-known student of Swedish history and folklore, Dr. Ernst Klein, says that is is not necessary to resort to explanations "from the arsenal of psychiatry" to understand Swedenborg's belief in spirits, for it was quite usual in his day. In fact, there was a serious witchcraft epidemic in Sweden during his lifetime.[18] His own father, a man of great intellectual vigor, conversed with his guardian angel, heard celestial choirs, and practiced exorcism. And certainly no good Lutheran of that day ever doubted that Martin Luther had hurled his inkwell at an actual devil!

Therefore, we can afford to be a little cautious about accepting the diagnosis of insanity uncritically. It is reasonable enough to see in Swedenborg, as in Lincoln, and Beethoven, and many other geniuses, a peculiar type of psychological divergence from the normal, which

15. *Divine Love and Wisdom*, no. 92.
16. *Divine Wisdom*, xii, 3.
17. C. G. Jung, *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology* (New York, 1917), pp. 408-411; 445-474.
18. *Bilder ur Sveriges historia* (Stockholm, 1931-32), pp. 366 ff.

may be described in clinical terms as paranoid, or schizophrenic. It is possible to find in his phantasy life a pattern of "systematized delusions," to interpret his "infestation by evil spirits" as persecution mania, and to see delusions of grandeur in his belief that he was divinely commissioned to reveal to the world the "inner sense of the Word," which constitutes the Lord's Second Coming. But such a picture, however carefully and systematically built up, is difficult to recognize as Emanuel Swedenborg in that last, busy quarter of a century. His life is too well documented. Although he resigned his post in the College of Mines, and gave up his scientific studies, he never became a recluse, but maintained his place in the political and social life of his time. That he suffered no mental deterioration is amply proved by the testimony of his colleagues in the House of Nobles (though a few did consider him a bit "touched" on the subject of spirits!). The Prime Minister, Count von Höpken, wrote to a friend, just after his death:

> He possessed a sound judgment upon all occasions; he saw everything clearly and expressed himself well on all subjects. The most solid and best written memorials presented to the Diet of 1761 [he was then seventy-three] on matters of finance were from his pen.[19]

At sixty he took up the study of Hebrew in order to make his own translation from the original text. A knowledge of the original language was essential to his elaborate development of an "inner sense" by means of a "science of correspondence." His copious Biblical notes, made in preparation for writing the *Arcana Coelestia,* fill nine large volumes, and form a record of three and a half years of intensive biblical studies. However sharply one may disagree with the system of theology contained in his vast output, one is obliged to admit that it is a logical structure of perfect co-ordination in all its parts, characterized by genuine spiritual insight and ethical grandeur. *The True Christian Religion,* the final summation of his system, written at the age of eighty-two, fully equals the earlier works in clarity of exposition. It is quite impossible to regard it as the product of an unsound mind, though the "Memorabilia" (accounts of his experiences in the spiritual world) interspersed throughout, do reveal an unusually rich imagination.

If Swedenborg had come through his religious crisis "restored to normality," the world might have been the richer by many important

19. Tafel, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 408.

scientific discoveries, but it would have been distinctly the poorer for the loss of such works as *Divine Love and Wisdom, Conjugial Love, Heaven and Hell, Divine Providence,* and *The True Christian Religion*—a body of doctrine which has sufficient coherence and dignity to recommend itself to many others in intellectual difficulties similar to his own. But it is best understood as a personal triumph of faith, a thought-structure by means of which Swedenborg's religion could command his highly trained intellect. The discovery of the soul which anatomical science had denied him was granted through "internal respiration," which opened to him the "world of spirits"; and his faith in the Word of God, which the science of the Enlightenment had threatened, was restored through the "science of correspondences."

The Cultural Heritage of India. By one hundred Indian scholars. (Sri Ramakrishna Centenary Memorial) 3 vols. Calcutta: Belur Math; New York: Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center, 1937. 608; 617; 692 pp. $12.00; postage, $2.50.

This important publication has been in preparation for many years for the purpose of celebrating the one hundredth anniversary of the birth of Ramakrishna.[1] Its subject is defined in the Publishers' Note as "Developments in the Soul and Culture of India." "Philosophical systems and religious movements, with special reference to practical values in the life of our people, have been treated in the first two parts, and the third part has been devoted mainly to the delineation of the secular achievements of our countrymen, in the past as well as in the present, in the fields of arts, letters, and sciences." We may add, that, even in this last volume, most of the subjects are treated in such a way that their deep relation to religious thought is strongly stressed; for nothing in India can be fully understood without this relation to religious thought. Typical of this attitude are the words of Dilip Kumar Roy, who says that even music should not be looked at as an art, but as a *sādhanā*—a means of perfection: "*Gānāt paratavam nāsti*—There is nothing more helpful to the spirit than music" (Vol. III, p. 592).

The collection of articles, concerned with so many different realms of Indian life, is certainly a standard work which will be of much use to scholars who are in any way touching Indian culture in their investigations. It would serve as an encyclopedia of Indian thought and life if only there were an index—a lack which is exceedingly regrettable. A detailed index will have to be provided, if the hope of the publishers is to be realized, that "the work will form a unique and really valuable contribution to the permanent literature of the world."

As there are so many different authors, the subjects are treated from many different points of view. Some of the articles are elaborate surveys of systems, or periods, from the standpoint of the history of literature, in which are worked out new discoveries, and special points which can be evaluated only by well-trained scholars. In others the approach is

1. The principal events of this world-wide celebration are described in *The Review of Religion*, Vol. I, pp. 43-45.

far more on the spiritual plane, and more adapted to the general reader. But one point on which they all agree is that the origins of all the systems are lost in obscurity; that no idea in Indian thought had a fixed birth-date, or a single founder; and that nothing which has ever been important in India has ever really died. Even very modern movements try to find their own historical background in the past. And, on the other hand, ancient literary types, such as the Upanishads, are still produced today. This proves that there is some truth in the Western opinion that any sense for the importance of history is lacking in India.

It may be seen again and again, in so many of the articles, that time is considered as something so deeply involved in the *māya*, or illusory, side of life, that it is not worth while to take it as an impulse in reality. Time is thus subject to different valuations in different cultures. In China the past is of the highest value; human life should be only the continuation of ancient traditions, and is good only in so far as it is in harmony with the past. On the other hand, wherever we find nature-worship, and a mystical feeling for the omnipresence of the Absolute (as in many cults of the Ancient Near-East), the present moment in its very contingency is stressed; the *hic et nunc* is of the utmost importance. And in all western thought, in so far as it is influenced by the Christian attitude, with its eschatalogical tension towards the coming Kingdom of God, the future is regarded as the most valuable part of time. In India, on the contrary, where the idea of the turning wheel of life prevails, time is so unreal that neither past, present, nor future can have any real importance. This attitude of Indian scholars leads to a desire to prove that Indian thought has been at its best through *all* the periods of its history, and that nothing of value has been lost today—a contention which we will consider later.

There is another point of agreement among the various authors: they all urge the necessity of special symbolical expressions for the Absolute. The task is to seek, know, and realize "the one in the many," but they all agree that the one cannot be realized without the many. This is their answer to the reproach of idolatry in Hinduism. "It is utterly untrue that the image is worshipped. The image that is used in worship is the form of the mantra that is chosen for the worshipper by his guru, and that after ascertaining his competency. It is a necessity. The formless and attributeless Brahman cannot be worshipped" (Vol.

II, p. 199). This one, ineffable, limitless Brahman is compared to the *Ain Soph* of the Kabbala, and with the supreme *Huq* in Islam, "By reason of our limitations we are unable to see Him, although He is in and around us, and is our very being" (Vol. II, p. 205). "Whatever be the image we may use for the purpose of sādhanā, be it made of metal or clay, or formed in the mind, the ultimate Reality is He alone" (Vol. II, p. 207). But symbols pointing to the truth are indispensable. "With the help of the form we have to reach the formless; with the aid of the holy names and attributes, we have to attain that which is beyond all names and attributes, . . . we are like children and need supports. Let us have them by all means" (Vol. II, p. 17). This attitude bears a relation to very ancient ideas: "To what is one sages give many a name. They call Him Indra, Mitra, Varuṇa and Agni" (*Rigveda* I, 164.46). The necessity of realizing the Absolute is dealt with particularly in some most important articles on the Tantra philosophy in the second volume.

In these kernel articles there is some recognition of the fact that not every doctrine can be presented to the many in simple language without some loss of depth. "A popular version of the Relativity Theory, of the Quanta and Wave-mechanics, and of the Principle of Uncertainty may, of course, be given. So of Kuṇḍalinī and other Tāntrica principles. But the 'proofs' in the one case, as in the other, are in the delicate experiments, and in the highly abstruse calculus which are, unfortunately, beyond the reach and comprehension of the average 'lay' man. The 'proofs' are the essential thing" (Vol. II, p. 185). But on the whole the tendency is just the opposite. Most of the authors try to show that Indian thought has only gained in the process of democratization within the last centuries, and that it is not at all in decay. And here is a point where a criticism must be made; for, if this really was the tacit purpose of the whole work, we must confess that it has been a failure. The more we study the outlines of Indian history as here presented, the more we realize that the high level of ancient Indian culture has not quite survived, and that it has not been reached again since its vanishing point in the Middle Ages. Every system founded before that time is much more profound, and brings a clearer revelation, than what has been created since. This decay is due to several causes: (1) a heavy burden of traditional elements in the background of every idea necessarily leads to confusion with other ideas,

historically related, and overwhelms the clearness of perception by a mass of concomitant associations; (2) when the influence of foreign cultures (Mohammedan, and later Christian) grew strong in India, the distinctness and lucidity of her own mind was lost; (3) the democratization of religious doctrines has been, in many respects, a great gain, but it has also resulted in a loss of strength and sublimity. History shows that popularizing a doctrine in India, in almost every case, meant, at the same time, its lowering to a deeper level. In fact, most of the writers are eager for a simplification of all the high doctrines, even if it can be done only by stirring the emotional side of worship to a degree that the great religious teachers of the past would not have approved. It seems too often forgotten that "Śāṇḍilya is not an advocate of irrational emotionalism. He upholds the cult of devotion enlightened by reason" (Vol. II, p. 54). The word *simple* seems now to have become an attribute of praise. Thus Kabir is glorified because he "tried to express the simple thoughts of a simple heart in the common language of the people . . . his simple words had infinite power" (Vol. II, p. 255). Similar things are said of Śri Chaitanya. (In this connection we may recall the words of Karl Barth, in the Preface to his *Epistle to the Romans*, "He who is concerned with Truth must have the courage sometimes not to be simple. . . . Until now I have found among those who talked 'simply' only those who talked 'simply' about something else than Truth.") But here the path of devotion is praised, because it is "the easiest of all," because "the cult of bhakti is open to all," because "it is a perfectly democratic religion" (Vol. II, pp. 63-65). And this *yuga-dharma*, this religion of the age, is recommended everywhere in the three volumes. "As a matter of fact, attempts at reviving and popularizing it . . . should be regarded as a sacred duty by those who have regard for the culture of the land" (Vol. II, p. 302).

Another point which is subject to criticism is the general attitude towards the question of sex. Here India is defending herself against the accusations of a pre-psychoanalytic Occident of yesterday. Many of the authors are so much influenced by western complexity, and abhorrence of sex, that they merely try to prove that India should not be blamed in this respect. They even deny the importance of the sexual element in religious thought and practice, instead of showing that it can be made a form of worship in itself. The Tantric books offer a

definite solution of the sex problem by revealing the symbolical meaning of all strong emotions, which may be used as a means of overcoming the self and its isolation. India well knows "By that must one rise by which one falls; the very poison that kills becomes the elixir of life when used by the wise" (Vol. II, p. 172). This use of the emotions is described in the important articles on Tantrism. To quote only one example of the erotic symbolism of the Tantra-Śāstra: "The physical union of man and woman is sublimated as the creative union of Śiva-Śakti (that is, perfect consciousness at rest becoming dynamic as creative activity); the thrill of the act of union being nāda; and the 'seed' that issues from the union is bindu" (Vol. II, p. 175). With such ideas India might make a very decisive contribution to modern western attempts to clear up the whole realm of sex problems. But instead of doing so, many of the writers follow the old-fashioned western trends of thought (regarding sexuality as mere "carnal pleasure"), which are really only decadent and perverted interpretations. In this point India, instead of bringing a clear light to the West, might even learn today from western psychology.

But India is not willing to learn from others—this is the last point on which a stricture has to be passed upon the Centenary Edition. Its distinct intention is revealed in the words of one of the writers: "Our object in this article is to show that India's is the greatest contribution to the world's religious thought" (Vol. II, p. 104). In this article it is rightly stressed that Indian philosophy, in its detailed and systematic analysis of the emotion of ecstatic joy, is superior to all similar attempts in western mysticism. To prove this Plotinus is taken as an example. In his discrimination of only three stages in the mystic way: Purification, Illumination, and Ecstatic Union, he is typical of the western way of thinking about the problem. "While describing the supreme joy as 'a harmonious choral dance around the One,' Plotinus seems to echo forth the most sublime conception of the rāsa līlā, as described in the Bhāgavata, and elaborated by the expounders of Bengal Vaishnavism; but the various stages leading to this highest stage have not been touched upon, nor has any attempt been made to analyze the sentiment of the choral dance. The deficiency was made up in the Bengal school" (Vol. II, p. 112).

While the intention of demonstrating the supremacy of Indian thought prevails, it may be questioned whether—even for this pur-

pose—it was really wise to include only Indian scholars in a work which is of importance for the whole world. It is certainly significant that such a universal work could be accomplished by Indians alone, but the question rises whether, perhaps, it would have been better, in a few special cases, to ask the collaboration of some few western experts. For example, would not the contribution of H. Zimmer's new way of explaining myths from the psychological point of view have been a valuable addition? The reason why western scholars were not included was evidently not one of purely scholarly method, but rather of anxiety to prove India's equality with the West. Where this purpose has been carried to the extreme of proving India's *superiority* one may suspect an underlying inferiority-complex such as is the basis of all overstressed nationalism. An unfortunate example of this is seen in an article on Early Buddhism in which the author, in his last footnote, attacks the investigations of C. A. F. Rhys Davids as follows: "Following the lead given by Mrs. Rhys Davids, some of the English and Continental scholars have started talking about pre-canonical Buddhism without any reference to the Buddha, which is just speaking of a play of Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark in it" (Vol. 1, p. 251). This is simply an ill-natured defacement of the clear statements of Mrs. Rhys Davids, who has certainly never talked "without any reference to the Buddha" when referring to Pre-canonical Buddhism, which, as a matter of fact, she even likes to call "Gotamism," substantiating her theories by quotations from the words of the Buddha. We would be glad to hear reasonable criticism of this new doctrine by Indian scholars, but are obliged to reject such an impossible misinterpretation.

According to the teaching of many Hindus there are people living in the Occident who belong spiritually to India as a special "caste," who, following their personal karma, have had to experience once a birth in the West. Such people could add something of higher importance to a study of the cultural heritage of India than those native Indian scholars who seem to belong spiritually to the West. For, while some of the writers strictly avoid any expressions of western philosophical terminology, others seem proud of their ability to use it. They make comparisons between Indian and Western thinkers, i.e., between Śaṅkara and Bergson, and between the Patañjalists and the Behaviorists, etc. They even accept western critieria of judgment with

regard to their religion, claiming that Hinduism is "the religion of common-sense." This yielding to western ways of thinking is shown in this excerpt from the Prospectus issued in advance by the Committee: "So far as the philosophical aspects are concerned, the aim of the proposed volume is not to bring out a new book on the history of Indian philosophy, nor merely to describe the various religious systems and sects, but to attempt to show the hopes and aspirations of the race, the meaning and value of life as the great teachers, saints and propounders of the different schools taught and illustrated in their own lives, and how their respective followers *understood these teachings and strove to live up to them in their everyday life and conduct.* (Italics mine.) It is therefore of the greatest importance that the exposition and interpretation of the different schools of thought should lay *special emphasis on their bearing on the life of the people*, and set forth the sādhanās, or the ways and means prescribed by each system for the realization of the supreme goal of life" (Vol. I, p. iv).

All the criticisms made here do not mean that the importance of this valuable publication could be denied or derogated. They only needed to be put before the forum of scholars who will make use of it in the years to come.

FRIEDRICH SPIEGELBERG

New York City

Yoga: A Scientific Evaluation. By K. T. BEHANAN. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937. xxi + 270 pp. $2.50.

This book deals with the subject of yoga from the standpoint of Western thought and psychology. The author, a Hindu, took his doctorate in psychology at Yale University and afterwards spent two years in the study of yoga technique at the well-known school at Lonavla, India. He then became a subject for laboratory experiment at Yale. The results of these investigations and experiences are the basis of this work, which aims at understanding, not at propaganda. His review of the fundamental psychological and philosophical concepts of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga is in no way exceptional, although he does lay emphasis upon aspects of yogic theory that are pertinent to his study, and describes breathing exercises and postures in direct and simple fashion.

Dr. Behanan says that Self-consciousness (*Ātman*) "is attainable only through a super-intellectual, mystical process." Would it be sim-

pler to say "non-intellectual process"? According to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga theory, mind, being a limited function within substance (*prakṛti*), has to be superseded if *puruṣa* (the self) is to be free. "Mind-stuff" (*sattva*) in all its combinations with the other *gunas*, is a constituent of prakṛti, and nothing else. The puruṣa, or soul, on the other hand is discrete from prakṛti and has nothing in common with any of its manifestations. It is "mere sentience and entirely passive." "Motion and activity are characteristic of prakriti alone." Although the steady flow of the mental stream reveals only the content and form of the mind, yet the author falls back upon a "transcendent principle of consciousness, purusha, the never changing soul" in order to account for the intellectual or mental life. "The presence of the purusha as a theoretically necessary principle may be safely inferred from the data of knowldge." "Intelligence as a mental faculty, according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga, is the work of prakriti and cannot have any relation whatever to the transcendental principle, purusha." Still, the author holds that the teleological principle manifest within prakṛti is traceable to an external source, the inferred puruṣa, for whose emancipation the evolution or activity of prakṛti takes place. This problem of an outside agency is the perennial bogy of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga. One might ask, then, whether his task could be equally well performed if he confined himself to prakṛti. In his closing chapter he insists that yogic experiences give no data concerning external reality. As a science, psychology does not deal with the soul, but with the problems of the menal life. The subject-object gulf is bridged within prakṛti, for, as he says, "it (*mahat*) is both mind- and matter-stuff."

Dr. Behanan's primary interest is with the "psychic apparatus," which consists of *buddhi*, *ahamkara*, the five cognitive senses and the mind (*manas*, or mind, is sometimes claimed as the sixth sense), and the motor organs. These are thirteen modifications of prakṛti. For this the yoga uses the word *citta*. Since citta is "non-conscious," it "cannot experience or comprehend"; therefore puruṣa must be the real experiencer. This is the position of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga; and it is this confusion of the spheres of non-conscious prakṛti and of self-conscious puruṣa that is responsible for the pain which characterizes the individual's lot. A clear understanding of their non-connection would set sufferers free.

The yoga holds that, "although seldom attained by men, there is

a state in which the citta could be free from all fluctuations, where neither knowledge nor its twin, feeling, could exist. This state can be reached by slowly steadying the mind through exercises in concentration. Citta is like a river that runs in both directions, one leading to a continuance of the present existence and resulting in strengthening the tie of life, and the other leading to release from the chains of rebirth. To be successful in the latter venture, it is necessary to redirect the natural course of the mental life. By slow practice and training, yoga claims, it is possible to effect this redirection." In the yoga psychology "all the elaborate preparation, ethical, physical and psycho-physiological, is aimed to serve this one purpose: the control and then the elimination of mental processes."

The citta of the yoga doctrine is the significant thing as a point of contact with modern psychoanalysis. It is this psychic apparatus, doomed to endless reincarnations (rebirth), which becomes for Dr. Behanan the basis of comparison with the western system. "According to yoga, that which migrates is not the soul but the citta, which is the congealed and concentrated essence of all the previous experiences gathered together in an individual mental substance." We repeat, therefore, why resort to the external (also eternally separate) puruṣa at all?

His chapters comparing psychoanalysis and psychic research with yoga are of special interest to western students. The author's handling of the latter subject is commonplace, although he does show that there is a place for telepathy and clairvoyance in yogic theory. He says: "Most of the theories of psychology in the West have been built along lines which do not take into consideration telepathic manifestations. It is, therefore, worth while to point out that yoga has held that such phenomena are not only possible, but also that they have been confirmed by the experiences of yogins; and so yoga makes the distinction between the individual mind and the collective mind. The mind, under certain psychological conditions somehow seems able to 'make connection' with other minds, without at the same time losing its identity. Each mind is an isolated organism in one sense, and at the same time it exists in a cosmic whole. This is the yogic contention." Evidently Dr. Behanan is dealing here with hearsay, not with experiment. In his effort to disclaim an interest, on the part of yogins, in unusual powers, he goes too far, even though it is true that "yogins who have

the spiritual ideal before them pay very little attention to these 'psychic phenomena.' One encounters them in the course of his practices, but they are merely distractions to be overcome. They are not gifts but obstacles. Barring the pretensions of the professional marvel-seekers, there is no basis for the popular impression that the 'supernatural' centers around yogins and yoga." He is speaking for the few only. The attention given, even by Patañjalī, to the subject of unusual powers is a sufficient rejoinder.

The interest in the chapter on "Yoga and Psychoanalysis" lies in the similarities and differences which he points out. The yoga goes further than the other in eradicating fears, for it disposes of death also. The subtle body, the psychic apparatus of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, performs all the functions which are, in the other system, attributed to the subconscious. Impulses from below and even racial inheritance are here explained, in the doctrine of the ever-reincarnating psychic apparatus. "Yoga believes that the unconscious (all of the modifications and prakriti are unconscious) contains the individual experiences of all the past lives and will continue to be effective until the passion for life has been forcefully conquered by 'burning the seeds of the latent deposits.' The 'primal phantasies,' 'dominants,' and 'archetypes' attributed by Jung to a collective unconscious, and by Freud to phylogenetic inheritance, can equally well be explained on an individual basis if the yogic theory of a subtle mental substance, which might constitute the principle of individuality, is accepted." We may quote one further statement: "In conclusion it might be pointed out that therapeutic similarities exist between psychoanalysis and only the earlier phases of yoga. The higher stages of yoga are reached by psychophysical and mental exercises for which psychoanalysis has no parallel. Freud's 'depth-psychology' would not be considered deep enough by yoga. The repressions of childhood and their uprooting by psychoanalysis may equip a man to meet successfully the problems of life. The method may be sufficient for the goal. But the spiritual objective of yoga, a release from the chain of existence, is attained only by a contrary procedure, the extinction of life-instinct itself. Can there by any two ideals more mutually opposed?"

In emphasizing the importance of posturing and breathing for various ends which the yoga sets for itself, he says, "From the yogic point of view, a correct and harmonious physiological functioning of the vari-

ous organs of the body is more important than either mere physical strength or muscular power. . . . These [postures and breath regulation] help the yogins to maintain their bodies at a high level of physical efficiency." There is a close relationship between breath control and mental states. "With sufficient practice in pranayama the yogin finds that changes occur in his mental states; in a marked way his awareness of the external world diminishes." The breathing exercises which he describes "are said to possess spiritual significance, in as much as they are all conducive to the awakening of spiritual forces. Some of them are claimed to have specific virtues."

Just what are exercises in concentration designed to accomplish? "The objective that the yogin lays before himself . . . is the complete elimination of thoughts, or, rather that of getting behind thoughts, i.e., transcending the activities and fluctuations of the citta, or mind-stuff. The ideal is not reached until all thoughts are suppressed. To the mind as such, yoga attaches no importance, regarding it as an obstacle or veil, so to say, that hides the true self." Is it not a valid statement that a theory is thrown into the discussion here when he says, "rather that of getting behind thoughts"? The yoga doctrine involves the suppression of the activity within prakṛti and nothing else, since all activity is there. Moreover, "in the mental exercises of yoga a progressive relaxation is also accompanied by the diminution of the will until at last in the highest stage, that of samadhi, a complete paralysis of the will is reached." The grades of achievement in concentration deal with "the relative or total loss of subject-object awareness." But, "the yogin's aim is to surpass the citta stage entirely. Ultimately this is accomplished without effort, habitually."

The last chapter is the most significant in the book, for the author records there some interesting conclusions and judgments. He calls attention to the fact "that traditional modes of thinking have in general perpetuated the notion that the mind and the body are two different substantial entities. . . . Today, closely following the findings of the various biological sciences, we are forced to think of the mind as a function of the integrated organism." We are apt, however, to slur over the distinction between puruṣa and citta (or manas) which is involved here. For we must not forget that the application of this principle to yoga confines us to the realm of prakṛti. This caution applies to the next statement as well. "No matter whether we approach

from the side of the higher mental processes or from that of the physical aspects, the organism emerges as an integrated whole—an inseparable but distinguishable unity of physical and mental factors. The treatment of the mind-body problem as two aspects of an integrated organism, distinguishable for purposes of experimentation and understanding but wholly unreal when separated, has proved more fertile and seems to offer a very satisfactory explanation of the problems of psychology." This is, to repeat, to say that, for yoga, both 'mind' and 'body' are related modifications of substance.

Turning now to the author and his experiments, we find that his tentative deductions are of considerable value. "We may rightly conclude . . . that breathing and concentration tend to decrease the mental functions. As to whether concentration is better adapted for this purpose than breathing as is sometimes popularly thought, we must give a negative answer." And further: "Those who are inclined to believe that yoga is a beneficial training for mental development may be a little surprised by our conclusion that there is a retardation of mental functions after yogic practices. But we have not even raised, let alone answered the question as to what effect these practices have on the mind over a long period of time. There is no experimental evidence, therefore, either to support or disprove the popular notion that these practices can improve one's intellectual faculties (in the broad sense including memory, logical acumen, etc.)." Concerning breathing exercises he offers the opinion that, "it seems very probable . . . that the pranayamic breathing of yoga induces a state of relaxation, thereby influencing the mind to take an 'inward' course."

In pointing out that sleep and hypnosis are different phenomena when viewed from the angle of underlying physiological changes, Dr. Behanan refers to the practice of equating yoga with partial or complete hypnosis. "An hypnotized person has no memory of what had transpired during the trance (except when it is suggested that he remember). But the yogins are relatively conscious of their experience during and after the trance. Their statements of indescribable joy and blissfulness certainly are indicative of a real remembered experience which, because of its sheer ineffability, is found difficult to convey through the medium of language. The experience itself may be transitory, but it does leave a vivid impression on the practitioner—so vivid and blissful as to make him long for further trance experiences. This

is an important point of difference between the two." Dr. Behanan, apparently, has not experienced yogic trance himself. He continues, "experimentally, however, we know only very little about hypnotic phenomena and practically nothing about the samadhic (trance) stage of yoga. It would be mere speculation of doubtful value either to affirm or deny that the two are essentially similar" (or dissimilar?).

According to yogins, the subjective experiences under prānāyāma and concentration are different.

He reduces the function of prānāyāma considerably when he remarks, with a "probably," "the chief purpose of the yogic breathing exercises is to increase the consumption of oxygen with the minimum of physical exertion, under conditions probably favorable to the storage of oxygen."

To the questions, "Does yoga help the practitioner to arouse deeper levels of energy?" "Is it conducive to a feeling of equanimity?" and "Does the sum total of these practices lead to an alteration of personality, attitudes and the manner in which we react to the ups and downs of every day life?" his answer is: "The systematized practices of yoga seem somehow to be able to arouse, little by little as the practice progresses, this indomitable power of the human mind"; and then he falls back upon William James for corroboration. He does find in his own case, however, improvement in health; and he is convinced that prānāyāma induces a pleasant feeling of quietude and isolation, a sort of hazy, empty state of extreme pleasantness, and the impression of shallow breathing. But, he adds, "Our experiments . . . do not point to an actual decrease in the rate or depth of respiration; hence I am inclined to believe that this is a purely subjective feeling." He believes that now, after his experiments with yoga, his "mental-emotional life is no longer a blind catch-as-catch-can, and, unlike the two snakes that intertwined their bodies so inextricably as to make each feel the other a part of itself, I seem relatively able to prevent self-victimization by emotional extremes. Here I may add that this discipline has in no way influenced my intellectual outlook." One might ask whether other factors of maturing life might not be involved in his progress toward stability.

As to the employment of experience to throw light upon the problem of external reality and its nature he says: "But is an intensely real experience, no matter how certain it might seem to the experiencer, by

itself a proof of the objectivity of what is experienced? On the contrary, the diversity of intellectual interpretations [in India] should incline us to believe that the super-normal experiences are, to say the least, predominantly subjective. They constitute no valid source of knowledge. As far as the metaphysical tenents of yoga are concerned they are an audacious and poetic leap in the dark—worthy enough to occupy a spacious hall in the 'Mansions of Philosophy' that the human mind has spun in its irresistible desire to explain the warp and woof of the unknown."

This study is a significant beginning in an approach to yoga which deserves much serious attention. The subject, relieved of the mystery and the occultism which follow it like a shadow, will well repay investigation.

It will not be out of place to note, however, that the writer of the "Foreword" attributes the peculiar Indian philosophical tradition to environment (p.ix) and holds that yoga (which in this work is basically that of Patañjalī) "has sought for an ultimate union of the individual personality with the infinite." The aim of the yoga as stated in the *Yoga Sūtras* (III: 51) is the isolation (*kāivalya*) of the individual intelligence (*puruṣa*).

GEORGE W. BRIGGS

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The Birth of China: A Study of the Formative Period of Chinese Civilization. By HERRLEE GLESSNER CREEL. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1937. 402 pp. $3.75.

For a long while there has been lacking in the English language any adequate treatment of the beginnings of Chinese life. Dr. Hirth essayed this in his *Ancient History of China,* published in 1911. Of two other attempts brought out a quarter century later in Paris, Maspero's *La Chine Antique* and Granet's *La Civilization Chinoise,* only the second and inferior work was rendered into English (in 1930). They were all worthy, based on Chinese sources, particularly the canonical literature and later commentaries, and still have some validity.

Since their publication, however, discoveries have been made on Chinese soil which have revolutionized our knowledge. When Hirth wrote nothing was surely known of Chinese history prior to the first millennium before our era, and the very next year Dr. Laufer was to

declare that nothing proved that there had ever been a Stone Age in China. In 1921 there commenced a series of explorations which laid bare any number of Neolithic sites reaching north into Manchuria, west into Central Asia, and south into Chekiang. In 1929 the first of a whole series of crania of Paleolithic men and women was brought to light. And from 1928 to May 1937 digging has been going on systematically at the site of the capital and royal graveyard of the Shang kings, who ruled China during the second half of the second millennium B.C. (When Granet wrote, in 1929, he made no use of these and earlier researches, and has almost nothing to say about the Shang people—a woeful omission.) This is by no means all. The earth has yielded many another of its secrets to excavators in the last decade, and the work would still be going on were it not for the disastrous campaign of China's island neighbor.

It was high time therefore for a summation of these discoveries, putting them in their proper order, interpreting each in the light of modern scientific opinion, and in turn re-interpreting the literary material of the ninth, eighth, and seventh centuries, which heretofore had in the main to be accepted without authentic supporting data. This is what Creel set out to do, and in this he has been splendidly successful. His work touches summarily on the origins of Chinese civilization in one chapter, and then presents in twenty-seven other chapters the history and culture of the people who lived in the territory bisected by the Hoang Ho, from 1400 to 600 B.C. This was China's formative period. After 600 come the more sophisticated group, the thinkers and historians and critics and artists—a great pageant which is for the most part abundantly portrayed on China's immense literary canvass. If anyone wants to read one book that will help him understand the classical writings of the Chinese—The *Odes* and the *History*, for example—let him take this volume. Creel has plumbed the authentic chapters in each of the early books, and described in lucid English the conditions of society, domestic and official life, law, and religion before the days of Confucious. Since some of the main sources on which we depend for information—the tombs, the oracle records, the bronze inscriptions, and the canon—have close connection with religious practices it stands to reason that a feature of his book is its treatment of the beliefs and ritual and observances of the people and of the ruling class. Chapters XII, XIII, XXV, and XXVIII are entitled re-

spectively "The Gods of Shang," "The Counsel of the Gods," "Religion," and "The Decree of Heaven."

One may take exception to a few of his statements or conclusions, but the great majority appear to me to be sound. He speaks (p. 36) of two chronologies for the Shang period: one traditional, 1765-1123; and one considered a forgery, 1558-1051. In this he ignores the important study of the late Wang Kuo-wei (d. 1927) who gathered together quotations of the original text of the *Bamboo Books* from many sources, and brought out *inter alia* that the dates for this period should be 1523-1028.[1] On p. 348 Creel writes: "The former rulers were ancestors of the present ruler; not to conform to their ways was to be scarcely filial." This seems logical enough not alone for ancient times, but also for the more modern when filial piety was equally stressed. The historical records, however, reveal numerous cases where the emperor would mouth the most pious phrases and at the same time upset his father's or grandfather's dicta. The cowries used for money and perhaps magical purposes in Neolithic and Bronze Age China are said to come either from the mouth of the Yangtze or from west of Singapore (p. 91). Another great authority holds that their source was the Maldive Islands only.

There have been a few discoveries or precisions made since the author finished his book, which may be added. In 1936 and 1937 an exploratory dig was made at Pao chi hsien, Shensi province, which uncovered a middle Neolithic site—the first of its kind in China. This is dated approximately 6000 B.C. and therefore fills up part of the gap in the record (see Creel, p. 42). The red pigment on at least one oracle bone has been examined by a scientist and found to be cinnabar (see p. 100). Three ocarinae altogether are now in the possession of the Academia Sinica, not just the one shown to Creel in 1935 (see p. 101). From these three we may hope eventually to derive some knowledge of the earliest Chinese musical scale. As to the question of horse-drawn vehicles in China in the second millennium B.C., Mr. Liang Ssu-yung informed me in June of this year that he

1. Since these lines were written there has appeared a technical monograph by Creel (*Studies in Early Chinese Culture*, First Series, Baltimore, 1938, published by the American Council of Learned Societies, Washington, D.C.) which presents part of the large body of proof on which the book under review rests. Among other things is a note on the chronology of Wang Kou-wei. Anyone interested in examining Creel's work in detail should obtain a copy of the *Studies*.

had definite proof that the Shang nobles made use both of the two-horse and of the four-horse chariot. Dr. Creel may also be interested to know that coffins (see his discussion of Shang burial customs on p. 176) had not yet been found by June 1937 at the site of the capital, despite the assertion of Professor Pelliot in his lecture at the Harvard Tercentenary Conference in September 1936. (See *Independence, Convergence and Borrowing in Institutions, Thoughts, and Art*, p. 269.) Finally, an interesting suggestion has been made by Mr. Lionel C. Hopkins (*Journal*, Roy. As. Soc., Apr. 1937, 209-214), an authority on Shang inscriptions, that the character *ch'ü* (one of the meanings of which is "deprive of") as first written, may be a pictograph showing the process of turning a man into a eunuch. This should be added, for what it is worth, to what Creel has written on p. 293.

In conclusion let me repeat that we have here a book unique in the literature on China, which should be in the hands of everyone interested in the beginnings of civilization wherever it shows its head.

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The Apostolic Age and the New Testament. By George A. Barton. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1936. xi + 157 pp. $1.50.

Professor Barton is the author of a long list of learned works on Judaism, Christianity and ancient Semitic culture. His linguistic equipment and his intimate acquaintance with near-eastern archeology make him a particularly interesting commentator on problems of biblical interpretation; as he is, in addition, a rather imaginative and original scholar, the reader may expect to find something new and suggestive in each of his books. This expectation will not be disappointed in the reading of his new volume on the Apostolic age.

The author deals with five subjects: The Church Unconscious of Its Mission; Missionary Efforts and Gospel Traditions; Christianity Encompasses the Aegean Sea; The Passing of the Apostles; The Institutionalizing of Christianity. In addition to these chapters there are an Introduction, a Chronology, a Selected Bibliography, and an Index.

Professor Barton is critical of the *formgeschichtlich* method of New Testament study, and gives a few illustrations of what he considers

an improper use of it from the writings of Dibelius and Windisch; on the other hand he is willing to accept those of its results which best fit in with the general presuppositions of historical science. The reviewer is inclined to be less skeptical of the results of the *formgeschichtlich* school than is the author, but he thinks that biblical scholarship has something to gain by a judicious presentation of the more conservative attitude toward tradition.

Among the interpretations which seem fresh and stimulating the following may be mentioned: "What happened, then, at Pentecost was that the little Christian company were united in a highly emotional group of mystic experience. As a consequence a number of them fell into ecstasy and gave voice to ejaculations such as were, in ancient times, regarded as utterances of the Spirit" (pp. 12 f.); that Saul first went to Damascus because the descendants of the Zadokite sect were especially interested in the coming of a Messiah (p. 23); "The Gospel of Mark, which Clement of Alexandria declared to have been written at Rome, was, I believe, the second and enlarged edition of the Gospel, made by St. Mark himself some years later. . . . If our conjectures are right, the disagreement between Paul and Barnabas, and the establishment of a separate mission by Barnabas, led to the compilation of the earliest form of our earliest existing Gospel" (pp. 63 f.)

We know that Apollos must "have been growing up in Alexandria when Philo, the Jewish philosopher, who lived until the year 40 A.D., was at the height of his fame, and there is good reason to believe that he had drunk deeply at Philo's fountain, if he had not been an actual pupil of that master. Two characteristics of Philo's method of teaching can, I believe, be traced to Apollos, delight in allegory and a peculiar way of accounting for the genius of eminent, God-commissioned men. . . . At this point I want to emphasize what I believe to be Apollos' contribution to our Gospel narratives. For more than ten years I have believed that it was he who . . . wrote the earliest account of our Lord's Birth—that embodied in the Gospel of Luke" (pp. 71 f.); "Any modern churchman who has to raise money can gain points in the psychology of the art from reading St. Paul's arguments. In money-raising, as in everything he undertook, he was a master" (p. 82); "for some years I have held the theory that two Jewish Christians, Andronicus and Junius, who had been with St. Paul in Ephesus

and had shared one of his imprisonments there, then went to Rome and established that church" (pp. 83 f.); "Personally, though perhaps mad, I am persuaded that the great bulk of the book [of Revelations], apart from chapters 1-3 and portions of chapters 19-22, was composed before the year 70 A.D., and that the earliest portion of it originated in the year 40 A.D." (p. 133).

The above are, perhaps, the most interesting passages that can be selected to show that Barton does not hesitate to advance new and bold hypotheses, of the conjectural nature of which he professes to be fully aware. Of course, in a semi-popular book of this kind, he has not been able to support his theories by detailed argument, but for most of them he does at least indicate the nature of the evidence in outline.

The chief criticism that occurs to the reviewer is that the author is either ignorant or neglectful of the rabbinic literature that illuminates much early Christian thought; hence he is puzzled by the choice of the four kinds of prohibited acts mentioned in Acts xv (p. 60); hence he makes such unqualified statements as "The ethical demands of Jesus were greater than those of Judaism" (p. 35); hence the (rather unimportant) error of making Jabne a later name for Jamnia (p. 117), whereas it was the Hebrew name contemporary with Jamnia, the Greek name. Rather surprising, too, is the omission in the Bibliography of the works on rabbinic Judaism by G. F. Moore, Strack-Billerbeck, and others. It is a pity that Professor Barton has not extended his studies of the Old Testament to include early rabbinic Judaism; if he had done so, his writings on the New Testament would be the more valuable.

Nevertheless this little book deserves consideration by students of Apostolic Christianity, and should be read by all those who wish a readable summary of recent discoveries in New Testament philology and history.

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The Religious Experience of the Primitive Church. By P. G. S. HOPWOOD. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937. 387 pp. + xxii. $3.00.

Just when one begins to think that New Testament criticism with the material now available has nothing more to do than tidy up

a few odds and ends here and there, a book like Dr. Hopwood's appears and shows that the subject has by no means been exhausted, and is still susceptible of fresh and illuminating treatment. The book is a significant one not only in opening up a new approach to certain New Testament problems, but even more so in personalizing and humanizing the early days of Christianity. It could never serve as a history of the primitive Church, nor is it meant to do so; but it is an almost necessary supplement to any such standard historical account. On many points not directly connected with his main thesis, the author assumes doubtful critical positions without substantiating them with proof; and there are also a few minor slips, which can easily be corrected in a second edition.

Before reading the book, one might easily imagine that there are not enough data available to furnish a description of the religious experience of the pre-Pauline Church, which is what Dr. Hopwood means by the "primitive Church." And when one remembers that St. Paul became a Christian within at least three years of our Lord's death, and that he was active as a Christian long before the First Missionary Journey, it reduces considerably the so-called pre-Pauline period. But to read the book is to be convinced that there is ample material available, and in meditating upon it one is helped towards a deepening of one's own religious experience today.

The thesis of the book is that just as "the formative years of a man's life are those of his earliest childhood," so also is this true of the Christian Church; and that the New Testament, which is its earliest literature, "is a collection of documents the writing of which was inspired by religious experience." It is perhaps, however, a considerable overstatement to say that "it is on religious experience alone that the ultimate data are to be found for the appraisal of Church origins."

In his description of the literary sources Dr. Hopwood adheres, on the whole, to accepted conclusions. He makes an excellent point in rejecting fantasy-making to account for apocalyptic and in rooting it instead in a deep faith in God and His power to save. How far, though, the psychology of vision will help to explain it is a doubtful matter. He emphasizes the sometimes-forgotten distinction between the Messiah himself and the Messianic era, and also the ready accessibility of man in those days to the invasive influences which are today called supernatural.

In Chapter IV Dr. Hopwood details the innumerable contacts, impressions, and experiences arising from our Lord's personal impact upon those who saw and heard Him. In doing so he quotes the words of the various evangelists, for instance Luke 4:14,15: "And there went out a fame of Him through all the region round about. And He taught in their synagogues, being glorified of all." But unfortunately Dr. Hopwood never stops to question whether this is an accurate statement or not. St. Luke was not present, and the question of the source and reliability of his information is never raised. Perhaps the saner view would be that our Lord did make a profound impression upon those who came in contact with Him, but that the various individual references may in many cases be heightened or exaggerated. That the crowds thought of Jesus as a prophet, the herald of the coming Kingdom of God, and hailed Him as the herald and not the Messiah himself on the triumphal entry into Jerusalem is well pointed out. There are particularly good descriptions of the effect of our Lord's personality on both sinners and the sick, and of His enlargement of the receptive power of His disciples to take in His personality. In the explanation of the Transfiguration no attempt is made to explain how the three disciples had the same vision; and the bringing in of the subconscious mind to account for it leaves the whole episode as inexplicable as formerly. There is a particularly fine description of how the disciples, after they came to believe that Jesus was the Messiah, then viewed Him in accordance with their traditional beliefs, and not as He actually was; and consequently their subsequent disillusionment which accounts for their actions at the time of His death.

One of the best chapters in the book is that on the Resurrection, where with proper caution Dr. Hopwood helps to elucidate by means of psychology the experience of the witnesses, and states the case for the appearances being objective visions better than it has so far been done. He fails, however, just as badly as others who share his view, to give any satisfactory account of the empty tomb, although he is right in stressing the inappropriateness from an ethical and spiritual point of view of mere physical bodily resuscitation.

There follows an excellent description of the various experiences produced by the Holy Spirit in the disciples, in which there is also a good brief summary of later spiritual personalities who possessed the power of healing, and also of those who have seen visions. The point

is well made that abnormal psychic conditions may just as well be evidence of the integration as the disintegration of personality; and also that St. Paul transferred his experience of Spirit-possession to his awareness of the indwelling of Christ. The whole chapter is a splendid account of the primitive Christian conception of the working of the Holy Spirit.

In his treatment of the early use of the term *ecclesia* Dr. Hopwood's conclusions are hardly in accordance with the evidence. He is inclined to underestimate the self-consciousness which the early Christians possessed of being a separate group and of being one, although scattered throughout the world. There is an excellent warning against assuming any definite body of early doctrine, although it is nearer the facts to say that the divergences in the texts of the Lord's Prayer, the Beatitudes, and the institution of the Lord's Supper show that there was a very widespread agreement in the subjects of early Christian teaching.

There is no reason for thinking that the *ecclesia* came into existence only after the non-fulfilment of the apocalyptic hope of Christ's return, for such an expectation is found in St. Paul, along with a definite Church-consciousness. The traditional conception that it was the Resurrection and the Pentecostal experience which made the disciples of Jesus conscious of their mission and of their peculiar fellowship is still most in accord with the evidence. The distinction between a "Messianic community" and the "Church" would seem to be a false one, if it is meant to imply that the "Messianic community" was not also the Church. It is a useful name, however, for one of the early phases of Church life, a period distinguished, as the author points out, for its freedom from ordinary common-sense considerations by its intense apocalyptic belief. But of all the things which the Church is not, certainly the chief of them is that it is not a "throw-back" from the failure of apocalyptic expectation. Again when Dr. Hopwood speaks of the division of the primitive Church of Jerusalem into a Hellenistic and Jewish section, to the former of which the Seven ministered and to the latter the Twelve, there is no real evidence in the Acts or in the Epistles that this was so; nor is it certain that all of the Seven were Hellenistic Jews; or that there was no intercommunion at first between the Gentile and Jewish wings of the Church.

In his discussion of the origin of baptism he asserts, but produces no

evidence to show, that primitive Christians regarded those who baptized them as the representatives of Christ. And in view of Nicodemus's interview with our Lord it can hardly be said that the Fourth Gospel never connects Spirit and baptism. Dr. Hopwood's interpretation of the Last Supper is almost wholly dependent upon Dr. Oesterly's view of it as the Passover Kiddush. But it is curious that no one has been able to submit any evidence of the existence of such a rite in connection with the Passover in the time of our Lord, and hence the validity of the whole interpretation is called in question. Nor is any real solution presented as to the significance of the "covenant" cup.

In the chapter on "The Christ Consciousness of the Primitive Church" the attempt is made to recount psychologically step by step how the early Christians came to regard Him as divine. The only difficulty is that the evidence points to this as having taken place by an immediate personal impression during His lifetime, and not by a process of reasoning after His death.

In the concluding chapter four points are well stressed in regard to the intrinsic worth of the religious experience: First, that the psychologically-abnormal elements are no criteria of the value of the experience they express; secondly, that the religious experience itself must be differentiated from the thought-forms in which it is expressed; thirdly, the religious experience of the early Church began with the feelings of individual men, but there is also a group experience which is more than the sum of these; and fourthly, the inadequacy of the New Psychology to account for this experience on purely human grounds.

In the final list of suggestions of possible modifications which his conclusions should make in the usual estimate of Church origins, there is not a one of them that is novel, or is not to be found in standard, orthodox treatments of the beginnings of the Church. The book merely lends further support to well-known positions and additional refutation of those opposing them. But so stimulating and helpful is this volume that one hopes that some day Dr. Hopwood will continue his studies further down the course of Church history and publish his conclusions in as readable and thought-provoking a book as this.

J. B. Bernardin

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Puti russkago bogosloviya (The Ways of Russian Theology). By Georgi Florovsky. Paris: Les Éditeurs Réunis, 1937. 574 pp. Fr. 65.

This is a very important study on the development of Russian theology and religious thought. It is the work of a "Russian Byzantinist," and by this often abused phrase we mean a man who believes that theology and Christian thought must develop along the lines of patristic tradition without submitting itself to slavish imitation or subordination. The author deplores the fact that much of Russian theology departed from this path at a relatively early date and sought its basis either in the West or in striking religious meditation, often of a type that can scarcely be called Christian in essence. It is startling in this connection to realize that from the time of Peter the Great to the middle of the nineteenth century, theology was regularly taught in the Russian schools and seminaries in Latin instead of in Greek, Russian, or Church Slavonic. Father Florovsky traces in detail the gradual reawakening of interest in the use of Russian, and the process of eliminating from the standpoint of the Church many of the Latin (and Protestant) accretions.

Side by side with these movements run, during the nineteenth century, the various religious developments of thinkers more or less at variance with the Christian tradition. In these sections the author treats of many of the writers well known in Russian literature, and several others, such as Fedotov, Rozanov, and Vladimir Solovyev, who allowed their fancy free play, and emphasized some particular aspect of life or thought to a degree that is hardly consonant with a well-balanced faith.

Through it all run, also, the constant efforts of the government to treat the Church merely as a department of state, and in this there can easily be seen the dangers of civil and secular influence on the life and thought of a religious body. In this connection there is a careful and fair survey of the activities of Pobyedonostsev, the procurator of the Holy Synod during the reign of Alexander III and the first part of the reign of Nicholas II.

The author continues his work only to the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, and does not consider the developments of the teaching as to *Sophia*, and the various movements that have arisen during the past years among the emigrés and at home. However, he covers

in some detail the early works of many of the leaders of the last period, although the changes which they have undergone in the last two decades have greatly distorted or obscured the ideas which they had in the period of this book, and the account of their work often seems out of harmony with the impression which they produce today.

The last chapter is an especially good summary and guide to the ideas of Father Florovsky. It is also a striking plea for the value of patristic studies, and a careful picture of the relations between Christian thought and the culture of pagan and Christian Greece, and well deserves to be read and studied for its general bearing on history and civilization. It is unfortunate that there is only a chapter index, and no table of contents or list of names to facilitate the use of the volume.

Along with this review, we may mention the extremely hostile criticism by Nikolay Berdyayev in the last number of *Put'* (No. 53, pp. 53-65). The author attacks Father Florovsky for his Byzantinism, for his views on history, and for his omission of the distinctly rationalistic intelligentsia, such as Byelinsky. Much of this might be attributed to bad temper, were it not so involved in the present efforts of Berdyayev to create a new synthesis of history, religion, and personality. In this, as in many other of his criticisms, Berdyayev is unsparing in his attacks, and seems to separate himself from any consideration of history, dogma or civilization which is expressed in terms that are fairly close in meaning to those used by the uninitiate, no matter how intelligent they may happen to be.

This is a weakness of the entire criticism, and we can well understand why Father Florovsky eliminated those authors who were frankly working for a breakdown of the religious sense of the Russian people. To include them would be to prepare a complete history of Russian thought or to accept the popular modern idea that all educational and social work, no matter under what guise or with what motive, must be accepted as a manifestation of the Christian spirit. Such an attitude definitely abolishes the value of traditional theology in a way that none of the authors discussed do, and the book would have been far weaker and more disconnected, had the radical and agnostic intelligentsia been included.

More serious, perhaps, is the failure to study the theological compromises among the Russian sectarians and Old Believers. Some of these were very close to the Orthodox Church, although their attitude

toward the priesthood compelled them to resort to a peculiar system of logic to maintain their positions. The author can easily defend himself for the omission of these, especially as none of the leaders adopted any definitely new ideas, and all were struggling to accept and explain a special view of traditional Orthodoxy.

Taken as a whole, the book will well repay study by students of formal theology, and also by persons interested in Russian literature who desire to have a good summary of the spiritual aspects of the authors. Again and again Russian scholars have emphasized the philosophical contributions of the literature, and it is well now to have some one comment on their theological contributions. Father Florovsky may well be satisfied that he has written this book. He has had to go through large masses of material, and for the most part he has shown himself a master in arranging it clearly, and in connecting the periods of Russian theological thought with similar tendencies, among the other Orthodox and among Western Christians (both Roman Catholic and Protestant).

CLARENCE A. MANNING

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John Wesley and Modern Religion, By UMPHREY LEE. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1936. 354 pp. $2.50.

The year 1938 is peculiarly timely for a review of what is probably the most important book on John Wesley to appear for many years. And for two reasons, first, because world-wide Methodism celebrates this year the 200th anniversary of Wesley's conversion, an occasion that for many marks the origin of the Methodist Church; secondly, in America, 1938 will probably witness the accomplishment of a very significant movement in Protestant church union, the union of the Methodist Episcopal Church, North, the Methodist Episcopal Church, South and the Methodist Protestant Church, resulting in the formation of possibly the largest Protestant denomination in the world. Both these events invite a fresh study of Wesley, and one, moreover, that can make use of the source material that has become available only within the past few years. Dr. Lee's book answers this need excellently, so much so, indeed, that one does not hesitate to speak of it as "definitive" and "authoritative."

Dr. Lee sets himself the task of recovering Wesley's religious ex-

perience and theology as they were in the original, of freeing them from the misconceptions and perversions fastened on them by both sympathetic and hostile interpreters. This can best be done, the author feels, by placing Wesley against the background of the eighteenth century, whose cultural and religious movements have exerted such an influence on our era that Dr. Lee does not scruple to call them "modern" (pp. 2-4). Hence the study is opened with an examination of eighteenth century religion which, in the manner of recent investigations, does not find the picture as dark as many have liked to paint it. Despite the stifling effect on religion of deism and conformity, there nevertheless existed certain tendencies favorable to individual piety that needed only the hymns of Watts, the eloquence of Whitefield or the evangelical passion of the Wesleys to be kindled into flame.

Dr. Lee's next chapters deal with the formative influences of Wesley's home and parents; with his schooling at Charterhouse and his university years at Oxford; with his deepening religious experience and thought while a tutor at Lincoln College, Oxford, and while a missionary in colonial America. In these years, in fact as early as 1725-26, Dr. Lee finds the rise of certain fundamental convictions that later came to provide the structural framework of Wesley's thought, the most important being the doctrine of Christine Perfection, "holiness, . . . the controlling idea in his life and teachings and the continuous goal of his experience . . ." (p. 60); the necessity of using regularly the appointed means of grace, the sacraments, worship, etc.; the doctrine of justification by faith; and the desire for an explicit assurance of salvation.

These ideas were heightened and sharpened by the intense religious experience that came to Wesley on May 24, 1738. Dr. Lee's interpretation of this event is one of the most interesting sections of his book. He questions the traditional view that this was an abrupt, wrenching, evangelical experience of salvation by faith in which Wesley was transformed over-night from a sinner into a saint. On the contrary, Dr. Lee believes that the evidence suggests that before 1738 Wesley was deeply and genuinely religious, and that Aldersgate was in reality only a "mystical conversion" to a higher stage of religious devotion in which Wesley's desire for an *emotional* verification of what he had *intellectually* understood for years about the divine forgiveness was satisfied. Dr. Lee would hardly agree that Wesley's conversion is of the twice-

born type of which William James writes. And it must be said that Dr. Lee's analysis of the evidence, especially of the all-important corrections Wesley made in the *Journal* of his religious life before 1738, is measured and clear. In fact his interpretation gains in cogency from the restraint with which he sets it forth, in contrast, for example, to such a variant interpretation as that made by Professor G. C. Cell in his book, *The Rediscovery of John Wesley*.

From a discussion of Wesley's religious experience the author proceeds to an exposition of the bases of Wesley's theology. He deals in turn with the doctrines of God, of the atonement, of grace, of miracles and of religious authority. Under the title, "The Doctrine of Salvation," the author considers Wesley's views of faith, of justification and of the new birth (pp. 144-173). He perceives that these are substantially Reformed. This does not necessarily mean, he insists, that Wesley derived them from Luther and Calvin and other Reformers. They came from various sources, the ancient Fathers, the Moravians, Catholic devotionalists, the Articles and Homilies of the Anglican Church, English mystics, etc. Dr. Lee makes this point in order to dispel the common notion that Wesley consciously derived his doctrine from Reformed theology, and the clear treatment of the very difficult problem of Wesley's changing views of the place of faith and works in justification would seem to confirm his interpretation. Dr. Lee admits of course that Wesley can be considered Reformed in his insistence that man is saved by the grace of God made available by the atonement of Christ, no matter where or how he got this doctrine (p. 160). But he carefully points out that Wesley's concern for inherent holiness would not let him rest there, that it was necessary to provide a corrective to the Antinomian abuses to which the strictly Reformed doctrine of salvation could so easily give rise. This corrective took the form of a vigorous emphasis on the necessity of inward and outward holiness which, theologically, became the doctrine of Christian Perfection, or, as Wesley sometimes speaks of it, the doctrine of "full" or "entire" sanctification. In the union of these two emphases, "free, full present justification, on the one hand, and of entire sanctification, both of heart and life, on the other," Dr. Lee feels Wesley's genius is characteristically found (pp. 172-173).

The author's treatment of the doctrine of Christian Perfection is accompanied by a chapter on "The Discipline of Life" which presses

the importance Wesley attached to regular public and private devotion. This is the least significant chapter in the book to the reviewer. Its inclusion is probably justified, however, by the light it throws on what Wesley thought Christian salvation to imply in actual practice, and by the introduction it provides to the more important doctrine of the Church. For Wesley was a churchman to the core, and in his opinion a large part of the discipline of the Christian life consisted in regular attendance on the means of grace to be found in the Church and nowhere else. Dr. Lee's treatment of Wesley's doctrines of the Church and sacraments, and of the way they influenced his relations with the Anglican Church of his day is altogether admirable. It is unfortunate that it cannot be given in more detail. His main thesis, however, is that Wesley's devotion to the Christian Church defined as a fellowship in which the pure word of God is preached and the sacraments duly administered, and his loyalty to the Anglican Church of his day are not be questioned. Wesley always maintained that his task was to awaken an "intense, individualistic religious piety" (p. 247) in the hearts of men that should both feed into and be nourished by the Church. Similarly, Wesley intended that despite their seemingly independent character the religious societies which sprang from the revival should be societies within the Church, not outside it. It is of course true that Wesley believed religion above all to be a personal experience in which individual feeling plays a large part. And it is easy to understand how many of his followers, unblessed by his breeding, education and native taste and intelligence, could sieze on this view and exalt it at the expense of Wesley's insistence on the place of the Church in the Christian life. "But what the Founder of Methodism intended is another matter," Dr. Lee pointedly concludes (p. 299).

Dr. Lee's final chapter on "John Wesley and Modern Religion" traces the influence of Wesley on the development of religious life and thought since the eighteenth century. He finds that Wesley's emphasis on religion as experience has been a very effective factor in assisting the break-up of orthodoxy and rationalism, and in encouraging the development of the psychology of religious experience as one of the accepted theological disciplines today. The pulse of Wesley's strong feeling for ethical holiness is also still found, Dr. Lee notes, in the interest of the Methodist Church in reform and humanitarian movements. To those who are more specifically concerned for the plight

of theological liberalism in America, Dr. Lee would have Wesley welcomed as a prophet bringing a most timely message: a message, first that furnishes an accent on the objectiveness and holiness of God, and the evil in man, which liberal theology sorely needs; a message, secondly, that at the same time avoids the perils of theological reaction by insisting on the immanence and communicativeness of God, and on the agency of the human will in both individual and social salvation; a message, finally, which gives a very high place to the life and ministries of the institutional church, without, however, turning the church into a sacramental flight from reality, as is the tendency in some quarters today.

To the reviewer, *John Wesley and Modern Religion* is the first book ever to appear which presents a truly synoptic treatment of Wesley's theology and religious experience supported by unquestionably trustworthy scholarship. Dr. Lee refreshingly escapes the superficiality of much of Methodist literature and brings to his task just the right mixture of enthusiasm and restraint. Most of all, he brings that one quality which is indispensable to a work of this kind,—an informed feeling for the mind of the man he's writing about. Dr. Lee knows Wesley and Wesley's mind. His grasp on the key elements in Wesley's thought—grace, holiness, the Church, experience—is sure.

The analysis of the confusing problem of Wesley's changing views of works and faith in justification is the best we have ever seen. Is it not possible, however, that Wesley's change of mind which culminated in the *Minutes* of 1770 sprang not only from theological but also from practical necessity, i.e., not only in order to correct the excessive doctrinal Calvinism of his early years with Arminian modifications, but also to counteract the hard fact of Antinomianism in the societies? In other words, this very difficult problem could have been more clearly treated if it had been handled against the actual background of Wesley's experience with the Moravians and Quietists and Antinomians.

It is, perhaps, to be regretted that the space devoted to the chapter on "The Discipline of Life" could not have been used otherwise, especially in telling us more of Wesley's doctrine of the assuring witness of the Spirit. For this is one of the most distinctive doctrines in Wesley's theology. And Dr. Lee's discussion tends to be over-simplified. He writes as if there were only one type of assurance, "the full assurance of faith . . . the *plerophory*" (p. 157). As a matter of fact, there were three types of assurance which Wesley took pains to deline-

ate. The extent to which they bulk in his writings, and the manner in which they characterize different varieties of religious experience, are interesting enough to warrant fuller treatment.

If a general crititicism of Dr. Lee's book were to be made, it would be this: he chooses to depreciate Wesley's affinity with Reformed thought in a way that to the reviewer, at least, is hardly justified by the evidence. Would it not be true, for example, that M. Piette's *La Reaction de John Wesley dans l'Evolution du Protestantisme* appeals more to Dr. Lee than Professor Cell's *The Rediscovery of John Wesley*? Now it is true that Wesley's was a very agile and fertile mind. His thought is too rich and too many-sided to be given any single label. Moreover, Wesley's genius in large part consisted precisely in being able to unite certain truths of Reformed and Roman Catholic thought in a remarkably balanced synthesis. This does not do away with the fact, however, that the original impulse of the Wesleyan revival and the pulse that has surged in Methodism ever since are derived from truths that Wesley consciously shared with Reformed thought in general and Calvinism in particular, no matter how they came to him. Wesley's message was fundamentally the announcement of salvation by grace through faith. He did care tremendously, it is further true, that this issue in inward and outward works of holiness. But the sovereign passion that commanded Wesley in everything he did was to bring to sinful men the forgiving love of God. When translated into theology this became a belief in the natural depravity of man, in the power of grace and the merits of Christ's death that nothing could shake. These, certainly, are the key ideas of Calvinism. Wesley's position may therefore be defined as follows: if one be concerned for these fundamental *ideas* of Calvinism—as distinguished from certain formal *doctrines* elucidating them, predestination, for example,—one must stress Wesley's debt to Reformed thought to the extent, indeed, of acknowledging his affinity with its most extreme exponent, John Calvin.

This criticism is made because Dr. Lee's reluctance to give Wesley his full place in the Reformed tradition colors his entire approach. It is inevitable, however, that each interpreter will see Wesley differently. Dr. Lee's study is easily the most informed, the most penetrating and the most measured that has yet been written.

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Karl Barth's Idea of Revelation. By Peter Halman Monsma. Somerville, N.J.: Somerset Press, 1937. 218 p. $2.00.

"The main purpose of this book," writes Dr. Monsma, "is to reach an exact understanding of the origin, development, and present status of Karl Barth's theology and to evaluate it in the light of this understanding." The book is divided into three parts. The first deals with the origin and development of Barth's theology. It presents much fresh material dealing with Barth's theological ancestry and growth. Sections deal with the influence of Barth's home inheritance, his father's theology, and carry the reader into the respective influences upon Barth of Schlatter, Harnack, Herrmann, Kant, Troeltsch, Schweitzer, Blumhardt, Kutter, and of post-war conditions in Germany. It is an admirable presentation of Barth's theological growth. The entire book is profusely documented, and the author's translations from the German are his own.

The second part deals with Barth's idea of revelation, and enters into a detailed discussion of such subjects as Barth's idea of the relation of revelation to philosophy, the form, essence, knowability, and content of the Word of God, and the relation of revelation to history. It closes with the contention that Barth's idea of revelation is central in his theological thought.

The last section is a closely reasoned *résumé* and critique of Barth's idea of revelation. Dr. Monsma plainly states that Barth's idea of a God who is qualitatively different from man is impossible, since it precludes any human understanding of such a God. He also declares that Barth's idea of faith, as an independent validity that does not require any justification or confirmation by reason or any other form of human experience, is psychologically improbable or impossible. The book is a strong attempt to disprove what Monsma regards as Barth's central doctrine, namely, that of revelation. Monsma goes beyond Brunner's "No" in attempting to correct Barth's so-called one-sided emphasis upon the transcendence of God and his revelation.

The author has studied with Barth, knows him personally, and has made a careful study of all his writings. His final word is one of regret that he "cannot share all the views of a man whose sincerity, friendliness, and scholarly attainments he highly esteems." But he even goes so far in his final critique as to question the alleged character of Barth's faith! However, it is good to read books like this in which

American scholars critically evaluate Barth's theology. Besides, such a book as this presents some of the strong elements in Barth's theology that need to be better known in American circles. Monsma has helped to build a much-needed bridge between continental and American theology. This is a task that needs to be followed up in the new ecumenical era that is dawning upon us. However, I wish Dr. Monsma had been more constructive in his work on Barth. I laid the book down with the uneasy feeling that the author had closed his work in a spirit of negative criticism. While contending that Barth's main idea is that of revelation, he has sought to pluck this so-called heart out of Barth's theological work and expose it so as to deal it a death blow. I do not think this is true scholarship.

It is not right to attempt an understanding of the phenomenon of Barth on the basis of one phase of the man's thought, and I do not regard Barth's idea of revelation as central to his total work. It is also rather doubtful whether Monsma has understood the real nature of Barth's persistent attempt to maintain the qualitative difference between time and eternity, and his ethical dualism between God and man. And it is hardly a proper treatment of Barth that would proceed as follows: Barth's idea of revelation is central to his thought and faith; all other phases of Barth's work are based upon his idea of revelation; Barth's idea of revelation is logically inconsistent and therefore false; therefore, Barth's entire work is problematical. Besides, Dr. Monsma has not exposed his own positive theological position in the least. Had he done so, his might have been a better study.

I do not want to appear to defend Barth. He can defend himself. And he alone can and must defend himself, since he claims to found no school. Besides, his recent utterances have revealed him as constantly moving in thought, so that it is next to impossible to catalog him finally. Perhaps he is today moving away from a truly dialectical theology, and becoming more and more of a transcendental scholastic, which may involve his loss of leadership in the development of a new positive Protestant evangelicalism. And perhaps Barth's lack of ecumenical contacts is taking him away from the corrective influences of the Church Catholic. But this is a criticism quite different from those which Dr. Monsma presents.

Other major criticisms of Dr. Monsma's critique of Barth are typical of them all. For instance, he states here and there (pp. 178 ff.)

that Barth's position is not sound logically. Barth would be the first to admit that God's revelation may not be logical from the human point of view. For when we are dealing with the revealed Word of God in history, we are really dealing with miracle. God's Word is not a datum of natural history; it is a revelation of something that is beyond history. Monsma's attempt to criticize Barth is to be expected, for his conception of theology is the science of a God Whose revelation is a fixed datum of history to be apprehended by the rational mind and organized into a system. Monsma is one of those who turn from Barth because Barth does not build up a logical system. He is like those who asked Jesus, "If thou art the Christ, tell us *plainly*."

Barth feels deeply that theology must maintain the miraculous if it would be true. He refuses to allow it to degenerate into a mere historism. That is where his trouble lies, thinks Monsma. How will he reconcile reason and faith? Let Monsma study the history of theology and see if this dilemma has ever been solved *logically* without running into heresy. Our desire for a logical theology costs us very dearly at times, for logical theology is gained only at the expense of losing the living faith. It is to be expected that one with Barth's prophetic approach would find it difficult to worship at the shrine of a static theology that makes God's revelation into a "some*thing*," like sticks and stones. To him there is something intangibly personal and miraculous about faith and God which criticisms offered on the basis of static writings and logic do not take into consideration. I would much prefer a prophetic theology of faith, however inconsistent, to a static theology of bare facts, however consistent.

In the end, it all comes down to one's definition of theology. Is it a logical science of God, with or without revelation, but conceived as a *human* study that can be put into logical categories, or is it a perennial, human study about the living God Who reveals Himself, in marvelous grace, but Whose truth is known through the channels of faith and the Holy Spirit rather than through reason?

And this brings with it another criticism, namely, that in Monsma's critique against Barth the Word of God itself is not used to refute Barth. It would seem that such a procedure would be far more sound. Monsma has not quoted Scripture to disprove Barth's contention. I am not arguing that Barth's idea of revelation is right or wrong, but I am saying that if we would disprove his idea we should use his materials and his methods. It is difficult to use biological materials to

argue an historical case. All of which puts Monsma on the humanistic side in his argument against the possibility of Barth's concept of revelation. Only the Word of God can refute itself!

Dr. Monsma's criticism of Barth finally comes down to this: Barth tries to keep the discontinuity between God and man, and in attempting to reconcile those contradictory concepts, he fails. Discontinuity and revelation are at bottom, he says, and remain, incompatible (page 188). A word must be said about these statements. Barth has never championed an absolute cosmological dualism. He has never denied the immanence of God in nature, history and man. But he has said that the original form of that immanent divinity (which is "image," not identity of the human and divine) is no longer capable of restoring itself because of sin. Only God's Word, created by God's initiative, can ever make a man aware of the fact that he is utterly ruined; it alone can give him power to make a decision in the face of the Word. The dualism is ethical. It is not Barth who is trying to keep the discontinuity. The Scriptural Word of God presupposes this dualism. (Even Tillich admits it is there, and so do the neo-Lutherans and the neo-Calvinists.) The major issue for us all is: how to reconcile the Word of God that is not naturally generated, and which confronts us as "other," with the plane of the natural and human? To make the divine Word natural, is to fall into the pit of monistic secularism. To make it divine, but without a way to make itself effective in the world, is to talk nonsense. Barth says that the Divine Word is historically effective! Because it is effective in the world, he calls it dialectic miracle. At this miracle of bridging what to man is an unbridgeable chasm, Barth is working. For those who do not see this dualism, Barth is, of course, talking nonsense. For to them the Word of God is a direct, material thing.

As for the statement that discontinuity and revelation are incompatible, let it be said that without discontinuity the idea of revelation would be nonsense; it would be unnecessary and impossible. The Christian idea of revelation always has presupposed God's coming in miraculous grace, since man was lost. Further, without discontinuity God would hardly have needed to become man, Jesus would hardly have died on a cross, faith would hardly involve such a drastic surrender on man's part, and the Christian life would hardly be spoken of as the beginning of something new. For anyone who tries to make this miracle rational, there is nothing in store but logical inconsistency.

Anything logical is surely not miracle! I sometimes think Barth is trying too hard to make this miracle rational. And there is great danger that, in abandoning the dialectic miracle and trying to become a systematic theologian, he has written inconsistently. But his central contention is still valid. We shall need to think about it, and we shall never be done with its reality.

For this reason, I doubt whether the idea of revelation is central in Barth's theology at all. His theology is based upon the Word of God. The Word of God is not something we humans get hold of. It is something that meets us, and which we are permitted to apprehend as an eternal hope. The talk of "possessing God" (page 173), about which Dr. Monsma speaks, is surely impossible. That is humanism, too, in which man, a creature, possesses the Eternal! No man possesses God; God possesses and gives Himself. The Word of God is a new category of divine judgment and mercy that has appeared in history. This Word does not exist anywhere else. It has become effective in history. It is in attempting to understand this phenomenon that Barth has run into the problem of revelation and human faith, but these are all subordinate to the Word itself. Where did the Word come from —and how? From beyond the plane of normal history? And how does this Word, coming from beyond history make its contact (*Anknüpfung*) with man in history? But prior to both is the reality of the mysterious Word.

Further, I doubt the wisdom of quoting chance remarks and statements of Barth (page 193, lines 3, 4), and using them as judgments against his total position. Monsma speaks of Barth's theology as robbing life of its intrinsic values, and maintains that Barth's theology makes it impossible for one to live seriously in the world (page 173). But what is life's intrinsic value? Is it that which man places upon himself, or that which God places upon him from outside sinful man's evaluation? And where is that evaluation to be found? Moreover, Barth's concept of God as God and man as man, of God as "other" than man, and man as created, places a realistic evaluation upon life. It makes man aware of his concrete existence in this world. Man's sin has been his attempt to be as God. He thereby loses his true humanity. Man is finite, and not infinite. And because he is a sinner the Word of God comes as God's judgment and hope. There is truth in the statement that time and eternity are not the same. Time cannot be made into eternity, and no amount of it, however elongated, can

make eternity. But when the creature loses his sense of finiteness by sinful egotism, what can make man realistic about his finitude as well as his station in the presence of God and the neighbor?

Dr. Monsma also calls attention to the indefiniteness of the content of the Word of God. But has not everyone who reads the Bible the same difficulty? It is not easy to discover the Word of God. But the Word of God is not so much a static content of laws and principles as a personal address, and confronts us as individuals in the Church. There were people in Jesus' day who said, "If thou be the Christ, tell us plainly." Yet Jesus did not acceed to their request. To make the Word of God some objective thing to get hold of, with "handles" on it, is to make it an idol, to possess it, and to deny it divinity and lordship. When, however, Dr. Monsma invades the precincts of Barth's personal faith, and says that Barth may be the victim of self-deception, that is a personal matter. I would hardly want to argue this point, for it has to do with whether Barth's faith is genuine, or, whether he is a victim of delusion. The fact of the matter is that many have said the same thing about Paul and Augustine and Luther—and even Jesus. This is a terrible question even to raise.

Much of the criticism of Dr. Monsma against Barth has already been aimed at him, especially by Dr. A. Zerbe, who on philosophical grounds has stated the case best of all. But, peculiar as it may seem, while Barth's theological premise is the Word of God, or God's initiatory, as well as consequent, action in the life of the Christian is made so all-important, he does do an enormous amount of theologizing, and, like the old Calvinists who gave God all the glory, is actively involved in the affairs of men, especially in the ideology of modern total states.

It must be said, nevertheless, that this book is a scholarly work, and should be read by all who would understand Karl Barth and his theology. The author has attached a complete bibliography, and has quoted from Barth's work as an expert. It is a substantial piece of work, although this reviewer feels that the treatment of the subject is rather negative, does not take into consideration the real danger of Barth in his recent utterances, does not answer Barth on his own ground in the light of the sweep of his total work, and does not raise the weightier arguments against Barth's theological thinking.

E. G. Homrighausen

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The Future of Christianity. By Edgar Sheffield Brightman. New York: The Abingdon Press, 1937. 158 pp. $1.50.

In this book, based upon two sets of popular lectures, delivered to Protestant audiences, Professor Brightman sets forth in language that everybody can understand, views upon the future outlook for Christianity in which all thoughtful students of religion will be interested.

Scientific knowledge, Professor Brightman points out, gives certain knowledge regarding the eternal truths of logic and mathematics, and it is able to indicate with high probability the physical framework within which human history, including religion, will take place. But science cannot predict the course of spiritual events, except to the extent that they will necessarily be conditioned by this framework. Nevertheless it is possible to make predictions regarding the future experience of moral, religious and aesthetic values; although such predictions are more indefinite than those of science and rest in part upon faith. Many spiritual predictions in the past have been fulfilled to a surprising extent; among such are those of the ancient Hebrew prophets, and, during the last century, predictions by Heine and Tolstoy which remarkably forecast the present Nazi and Bolshevist revolutions. So it is possible to predict some aspects of the future of Christianity with a fair amount of probability.

Most essential to the future success of Christianity is a more general study of the Bible; fundamentalists will have to read the Bible more scientifically, and modernists more religiously and appreciatively as a guide to life like a laboratory manual (p. 61). The Bible is more important than the Church; with the abandonment of the Bible, Christianity would be done for, while it could survive the destruction of the Church. The Church is now in spiritual decline. The Great Depression since 1929 is the first such experience in modern history not to be accompanied by a religious revival (p. 65). The Protestant churches have found no devotional substitute for the prayer meeting. They have not really faced the alienation of the cultured classes, nor reached the unchurched masses. They have not arrived at a clear conception of their social responsibility even for the rural churches, much less for the evils in the economic system and in international relations. Yet the churches are not so stagnant as has sometimes been true in the past, e.g., in the periods prior to the rise of Luther and Wesley.

There still is hope for the churches. Encouraging signs are the increased interest in union and co-operation between religious denominations, including even the Jews and Catholics; the recent revival of religious faith in Germany; the fact that there is some interest in social and economic betterment; and the willingness of the churches to accept self-criticism. The churches in the future will have a more philosophical theology, with simpler doctrinal requirements. They will be more intelligently Biblical, more conscious and competent in their social mission, and more appreciative of the other great world religions. Yet the churches will continue to have an active missionary spirit, and affirm their faith in Christ.

The Christianity of the future will believe in God—not necessarily, one surmises, the absolutistic God of traditional orthodox theism—but perhaps the limited God which Professor Brightman has defended elsewhere. Faith in God is a rational hypothesis justified by various facts set forth more fully in the author's previous publications, which are here cited. From faith in God follows belief in the ultimate triumph of good as a result of combined divine and human effort, in the freedom of the human will and in personal immortality. All these are essential to Christianity. Christianity must expect to live for some time to come in the same world with powerful political forces like Fascism and Communism, which will seek to destroy or enslave it. But Christianity will find a better solution for the social evils of the times than these competitors. Christians can face the future with a disciplined hope.

There is little in what Professor Brightman says with which the reviewer finds himself in disagreement. One difficulty, however, is the matter of the Bible in its relation to the Church. It would be more accurate historically to say that the Church originally produced the Bible than that the Bible produced the Church. At the time of the Reformation the Protestants so completely reinterpreted the Bible in a manner better suited to their own times that, for practical purposes, they virtually made a new book out of it. The higher critics of today are discovering what the authors of the Biblical books really meant. In so doing they are undermining the fundamentalist interpretation that has come down to Protestants from the Reformation. But to those who read them, the higher critics are making it more and more difficult for social reformers of our own time to read into the teachings of

the New Testament the social outlook needed today. Can our social reformers, like those of the Reformation, reinterpret the Bible in order to make it accord with contemporary needs, when it is known by scholars that in so doing they are reading into the Bible teachings of which its authors never dreamed? For Christians to continue to derive their guidance and inspiration from the Bible is desirable, both to preserve historical continuity and to enrich present culture. But are not Christians becoming too sophisticated for this to be much longer possible?

WILLIAM KELLEY WRIGHT

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The Nature of Religious Experience. (Essays in Honor of Douglas Clyde Macintosh.) By EUGENE GARRETT BEWKES, JULIUS SEELYE BIXLER, ROBERT LOWRY CALHOUN, VERGILIUS FERM, HUGH HARTSHORNE, CORNELIUS KRUSÉ, HELMUT RICHARD NIEBUHR, REINHOLD NIEBUHR, FILMER S. C. NORTHROP, DANIEL SOMMER ROBINSON, GEORGE F. THOMAS. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937. xiv + 244 pp. $2.50.

Professor Douglas Clyde Macintosh has always had the respect and affection of his students. Eleven former students have written essays in his honor, and they are evidence that the lesson Professor Macintosh has taught so well is not any system of theology but the ability to think clearly and logically about religious problems. It is safe to say that Professor Macintosh is *the* leader in the attempt to construct a theology of religious experience. *Theology as an Empirical Science* is one of his most characteristic books. The data of religious experience have served as the basis for his theology. It is right, therefore, that this volume in honor of his sixtieth birthday should be entitled *The Nature of Religious Experience.*

The Preface offers a short introduction to the man and his thought. It tells us too little of the man, and it would have been more desirable to have a complete essay on the Macintosh point of view. It does tell how he has attempted to apply scientific method to the perceptions of "the eye of the body and that of the spirit," and to build hypotheses on these data. "His final test has always been experience in its widest sense. But his empiricism meets the claims of common human convictions as adequately as those of subtle philosophical analysis" (p. xii).

Professor Macintosh stresses realism and empiricism. This is consistent with the present social mind and with common sense. The first essay, by Professor Bewkes, traces the connection between the position of Macintosh and the common sense realism of Thomas Reid. Macintosh follows in the tradition of Reid and his successors, because he "felt that it was necessary to give much attention to our knowledge of the external world, in the confidence that if we can defend our knowledge from dualism and scepticism, we have established confidence in the essential testimony of our moral and religious experience" (pp. 10-11). Bewkes gives some details of Macintosh's position, calling him "the most distinguished representative of the common sense tradition. He has endeavored to do justice to the realistic claim of religion for direct monistic acquaintance with God; to accept what is valid in the Ritschlian value judgment approach; to utilize pragmatism for all that it is worth; to draw certain metaphysical inferences from reasonable postulates; and, finally, to attain, if possible for theology, some scientific verification" (pp. 18-19).

While Bewkes is kind in his summary, others are more severe in their criticisms. Vergilius Ferm indicates what is perhaps a prominent trend in naturalistic theology. He says that as religious experience is a "weasel term," we must turn back to rational theology. Ferm points out that in their definitions of religious experience theologians have begged the question of the existence of God. The confusion has been between a normative and descriptive approach. The paramount question is what the religious frame of mind is—not what it ought to be. Therefore Ferm declares that "an individual may be said *to be religious* if in some vital manner he reacts to whatever he takes to be of serious or ulterior concern, however dimly apprehended" (p. 35). In this sense, a professional prize-fighter could be religious if he took his work as an "ulterior concern." Ferm identifies religious experience with feeling rather than with sense perception, and then maintains that it has no knowledge value. Therefore theology cannot rely on it. Theology " is the artistic work of reason."

Professor Thomas, after some good suggestions, relies in the end upon a reasoned faith based upon intuition. He analyzes the empirical theology of Macintosh and objects to the normative element, to "inferring what a factor is from what it does," to his interpretation of the data, and to his pragmatic defense of a personal God. So while re-

ligious experience has no knowledge value, and he uses Tennant to "prove" this, we must also reject the evidences of the "profane" sciences, which Tennant uses. Then Thomas objects quite rightly to A. E. Taylor's argument of what is from what ought to be. Turning to Edouard Le Roy, Thomas discusses religious insight, and comes to the conclusion that we must rely on religious intuition based on faith. "Exalted feelings, high aspirations, and fleeting intimations of harmony and holiness cannot be rejected as insignificant" (p. 65). In the end, Thomas accepts a position which is foreign to all empirical theology—a position open to greater criticism than any position he has rejected.

All of these essays are penetrating. Reinhold Niebuhr discusses "The Truth Value of Myths." Cornelius Krusé asks "Is Subjectivism in Value Theory Compatible with Realism and Meliorism?" and answers with an unqualified "No!" Robert L. Calhoun discusses the problem of the self. He rejects the radical empiricism of Hume, Dewey, and C. I. Lewis; he criticizes "subjective idealism in religion" and Schleiermacher's "philosophy of identity." We must keep the reality of God and man, holding that "each man stands over against God as a real other self" (p. 182). F. S. C. Northrup discusses the age-old problem of the one and the many from the point of view of modern mathematics. Hugh Hartshorne suggests that we must undergo a transformation of consciousness in order to become aware of that underlying process which is divine reality. Daniel Sommers Robinson concludes the book with "A Definition of Religious Liberalism," drawing more on Georg Wobbermin than on Macintosh.

Two opposite forms of value theory present themselves in the essays of J. Seelye Bixler and Richard Niebuhr. The former relies on phenomenology and absolute values; the latter relies on objective relativism. Bixler rejects the empiricism of James, Macintosh, and Wieman. Their approaches are inadequate for religious needs. There are particular weaknesses which Bixler points out, but any scientific approach leads to "averages of statistical probability," and "religion, we feel, can permit standardization no more than can art" (p. 76). Religion is at least "an acceptance of the demand of the world of things as they should be, a sense of the presence of absolute value" (pp. 79-80). This involves empiricism, but it is more than empiricism. It is the experience of *validity*. So Bixler turns to phenomenology. With

references to Scheler, Husserl, Hartmann, Stavenhagen, and others, he builds up the familiar phenomenological approach to the "given." He assumes absolute values, which can be reached only through inner perceptions which are basic intuitions. Of course, there can be no direct check on these intuitions, no means of verification. It is a question of the dilemma of seeking the richness of immanent, phenomenological intuitions of absolute values (which seem like a dream world to the common sense tradition), or of seeking the verified facts of sense perception and objective but relative values which can be found in verified experience. "Religion is committed to the search for the holy as the absolute good," and as "empiricism can offer what men have supposed to be good," we must turn to phenomenology for the successful quest of absolute value, for the concrete *a priori*.

Perhaps the most brilliant article of all is Richard Niebuhr's. His criticisms of Macintosh and Wieman are even more devastating than Bixler's, and his conclusions, in spite of their vagueness and confusion, seem more tenable to this reviewer. Macintosh and Wieman, according to Niebuhr, are guilty of using logically prior *relative* values for *absolute* evaluations of religious experience. The great error of these empiricists is that they have used values gained from non-religious experience "as absolute criteria of theology. Only if this approach is abandoned can theology become truly disinterested, just to the requirements of religious experience, and philosophically consistent" (p. 110). Empirical theology needs evaluation which is analogous to that of morality and art; but this cannot be done until it is recognized that all values are relative. They are relative to structure and organic needs rather than to desire and consciousness. We may call this position *objective relativism*. Values are real. They exist in valued things or beings. They cannot be abstracted.

"The important question is not whether a god exists, but rather, what being or beings have the value of deity" (p. 114). We need to discuss the nature of God in terms of man's *real* need for God, which is not to be discovered in any subjective feelings or desires, or in the conservation of the highest human values. "The religious need is the need for that which makes life worth living, which bestows meaning on life by revealing itself as the final source of life's being and value." The experience of deity is primitive and original. We cannot make an analysis of this experience on the basis of values "known and regarded

as absolute prior to the experience." Such an experience will lead to ethical action, but the values to be sought come out of the experience. This experience leads to "the criticism and reconstruction of the ethical system rather than to the support of the one which has been accepted as absolute prior to the experience" (pp. 115-116). If it seems that Niebuhr has turned from extreme supernaturalism to an empirical realism, it is even more evident in the following statement: "The content of revelation is not the self-disclosure of an unknown being, but the unveiling of the value of a known being" (p. 116).

Niebuhr has made a good case against Macintosh and Wieman, but it can be shown, I believe, that Wieman and Niebuhr are very close together. Wieman rejects personality as absolute. Indeed, the supreme value for Wieman is "the growth of meaning and value," which could hardly be absolutized. It may be claimed that Wieman's norms for judging religious behavior are based upon felt human needs, and that Wieman is making value judgments based upon prior non-religious experiences. But Niebuhr, in setting up how man's religious needs must be met, is guilty of the same use of norms. He tells us that "the religious need is the need for that which makes life worth living (i.e., for human beings), which bestows meaning on life, etc." He also tells us that the experience of "the supremely worthful being . . . should lead to ethical results." Religion, for Wieman, always leads to "ever higher unexplored values," as for Niebuhr it leads to "the criticism and reconstruction of the ethical system." Is not Niebuhr's concept of "deity-value" just as much a logically prior value judgment as is Wieman's? But we must not belabor the point. The similarities of the two positions are worth mentioning because of Niebuhr's criticisms of Wieman. They both insist that religious experience leads to a revaluing of values.

The experience of reality, of something real which is beyond the self, is the primary factor in religious empiricism. It is this which provides the data which are to be interpreted. It is when we interpret the original and primitive experience of the reality into concepts that it becomes necessary to make judgments—existential, theoretical, axiological. The direct experience of reality provides the original stimulus; it is by interpretation that we say that this reality is existent, that it is part of the whole of reality, and that it has supreme (not absolute) value. It is only then that we may agree with Niebuhr about the deity

value of the object of religious experience. If value judgments are thus made secondary, and are still recognized as objective and relative, then we may safely avoid the pitfalls of an empirical theology based upon value presuppositions.

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Psychology and Religious Origins. By THOMAS HYWEL HUGHES. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937. 242 pp. $2.25.

In this elaborate exploration of the psychology of religious origins it is not entirely clear whether failure is to be charged to previous psychologists of religion or to the author. That someone has failed is plain. For their part, the psychologists will find in this book the means of refuting the charge. Although they are not beyond criticism by the philosopher, the philosopher's expressed criticism is here inadequate and too often irrelevant.

Dr. Hughes seeks not only to review, but also to contribute to psychological theories of the origin of religion in general and of the specific ideas of God, worship, sacrifice, and immortality. On the level of psychological study such origins must be referred to psychological processes, such as the instincts, sentiments, social intercourse, behavior, etc., which have long been standard in the psychology of religion—or to other processes that come to light as aspects of the special subject-matter. But while this book contains wholesale rejections of previous functional references it fails to establish suitable alternatives. In this latter circumstance lies its chief value; for its *proposed* alternatives, though dogmatically asserted, would seem to be susceptible of fruitful research.

The reader is assured, for instance (in the course of a diatribe against Leuba), that "man is a religious being because of an element in his nature which the animal does not share." Again, man has a certain religious capacity, and functions on the basis of his "preparedness" for achieving religious harmony. There is endorsement of Hocking's view that worship is the perpetual amending of the person by himself. These assertions and others like them are introduced mainly as objections to some of the "standard" psychological processes. As such they merely amplify the apologetics already too prevalent among religionists who deplore the materialism of religious psychology; and

as such they are likely to be ignored by psychologists. But these very suggestions may also be regarded as future lines of attack in the psychology of religion. What psychological *process* is denoted by the element that distinguishes man from animals? What psychological *functions* constitute religious "preparedness?" What is meant in *psychological* terms by perpetual self-amendment? The author does not answer these questions since he seems unaware of the scientific need of asking them. Nevertheless, where his assertions leave off further psychological research might well begin.

If undertaken, however, such research will require a more adequate psychological framework than Dr. Hughes is willing to sponsor. For despite his frequent insistence that religion is a total process involving the whole man, he commits the cardinal sin of religious psychology—that of intellectualizing the interpretations. Despite his recognition of the scope of unconscious processes and internal motivation, he clings to the traditional assumption that psychological functioning, unless consciously directed, is not really effective (or, one suspects, really psychological!). One ground for rejecting the reference of religious behavior to various basic needs is his contention that man's self-consciousness is thereby overlooked. Anthropological evidence as to the meager self-consciousness of primitive man is simply thrust aside. The work of Lévy-Bruhl, and consequently the conclusions of Ames, are discounted in favor of a conception of primitive men who pray individually before they develop collective rituals, "since sacrifices presuppose a more developed range of ideas than prayer." This is intellectualism with a vengeance. Matters are not helped, moreover, by the introduction of advanced notions of value. "Ames fails to account for certain religious customs such as mutilations and many ascetic practices, which are opposed to the interests of physical life in the individual and the group." From whose point of view? Unless the primitive outlook is consulted, the whole psychological question is begged.

The rejection of social theories of religious origins (to say nothing of the rejection of the comparative method!) is remarkably at variance with established facts. Dr. Hughes repeatedly falls under the influence of such middle-of-the-road philosophers as Hocking, and reflects the latter's conviction that religion is an individualistic affair prosecuted in sober knowledge of what one is about, conforming in all

authentic instances to Professor Hocking's ethical standards. This may be noble and British, but it is not psychology.

HOWARD DAVIS SPOERL

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The Modern Family and the Church. By REGINA WESTCOTT WIEMAN. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937. xii + 407 pp. $2.50.

A few generations ago no widespread question as to the value of such well established institutions as the church and the family could have been raised. The church was regarded as a sacred institution, firmly settled upon an unshakable foundation, while the inviolability of the family was accepted almost as if it were axiomatic. Today however, all that has been changed. The rapidly shifting patterns of modern civilization, together with the laudable scientific tendency to apply the pragmatic test to all institutions, force us to rethink our positions. Is the family necessary to the happiness and welfare of humanity? Is the church as indispensable to the preservation of the highest values as we formerly believed? In what ways are the two interrelated and interdependent?

To the answer of these and kindred questions Dr. Regina Westcott Wieman brings an analytical mind, years of experience as a counselor in individual and social problems, the understanding of a psychologist, and a rich teaching career. The book grew out of her work with parent seminars with pastors, and her own concern for the values represented by the church and the family. The arrangement of material is such that it can be used by classes in parent education or church study groups. With this possibility in mind the author has appended a comprehensive bibliography and a few suggestions as to study outlines. This book was written to be used, and churches which fail to make the most of this advantage will be missing an opportunity to do some really constructive work.

Section one is a discussion of the family and its problems; section two deals with the church and its relation to the family; the third part presents a picture of the church meeting family problems; and the final division is an attempt to look into the future.

The family is defined as "that fellowship of parents and children, created and promoted through the sharing of vital interests, which initiates and individualizes growth of personality and a concomitant

development of culture in the community." As such, the family faces a crisis for the modern world has little use for a fellowship which cannot be measured in commercial terms. Since society does not recognize the intangible yet real values that inhere in the family a disintegration has resulted. Increased crime and delinquency, sexual promiscuity among young people, increase in divorce, and a decrease in the birth rate, are symptomatic of the fact that the family is not functioning successfully in today's social organization.

The question as to the value of the family and the desirability of its survival is frankly faced by Dr. Wieman. She feels that the indispensable worth of the family can be defended, despite many imperfections, on the ground that it is the sole agency capable of meeting certain essential needs for the growth of personality and culture. If another institution could meet these needs we might dispense with the family, but it is inconceivable that any group can be better fitted to give discriminating attention to individual capacities and differences, and at the same time integrate the interests of the various members.

The church also is passing through a crisis. The situation is a tragic one in that there has never been a time when man sought so widely and fervidly for something worth living for, and the church is not meeting this need. This is the hour of the church's greatest opportunity and it is practically helpless. This is not altogether the fault of the church. The modern man looks for values which are immediate and explicit, while the values represented by the church are implicit and not immediately attainable. Our senses have been dulled to such an extent that the things of which the church speaks seem nebulous compared with economic success or professional eminence. Then too, we live so closely together that we take our opinions from the "crowd," and the crowd is unthinkingly caught in a series of fads. True religion cannot spread as a fashion or craze, so it is relegated to a subordinate position.

The church, for a time, attempted to recapture its lost prestige by capitulating to the community's interests: fine buildings, sensational advertising, popular preachers, impressive choirs, and a club life including dancing, sports and movies. The result has been that the people attracted by these things have continued to want just these same things, and no more. Thus the unique message of the church has been compromised, and it cannot exercise its distinctive functions.

The church itself must shoulder part of the blame for the widespread apathy toward religious values. It is divided at a time when unity is demanded; it is uncertain as to its social message and program; and its leadership is inadequately trained. This latter point has long been a favorite emphasis of Dr. Wieman, and is unfortunately a valid one. Even the best of our theological seminaries seem to be totally unaware of the kind of training necessary to meet the modern problems, and as a result our best thinkers are developed outside the church. It is to be hoped that the severity of the present crisis will force the church to make the adjustments which are necessary before it can act decisively.

The principal thesis of the book is found in Chapter VII on "The Interdependence of Family and Church." This is by far the most important and strongest part of the entire book. Dr. Wieman sees clearly that the future of family and church are inexorably bound up together in such a way that the failure of one means the failure of the other. Both institutions are personality-fostering and culture-fostering in the major sense. The family, founded upon a mutuality of interest, is the place where God can be most manifest, and the church is the reinforcing fellowship which gives the family motivation for religious living.

The family needs the church, not only as a support in time of strain, but also in order to realize its fullest possibilities. The church can furnish a working philosophy which will enable the family to orient itself in setting up a scale of sound values, and in effectively planning its future. The church also needs the family. It needs the family for its constituency, its support, and its future membership. Beyond this it needs an avenue through which to express and work out its values, and the family furnishes this functional background.

By very nature the two institutions are united by a bond that is essential to the vitality of each. After analyzing the problems and functions of both, the author concludes that each is forced to care what happens to the other, for they are mutually a source of strength and life renewal. This presents to church leaders a clear-cut challenge which they cannot afford to ignore, if they are deeply concerned about the future of the church and what it represents. They may well read with care the very practical suggestions as to program and methods offered by Dr. Wieman in the third part of the book.

The various church bodies have already taken cognizance of the prob-

lems involved, and have experts working in that field. Dr. Wieman is optimistic that the situation may yet be saved by a more complete understanding and a seriously purposeful program. Family and church must face their crises, and out of the travail of the present may emerge the finer institutions of tomorrow.

The entire book is a searching look at a complex situation and a clarion call for action before it is too late. The careful analyses, the concise presentation, and the vivid style have destined this book to play a part in the salvation of both family and church. Here is a field where careful study is needed, and although Dr. Wieman has not yet found an answer to all the questions, her work is worthy of thoughtful consideration.

WILFRED I. ORR

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BOOK NOTES

Oriental Philosophy: The Story of the Teachers of the East. By FRANCIS GRANT. New York: The Dial Press, 1936. xi + 303 pp. $2.75.

The sub-title of this book gives a much better clue to its contents than does the main title. It is a popular account by the Vice President of the Roerich Museum of the most celebrated religious teachers of the East, and secondarily of the traditions which they helped to form. Zoroaster and Mohammed are included, as well as the founders native to India, China, and Japan. The author's understanding of the Eastern religions has been influenced by critical scholarship, yet her attitude toward the great religious figures is predominantly rhapsodic and hero-worshipping. Her narrative is not a reinterpretation of these personalities, but a retelling of the widely accepted story of their wonders. Yet in her retelling she often communicates happily certain salient accents of the spirit in Far Eastern cultures. Her chapters on China and Japan are especially successful in this regard. Her chapter on India seems tinctured with a note of religious promise that may be more characteristic of western devotees than of the Indian people themselves, as when she says that Asia does not regard the blessed hour of the Future Buddha's Coming as remote (p. 65). The book is illustrated by eight reproductions from the paintings of Nicholas Roerich.

H. L. F.

Prophet and Priest in Old Israel. By A. C. WELCH. London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1936. 160 pp. 4/6.

Those familiar with Professor Welch's former works on Old Israel will approach this work expecting a fresh and stimulating discussion of an important theme. And they will not be disappointed. Dr. Welch repudiates the common and favorite opinion of our day to the effect that prophets and priests in Old Israel were confirmed and relentless enemies. He questions the view that Hebrew religion evolved through the stages of polydemonism, cultic religion (derived from the Canaanites and championed by priests) and ethical religion (perhaps derived from Moses and championed by the prophets).

It is probable that pre-Mosaic Hebrew religion was not simple and diffuse polydemonism. Recent archeology makes it probable that the J-writer was nearer the truth concerning patriarchal religion than was the E-writer. The name 'Yahwe' may have been common in Syria and Palestine before the time of Moses, and it may well have been associated especially with the religion of tribes later known as Hebrews. As to the matter of cult, it is probable that the passover and the other classical festivals, the scapegoat, the use of shewbread, the tent of dwelling, etc., were ancient Hebrew institutions, preserved by the priests as against Canaanitish religion. In post-exilic Judaism the priests were the great conservative force

who preserved the peculiar cult of their religion, and the prophets like Malachi co-operated with them. A similar situation may well have been in the time before the exile. The conflicts of the prophets and priestly religion recorded in the Bible may well have been due primarily to a clearer perception of the meaning of the Mosaic reform on the part of the prophets, and to their desire to establish it quickly and thoroughly (pp. 77, 85, 93, 146). The prophets were critics of the Hebrew religion rather than destroyers of a Hebrew-Canaanitish-cultic religion. As in post-exilic religion, the cult made use of prophetic rubrics (in the Psalms), so in pre-exilic religion 'ethical religion' may well have been embedded in the rubrics of the cult as known from the time of Moses. Hence the prophets may have been inspired by the rubrics, and in turn, they may have sought to lead the people to act according to their professions. One might add that as both Jesus and St. Francis were brought up in cultic religion, and sought to establish the 'ethical religion' embedded in it, it is certainly probable that the prophets learned from the priests and taught the 'common faith.' 'The Prophets' criticized both priests *and* prophets. They criticized cult *and* conscience on the basis of the essentials of 'Mosaic religion'—loyalty to Yahwe and obedience to his commandments—which everybody professed as their religion.

It is needless to say that this thesis of Dr. Welch contains enough truth to justify much renewed critical perusal of *Prophet and Priest in Old Israel*, on the part of both scholars and theologians. One wishes that Dr. Welch had done more justice to the evidence produced by those who disagree with him, and to their reasoning. But that is not often the way of a critic. Furthermore, his exposition sometimes becomes diffuse and cumbersome due to arguments from analogy involving Arabia and Scotland. Yet, it will certainly pay the reader to apply himself to a great deal of suggestion and pertinent discussion which this book contains.

JOSEPH HAROUTUNIAN

Die Prophetie. By ABRAHAM HESCHEL. Cracow: Verlag der Polnischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1936. vi + 194 pp. (Memoires de la Commission Orientaliste, No. 22.)

This is a ponderous statement of a derivative theory of the nature of prophecy. Dr. Heschel has combined various comments on prophecy from the works of Dilthey with lengthy, and not always apposite, quotations from early twentieth century German psychologists, and modified the whole with a spiritual twist which, in the introduction, is attributed to the influence of Jung.

Such a treatment must justify itself. This justification the author provides by the elaboration and subsequent destruction of theories identifying prophecy with mantic ecstasy and with poetic inspiration. The examination of these two theories occupies the first part of the work, and leads to the conclusion that prophecy belongs in neither of these categories; that it

should be treated, neither as a chapter in the history of literature, nor as a sub-topic in abnormal psychology.

What, then, does Dr. Heschel consider the origin and the nature of prophecy? It arises from the totel submergence of the emotions of the prophet in the emotions of an immanent God; a God who cannot be known, but can be understood. Since God cannot be known, He is never experienced, represented, or thought as Object; always as Subject.

Prophecy is the expression of the mind which understands God, not through speculation, but through the direct experience of emotional identification. It must be remembered that the prophet did not identify himself with God, but his emotions with the Divine emotions. "The unity of consciousness, the unity of will and experience, of personality and inspiration, well expresses the nature of the prophetic spirit" (p. 176).

To the extent, then, that prophecy is the product of a subjective identification of the prophet with his God, prophetic theology is anthropopathic; the emotions of the prophet are regarded as the emotions of God. Anthropomorphism is avoided because God cannot be known as Object; because there can be no objective identification of the prophet and God. A priori, Heschel declares, man's relation to God is taken as God's relation to man; hence a relational reality is established, in which the prophet's emotional identification of himself and God involves an actual identity of the emotions of the prophet and of God. Thus, the prophetic God who suffers with mankind is based upon the sufferings of the prophets themselves, and the sympathy of the prophets for their fellow-man bears fruit in the concept of a sympathetic God. So, too, the prophets' loss of patience with those who will not listen is transmuted into the Divine Wrath.

The details of Dr. Heschel's analysis of the theological pattern are worked out only for the prophets Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Jeremiah. There is only passing reference to the other prophets in the second part of the book, where Heschel's theory is expounded.

The least satisfying aspect of the theory outlined here is the extent to which it implies a discontinuity; the extent to which it disregards both the antecedents and the successors of prophecy, and attempts to define a limited phase of a continuous historical pattern without reference to the pattern.

There is nothing as nearly eternal as the greatest of poetry; nor is there anything as local and temporal, as subject to the whims, conceits and fashions of its time, as dominated by the temper and tone of its age as is criticism of that poetry. The prophetic books stand, as they have stood for hundreds of years, as masterpieces of religious poetry. Each age, according to its limitations, puts forth critical theories of the nature, origin, and meaning of these poems. Better than some of these theories, worse than others, Dr. Heschel's attempt to analyze prophecy, in terms of suffering and sympathetic prophets creating a suffering and sympathetic God, is more clearly revelatory of Dr. Heschel's times than explanatory of prophecy.

Joseph L. Blau

A Fresh Approach to the Psalms. By W. O. E. Oesterley. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937. 303 pp. $2.50.

No book of the Old Testament has done more to nourish Jewish-Christian piety, or to kindle its religious devotion, than the devotional literature of Isreal. Indeed, the religions of the world have little to match it. Parallels to the hymns and prayers of the Psalter there are, indeed, from almost every age and civilization, but taking them as complete poems, Hebrew liturgies stand pre-eminent in world literature. Hebrew prophecy is more penetrating in its insight, its history more profoundly interpretative; but for warmth of devotion the Psalms stand alone, as is eloquently affirmed by their employment in the history of Judaism and Christianity.

Professor Oesterley's recent volume, *A Fresh Approach to the Psalms*, is a welcome contribution to the understanding of the Psalms. It does not profess to be "new" or original in its treatment, but it does make available in one volume, in language that is singularly clear and readable, materials that make the Psalms interesting, intelligible, and religiously edifying. Beginning with an admirable, though all too brief discussion of the Psalms in world literature, Professor Oesterley discusses the dates of the poems, their titles, their liturgical use, and their poetical structure. His treatment of the music among the ancient Israelites is unusually instructive. The theology of the Psalms is treated briefly but discerningly. One might question the relative importance given to various conceptions, but this may be due to the author's special competence in certain fields.

Not the least important feature of this new book on the Psalms is the way it opens doors to large fields of study to both layman and scholar. The latter will, indeed, discover little that is new in the book, but he will find that the discussion is almost always brought to the point of development at which critical scholarship has arrived. One might wish that Professor Oesterley had followed Gunkel more closely in his identification of the various literary types in the Psalms. His discussion is here somewhat confused. But taking the books as a whole, it is the best "popular" handbook to the Book of Psalms which we have in English; it is admirably designed for an appreciation and understanding of the devotional literature of ancient Israel.

James Muilenburg

The Parables of the Synoptic Gospels. By B. T. D. Smith. Cambridge: The University Press; New York: The Macmillan Company. 1937. 250 pp. $3.75.

The Gospel Parables are better known to the mass of readers than anything else in the world's literature. They were spoken for the very purpose of making religious truth transparently clear, and may seem to stand in need of no explanation. In recent years, however, the intensive study of the Parables has disclosed a number of difficult problems, historical and literary and theological. It has become apparent that on our right understanding of

this part of Jesus' teaching our whole estimate of his thought and activity must largely depend. No one who seeks to read the Parables in the light of modern knowledge could desire a better guide than the author of the present book. Dr. Smith, who is an eminent scholar in Cambridge University, investigates the nature of the Parable as it appears in literature generally; he traces the development of the Hebrew Parable through the Old Testament and the later Jewish writings; he compares the Parables of Jesus with those of the Rabbis, and discusses the motives which led him to adopt this method of teaching and the main ideas which he sought to convey. In the second part of the book the Gospel Parables are examined in detail, with a view to determining their structure, their authenticity and their application, which, in a surprising number of instances, the evangelists can be shown to have misunderstood. The treatment is everywhere fresh and penetrating, and on almost every page the reader will find himself compelled, under Dr. Smith's direction, to revise his previous ideas. There is no straining after novel theory, but by patient consideration of the facts, in all their bearings, each of the Parables is changed into something new.

E. F. Scott

Gegenwartsfragen in der neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft. By Johannes Leipoldt. Leipzig: A. Deichertsche Verlag, 1935. 133 pp. RM 2.85.

A discussion of three New Testament problems from the point of view of the modern German spirit. The author takes up the questions: Was Jesus a fighter? Was Jesus a Jew? Is there a normative Christianity?

The author argues that the picture of Jesus as a pietist is not true to the earliest sources. Rather was he a vigorous fighter. On the question of whether Jesus was a Jew, Dr. Leipoldt adduces evidence to show that, while the form of his teaching was Jewish, he had more affinity with Greek and Aryan thought, and, above all, a rich originality. On the final issue, whether Christianity has a single natural and normative form, the author claims that the history of the church offers abundant testimony that every Christian nation creates a type of Christianity suitable to its environment and culture.

While this book contains much that is pertinent, and an element that is true, its main theses are vitiated by applying the categories of modern thought and feeling to the early source of the Christian Gospel.

C. C. R.

The Doctrine of the Work of Christ. By Sydney Cave. Nashville: The Cokesbury Press, 1937. 317 pp. Price $2.50.

Dr. Cave, who is principal of New College in London, and is widely known for his theological writings on both sides of the Atlantic, has given us in the present book an historical sketch of the doctrine of the Atonement. It is very much to be regretted that we have still to look for a systematic

exposition of the doctrine; Dr. Cave could have done the job admirably, but he has chosen the historical approach, and we must be grateful to him for his concise yet inclusive study.

The book begins with the New Testament evidence, and it is shown that the Cross was no incident in the ministry of Jesus, but the very symbol of the victory of divine love which was the essence of his message and the meaning of his person. The Pauline interpretation, and other New Testament presentations, of the significance of the Crucifixion are next discussed. Much is made of the Christian life "in Christ" as sharing in the dying of Jesus, so that by his fellowship the believer may share in his victory.

The teaching of the Fathers and of subsequent theologians is passed in review. But special interest will center, of course, in Dr. Cave's final chapter, where he attempts to sketch (all too briefly) his own view. He criticizes the subjectivist, or exemplarist, theories of the Atonement, although he admits that in such recent volumes as Dr. R. S. Franks' *The Atonement*, sin is not minimized and the element of victory finds a place. In conclusion he says: "Christ's work was the irruption of the eternal into time; in him were manifest the resources of the unseen, and the Cross speaks not of defeat but victory. . . . Christ's work for man is not only a revelation of God's love. It was that love in decisive and victorious action." It will be seen that here Dr. Cave is influenced by Aulen's *Christus Victor*, with its emphatic assertion that on the Cross Jesus as Son of God won a victory over the forces of evil.

While we may dislike such a word as "irruption," it is doubtless true that Dr. Cave has seen the real significance of the classic Christian faith in Christ as "strong Son of God" who came amongst men to drive out the powers of darkness and restore God's human children to the kingdom of light and love from whence they had departed. There is no room in Dr. Cave's view for unethical ideas of God as one who had to be won by the sacrifice of his Son; he sees clearly that God is concerned with the whole event; and that it is just because God is there, supremely and uniquely at work in the world of men, that the Christian Ages have agreed in singing of "the Cross of Christ, towering o'er the wrecks of time."

W. Norman Pittenger

The Legacy of a Christian Mind: John M'Leod Campbell, Eminent Contributor to Theological Thought. By E. G. Bewkes. Philadelphia: The Judson Press, 1937. 305 pp. $2.00.

M'Leod Campbell had a place in British theological thought of the nineteenth century similar to that of Ritschl in Germany, and Bushnell in America. Professor H. R. Mackintosh called him "the greatest of all Scottish theologians." But notwithstanding Campbell's importance, this book gives the first general treatment of his theology. The author, Professor Bewkes, the head of Colgate University's School of Philosophy and Religion, has made a most thorough investigation of his subject, and has

produced an interesting and valuable work. In the biographical section he tells the story of Campbell's heresy trial and condemnation, of his years of ministry in an independent church without salary, and of his later vindication. The author also discusses the relations between Campbell and the Cairds, and shows how the philosophical position of the former is fundamentally that of Scottish realism. Campbell's famous doctrine of the "vicarious repentance" of Christ receives a new interpretation in this book. From Professor Bewkes' work one sees clearly that the Calvinism of Campbell's day made spiritually necessary the movement "back to Christ," of which he was a leader in Great Britain.

E. W. L.

A History of Christian Worship. By Oscar Hardman. Nashville: Cokesbury Press. 1937. 263 pp. $2.00.

This book on Christian worship covers a wide field, and has compressed an intricate and difficult history into a balanced and well arranged survey. Limits of space have naturally forbidden any significant discussion of the major problems in liturgical history. The Kiddush theory, for instance, of the Last Supper is accepted without any qualification (p. 30), and the difficulties of the Roman Canon are dismissed in a paragraph (p. 63). However, the book well serves the purpose of a simple text-book. It contains a fairly accurate account of the primary facts in the development of Christian worship, though sometimes the narrative becomes a mere catalogue of names and dates. Little is said of the genius of the various rites as expressions of different types of piety and culture. There are a number of useful tables appended to the text, and a short but good list of suggested books for further study. It is to be regretted that the author has mentioned neither F. C. Burkitt's little outline, *Christian Worship* (Cambridge University Press, 1930), nor the Mansfield Essays under the same title, edited by N. Micklem (Oxford, 1936). M. A. R. Tuker's *The Liturgy in Rome* (Black, 1925) is also a most valuable handbook that is not noted.

C. C. R.

The American Prayer Book. By E. L. Parsons, and B. H. Jones. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1937. 340 pp. $2.50.

This is an important book. It is a keen, clear and worthy contribution to the history of liturgy. Bishop Parsons and Professor Jones have succeeded in writing an authoritative work on the history of the Prayer Book, bringing the study up to the modern day. The book was originally planned by Bishop Slattery, but his death intervened before little more than a few sections were completed. With the help of Dr. John Suter, and guided by the papers left by Bishop Slattery, Bishop Parsons undertook the task. He is responsible for the work as a whole, and especially for the first and fourth parts, dealing with the general topic of worship

and the questions of ceremonial. Professor Jones has contributed most of the second part on the general history of the Prayer Book, and practically all of the third part dealing with the sources and rationale of the offices.

The need for a good history of *The American Prayer Book*, which included an analysis of the 1928 revisions and took account of the modern work on liturgics generally, has long been felt. Dr. Samuel Hart's *Book of Common Prayer* (1913) is now out of date, while the references to the American revisions in *Liturgy and Worship* (S.P.C.K., 1933), were scattered and incomplete.

The authors have written with care and discrimination. They have surveyed a wide field. Chapters deal with the origins of the various Christian rites, the development of the English Prayer Book, and the history and rationale of the different offices. The writers have included enough general liturgical history to make the American Prayer Book intelligible, but not too much to bewilder the intelligent layman. They have, moreover, written in a pleasing style. The account of the 1928 revision (pp. 58-64) is not only accurate, but shows discernment. The writer well distinguishes between practical and expert revision (p. 63), and defends the 1928 procedure and results on the grounds that what is liturgically correct is not necessarily correct. Liturgy is not a matter of antiquarian interest. The past is not necessarily normative for the present.

It is perhaps to be regretted that the authors have not mentioned the eschatological element in the primitive and later Eucharist, especially as one significant trend in modern theology lays stress upon the "realized eschatology" of the Apostolic preaching. To the body of the work are appended a useful glossary of liturgical terms, a well selected bibliography of texts and studies, and a full and carefully compiled index.

C. C. R.

The Eternal Word in the Modern World. By B. S. Easton and H. C. Robbins. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1937. xiv + 321 pp. $2.50.

This book contains liturgical, expository and homiletical notes on the Gospels and Epistles for the Church Year. For the most part the liturgical notes are brief, giving the source of the Epistles and Gospels in the Sarum and Roman Missals, and sometimes adding a little information on the season. Some feasts that are less well known might have been provided with more elaborate explanations. Nothing, for instance, is said on the Feast of St. Michael and All Angels (p. 288) of St. Michael as the patron and defender of the Church. The hardly helpful comment to that feast runs, "Expository application on this day will depend largely on the preacher's personal viewpoint."

The homiletical and exegetical notes are suggestive and valuable, reflecting both sound scholarship and religious discernment. They should

be useful to all Episcopalian priests who appreciate the liturgical value of preaching at the Eucharist on the appropriate lections.

C. C. R.

The Church Through Half a Century: Essays in honor of William Adams Brown. Samuel McCrea Cavert and Henry Pitney Van Dusen, Editors. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936. ix + 426 pp. $3.50.

Among the religious leaders of today it may properly be said that there is no one who is held higher in esteem and in personal regard than William Adams Brown. His long and eminent services as Professor of Systematic Theology in Union Theological Seminary, his prolific and influential writings, his loyal and liberal churchmanship, his participation in religious movements of world-wide significance, his practical wisdom and skill in the work of many organizations, combined with an unfailing tolerance and charity, have made him in the largest sense, as characterized by the inscription of the volume prepared in his honor, a "servant of the Church of Christ through half a century."

It was particularly appropriate that on Professor Brown's retirement from his full duties at Union Seminary this volume of essays should have been written by a selected number of his former students, in grateful tribute. For it is as a teacher, guide and friend to many student generations that he has been known in a privileged and an inspiring intimacy. In preparing their respective contributions, the writers of these essays have correctly sensed the significance of Professor Brown's career. They have made as their central theme a survey of the development of the thought and work of the Christian Church during the fifty years in which he has been constantly active. In various ways and degrees his influence has affected every aspect of that development.

The volume is thus both a personal tribute and an illuminating discussion of present religious thought and practical undertakings. To all who desire an informing summary of the positive positions of religion and a knowledge of what the churches are doing, this book is highly commended. Arthur Cushman McGiffert, Jr. writes of Doctor Brown's contribution to the literature of religion, Henry P. Van Dusen describes the liberal movement in theology, Walter M. Horton discusses science and religion, John C. Bennett, the social interpretation of Christianity, H. Emil Brunner, Continental European Theology, Henry Sloane Coffin, public worship, Samuel McC. Cavert, Christian unity in America, Henry S. Leiper, ecumenical Christianity; and there are other articles of equal importance.

A list of Dr. Brown's books and articles is given, requiring eleven and a half pages to print. Each author adds a selected bibliography in the field of his interest. To read this book is to trace the radiating spirit of a man who, though he has withdrawn from some of his former responsibilities, is fortunately still very active.

R. C. K.

Christianity in America. By E. G. Homrighausen. New York: The Abingdon Press, 1936. 227 pp. $2.00.

The author, who has recently been appointed to a professorship in religious education at Princeton Theological Seminary, is well known to theological students as the translator of works by Barth and Thurneysen. Despite the fact that he makes few direct references to contemporary German theology, Dr. Homrighausen's book is an attempt to apply Barthian ideas to contemporary American Christianity. He holds that the battle against secularism, both within and outside of the Church, is forcing Christians in this country to re-examine the meaning of their faith; and he writes with the intention of fostering and directing this re-examination. The first part of the book is an analysis of the situation; the second part is a constructive statement, aimed at a right solution of the problem.

The basic need, as the author sees it, is a recovery of that authority and power which attend the idea of the Church universal as created and sustained by God; and such a recovery can only be made, he contends, through a theology firmly grounded on revelation. This theme is developed in a fashion familiar to every reader of Barth and Brunner. Speculative philosophy can never reach the living God. Christianity can never be adequately understood as a phenomenon of human culture, that is, merely as a "religion." Preaching is never rightly conceived as the voicing of a set of personal opinions; it must be an attempt to witness to the Word of God. The Bible is not a collection of infallible oracles, nor is it primarily the record of man's quest for God; it is the medium through which God speaks to man. The divisiveness of denominationalism, which is an especially troublesome problem in America, will never be overcome until we cease thinking of the Church as a glorified discussion club, with various social services attached, and see it as instituted and sustained by God for the doing of His work in the world. The significance of Jesus Christ is missed so long as He is regarded merely as a man of religious genius, instead of as the Mediator, the Incarnate Son of God. The Christian message is not, in the first instance, about what man can do, but about what God has done in the sending of His Son to redeem mankind from sin.

Obviously what one thinks of Dr. Homrighausen's arguments will depend upon what one thinks of Barthianism. On any score, the book is a significant attempt to bridge the gap between American and continental theology; and many of Barth's criticisms undeniably apply with especial force to Christianity as preached and practiced in this country.

Because he evidently is convinced that the continental movement represents a return to essential Christian faith, the author has little else to offer. Thus he fails to provide any help to readers who are willing to go some distance along such a road, but are compelled, in the name of sincerity, to balk at certain points. To be sure, the author is not writing a theological text book; he is writing for conviction. But Christian unity, which he so

rightly desires, cannot be attained by simply invoking the Word of God in defence of one's own position; and there are views quite alien to those of the author which cannot be read out of the Christian tradition, however much one may want, for the sake of authority, to be able to speak of *the* Christian gospel.

Finally, candor compells one to admit that the book is often repetitious, and sometimes crude in phraseology.

DAVID E. ROBERTS

Die Problematik der Religionen: Eine religionsphilosophische Studie mit besonderer berücksichtigung der neuen Religionspsychologie. By WILHELM KEILBACH. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1936. 271 pp.

There are those who believe that, though psychology cannot explain the truth, nor the inspired processes of attaining thereto, it can make less puzzling man's many natural proclivities to error. Dr. Keilbach is one of these. He holds to a Thomistic version of the Catholic truth. But in the present rather freshly conceived study on "Die Problematik der Religionen," he proposes to show how natural it is for men to deviate from this universal standard. More specifically he wants to point out in detail how many occasions for such deviation the individual life encounters, when you take the findings of recent philosophy and psychology of religion into consideration. Part One of the book, entitled "Die Empirie des religiösen Individual-problems," surveys a considerable body of recent literature on the psychology of religion, particularly in Catholic circles. The author is in decided agreement with Girgensohn's emphasis upon the intellectual factor in religion.

Part Two of the book, entitled "Die Metaphysik des religiösen Individual-problems," works out the main theme of showing in how many ways the individual may be arrested, or deflected from the straight and narrow path to ultimate religious truth. The author makes sober and judicious use of his psychological-philosophical conclusions here, and in their light finds the variety of religions not surprising, since there are so many factors "die in die Weite und die Breite führen," as he puts it. The length to which his special pleading can go is shown by the quotation on p. 247 from another Catholic writer, O. Karrer, who writes that ancestor and spirit worship, veneration of the dead, mysticism and speculations on the Absolute, become straightway comprehensible through the psychology of religion as the tragic consequences of sin, of a 'perverted heart.'

H. L. F.

The Master's Influence. By CHARLES REYNOLDS BROWN. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1936. 200 pp. $2.00.

The content of this book gives in printed form the Fondren Lectures delivered at the Southern Methodist University in 1936 by the Dean Emeritus of the Divinity School of Yale University. In examining the influence of the life of Christ the several chapters discuss, "The Method of

His Teaching," "How He Worked," "What He Taught," "How He Lived," "How He Overcomes Evil."

While the author makes no attempt at a critical appaisement of the records, striking sayings of Jesus and His outstanding deeds are selected from the Four Gospels as showing the manner in which His teaching and life immediately attracted and influenced men. The tone of the book is essentially exhortative. It is written in the vivid style with many suggestive illustrations such as have made former Dean Brown a well-known and stimulating preacher.

R. C. K.

Christianity and Our World. By JOHN C. BENNETT. New York: Association Press, 1936. xi + 65 pp. 50 cents.

God. By WALTER M. HORTON. New York: Association Press, 1937. 72 pp. 50 cents.

Jesus. By MARY ELY LYMAN. New York: Association Press, 1937. 64 pp. 50 cents.

In a note about these Hazen Books on Religion as a foreword it is stated: "The purpose of the series is to present simply, compactly, and inexpensively a number of the best available interpretations of Christian philosophy as a guide to Christian living today."

From the first three books produced it would appear that this purpose has been admirably fulfilled in all particulars. The authors are scholars of distinction who have the ability to write of profound subjects in a clear and interesting manner. They give the results of scholarly investigation and of constructive interpretation which ought to prove very helpful to readers who desire to have a positive statement of present positions in easily understandable form. The aim of the series is well carried out because in these three books there is no attempt at exhortation; definite information is made simply available, with lucid exposition. The facts and the views presented are sufficient to make their own appeal.

The Hazen Foundation is to be congratulated on providing small, inexpensive books of this character. They meet "a long-felt need." To read them is to realize that Christianity has something vital to offer, and also that critical scholarship is the method that best leads to a constructive knowledge of it. These books, valuable in themselves as an introductory study, would be excellent for group discussion, and they may be expected to awaken interest in a large and more elaborate literature in the same field.

R. C. K.

Mind, Medicine and Metaphysics: The Philosophy of a Physician. By WILLIAM BROWN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936. vii + 294 pp.

In this collection of lectures and essays there are a number which touch upon religious problems. Perhaps it is the fact that they were originally

popular presentations that has given most of them their peculiarly unsubstantial character. The majority are a mixture of interesting psychological observations interspersed with unclarified generalizations, often merely asserted, with no previous statements as logical stepping stones. In speaking of morality, for example, the author casually mentions that: "We could write a psychology of morals, but true morals—the essence and heart of morality—are of course, philosophical or metaphysical, and there is nothing we are learning in psychopathology to undermine them. Certain people have special views of their own, partly because they have not been philosophically trained [reference to Freud], but those who have been philosophically trained all hold much the same view, that the result of psychology should be to deepen our morals and religions, and, indeed, it can have no other effect."

The author disagrees strongly with the Freudian conception of religion as an illusion, because of its negative character. "Religion is not something developed on the basis of cowardice and selfishness. It is based upon the principle of love, affection and creativeness of all kinds, a determination to go forward." Similar blank statements pepper most of the essays. Disagreement with Freud's complete identification of "conscience" with the "super-ego" is registered, but it is not indicated at what point the former ceases to be the latter. When the author does try to elaborate some specific disagreement he does it with such naïveté that, knowing his actual high repute, one can only ascribe the situation to the circumstances under which the particular essay may have been born. For example, in disagreeing with Freud's explanation of sympathy as a mechanism secondary to aggressive feelings and acts, the author states: "Sympathy is primary. . . . You do not do anything to be merely cruel: it is done without thinking and afterwards you feel extremely sorry and overwhelmed, and so your powers of sympathy are called out still more."

In striking contrast to the lack of substance in most of the essays touching upon religion, there is an interesting one on the Oxford Movement. With justice the author points out the many psychological pitfalls it presents. The most important of these is the "uncontrolled transference," to use the psychoanalytic expression, which takes place when people bind one another through a group catharsis. A regression to the original trusting, naïve attitude of childhood takes place. This dims one's critical faculties, makes one pliable to the suggestion of the "leader" and "fixes" one emotionally. As to the "guidance" which forms such an important part of Buchman practices, the author rightly stresses the fact that, when one consciously strives for "messages from God" what one is more than apt to get is merely a projection of unconscious material. He hastens to add, though, that he does not disbelieve in guidance, but simply points to the difficulty of disentangling it from the complex matrix of sub-conscious conflicts which guidance, or inspiration of any kind, necessarily reflect.

HENRY J. WEGROCKI

Cartesio—nel terzo centenario del "Discorso del metodo". Preface by Agostino Gemelli. Pubblicazione a cura della Facoltà di filosofia dell'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore. Milano: Società editrice "Vita e Pensiero", 1937 xii + 807 pp. L. 75.

Of the long list of distinguished contributions to the criticism of Cartesianism in its relations to Christian theology contained in this volume, we call attention especially to the following:

Arbitrarismo divino, libertà umana e implicanze teologiche nella dottrina di Cartesio. By Romano Americo.

Le "Cogito" dans Saint Augustin. By Charles Boyer.

An Illustration of the Attitude of the Early French Jesuits Towards Cartesianism. By Vernon J. Bourke.

Erneuerung und Umbildung des Cartesianismus in der christlichen Philosophie des 19. Jahrhunderts. By Alois Demph.

Von den "Ewigen Wahrheiten" Descartes zu den "analytischen Urteilen" der Neuscholastik. By Joseph De Vries.

La critique thomiste du "Cogito" cartésien. By Reginaldo Garrigou-Lagrange.

Die Philosophie des Cartesius und die Eucharistielehre des Emmanuel Maignan O. Minim. By Martino Grahmann.

Les conflits du Cartésianisme. By Regis Jolivet.

L'uomo di S. Tommaso e l'uomo di R. Cartesio. By Amato Masnovo

Les preuves cartesiennes de l'existence de Dieu dans les Meditations metaphysiques. By Pierre Mesnard.

Tradition in the Making. By Louis Finkelstein. New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1937. 24 pp.

In connection with the recent celebration of the Semi-Centennial of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, several noteworthy addresses have been published, and are available at the Seminary, Broadway and 122nd St., New York City. Among these addresses is one by Professor Louis Finkelstein, entitled *Tradition in the Making; The Seminary's Interpretation of Judaism.* It is expected that other scholarly papers presented at this celebration will be published soon.

The American Jew: A Study of Backgrounds. By Abraham J. Feldman. New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1937. x + 93 pp. $1.25.

A brief history of the various Jewish immigrations into America, and of the religious backgrounds and ideas of these groups. Especially useful is the extensive chronological table and bibliography.

Der Stern vom Morgenlande. By V. Stankevič. Leipzig: K. F. Kohler, 1937. 84 pp. RM 3.

An attempt to trace the legend of the Three Wise Men and the Star in the East to a Buddhist source.

The Church and the Churches. By KARL BARTH. Grand Rapids: Eerdman's Publishing Co., 1936. 92 pp. 75 cents.

Four short lectures on the nature and function of the church from the point of view of the crisis theology. Professor Barth discusses The Unity of the Church, The Multiplicity of the Churches, The Union of the Churches, and The Church and the Churches. There chapters were prepared as a preparatory message to the Edinburgh Conference.

La filosofia della religione e il problema della vita. By UMBERTO A. PADOVANI. MILAN: Società Editrice "Vita E Pensiero,, 1937. ix + 263 pp.

A careful survey of the problem of evil, and of various philosophical schools that have faced it, ending with the author's own solution, and philosophic defense of Christian asceticism.

La primauté de l'esprit dans le message évangélique. By JEAN BOISSET. Paris, Librairie Félix Alcan, 1937. 204 pp. Fr. 32.

A review of the problem of the origin of the Christian sacraments and churches, and an evaluation of Calvin's theology.

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